A temporary, albeit shaky, cease-fire is being negotiated May 27 between forces loyal to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and armed tribesmen loyal to Hashid tribal sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, the eldest of the brothers within the influential al-Ahmar family. This latest flare-up began May 22 when Saleh refused for the third time to sign an accord mediated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that would have had him step down within 30 days and pave the way for elections in return for immunity. Saleh loyalists then besieged the UAE Embassy, where U.S., EU and GCC diplomats were discussing ways to salvage the peace deal. The emergency evacuation of foreign diplomats struck a serious blow to Saleh's credibility and led to intensified calls by U.S., EU and GCC leaders for Saleh to step down once and for all. A day later, Hashid tribesmen loyal to the al-Ahmar family attacked and barricaded themselves in government facilities, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Tourism and Yemen's official Saba news agency. Saleh's security forces then tried to storm the al-Ahmar compound while a mediation was taking place among tribal leaders (an attack on a tribal mediation is a fatal breach of the "urf," or tribal law, tradition). The deaths of several tribesmen participating in the mediation, including prominent sheikhs and their relatives, expanded the fight to tribesmen outside of Sanaa, including members of the al Aesmat tribe, who are now seeking to avenge the deaths of their tribal kin. Clashes between Republican Guard forces loyal to Sanaa and tribesmen from the northern-based Hashid confederation spread to the outskirts of Sanaa and Sanaa International Airport on May 25. Then, on May 27, the fighting spread to the Nehem region, some 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Sanaa, where tribesmen stormed a military compound known as al-Fardha and the Yemeni air force responded with airstrikes in the area. The compound, situated on a mountain, is the main crossing point between the capital and the eastern province of Marib. Whoever holds this point can prevent the other side from reinforcing their fighters in the capital. At the time of this writing, fighting is continuing at al-Fardha. The death toll from the fighting in and around the capital over the past week has so far surpassed 100. (click here to enlarge image) While the president's energy and resources are focused on trying to hold down the capital, the state's authority in the rest of the country continues to disintegrate. Revenge attacks by tribes on oil pipelines and electricity pylons continued in Marib province May 27, where a U.S. airstrike in May 2010 accidentally killed the province's deputy governor, who had been mediating between the state and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Meanwhile, government officials from the southern province of Abyan claimed AQAP forces set up checkpoints and took over government buildings in the city of Zinjibar. These reports have not been confirmed, and the opposition claims Saleh loyalists use such claims to draw attention to the consequences of bringing down his regime. There is little doubt, however, that from AQAP in the hinterland to the al-Houthi rebels in the northern borderland to the southern separatists, Yemen's varied rebel landscape has benefited from the state's growing distractions.

Memories of the Siege of Sanaa

While throngs of tribesmen took part in funeral processions May 27, Saleh refrained this week from delivering one of his usually defiant speeches to loyalists at Midan al-Sabeen, the main national square in Yemen. The location of the president's weekly addresses in Midan al-Sabeen, named after Sanaa's historical 70-day siege, now takes on a much deeper significance given the events of the past six days. More than 43 years ago, North Yemen was engulfed in a civil war between Saudi-backed royalists and republicans backed by the Soviet Union, Egypt and China, among other countries. On Nov. 28, 1967, the royalists banded together tribes from in and around Sanaa and laid siege to the capital. Though the republicans ended up surviving the tribal offensive, the siege, which lasted 70 days, is remembered by many of the Yemeni tribesmen fighting today, who understand well that a tribal coalition, especially one fueled by vengeance and united in a common purpose, can have the power to overwhelm a leader sitting in the presidential palace. Such was the case when Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948, and the sons who survived him rallied tribesmen surrounding the capital to invade Sanaa and retake control of North Yemen. Indeed, the more state institutions are seen as illegitimate and ineffective sources of governance, the more relevant urf becomes. And once the battle comes down to the tribes, the country's most important state institution, the military, could see it soldiers forced to choose between loyalty to their units and loyalty to their clans. Still, there are a lot of differences between the current crisis and the conditions leading to the 1967-1968 siege of Sanaa. The first and perhaps most obvious is that the 1967-1968 siege took place in the context of the Cold War, when a battle between monarchists in the Arabian Peninsula and secular Nasserites allowed for ample foreign support to flow into Yemen. Though Iran has provided limited support to al-Houthi rebels in Yemen in a bid to constrain Saudi Arabia, Yemen is nowhere near the proxy battleground that it was during the Cold War. Saudi Arabia is the main stakeholder in the Yemen crisis and has the financial, religious and political links to sway Yemeni tribes, but it also is not ready to throw its full support behind one side.

The Saudi Dilemma

On the one hand, Saudi Arabia sees Saleh as a major liability, and his refusal to step down is creating instability in the region at a time when Riyadh would much rather be focusing on its internal issues and the broader strategic dilemma of containing Iran. On the other hand, the Saudi royals can see clearly that Saleh, while losing credibility at home and abroad, has the military advantage within Sanaa thanks to years of stacking the country's most elite military branches with his closest relatives and tribesmen. Moreover, while the al-Ahmar brothers are leading the siege against Saleh in Sanaa and have an extensive family, tribal and business web of relationships with which to form a coalition against the president, they also have their fair share of enemies who do not want to see a power vacuum in Sanaa give way to the political ascendancy of the al-Ahmar brothers. These enemies include factions within the rival Bakeel tribe; al-Houthis in the north, who fear being left out of the negotiation process; and more socialist-minded southern separatists, who resent the al-Ahmar family for taking their land after the civil war and do not adhere to the northerners' tribal code. In other words, Yemen is still far too divided and the president remains too militarily secured at the moment for Saudi Arabia to make a drastic move against him. Finally, Saudi Arabia does not necessarily want a successful people's revolution in Yemen serving as a model for protests elsewhere in the region, especially in the Saudi kingdom. The complexity of the situation explains Riyadh's seemingly confused approach to the Yemen crisis. What is clear is that Saudi Arabia seems to be doing its best to avoid a civil war in Yemen that could cause further instability on its borders. This may explain why Saudi Arabia in April cut off funding to a special committee of sheikhs in Yemen, likely using the opportunity to remind Yemen's main tribes of the consequences of ignoring Riyadh's demands. It is unclear whether that funding has resumed and to which tribes, but Saudi Arabia's financial prowess remains a key factor in determining to what extent the al-Ahmars are able to build a strong enough tribal coalition to overwhelm Saleh and his forces. Saudi Arabia also appears to be doing its part to avoid a major breakdown within the Yemeni military. Brig. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of Yemen's 1st Armored Brigade and northwestern military zone and the leader of Yemen's old guard, led a wave of military defections against Saleh beginning March 21 and remains Saleh's most formidable opponent. Though Mohsen and his forces have made limited advances toward Sanaa and provide protection to protesters in the streets, they have largely avoided major confrontations with pro-Saleh military forces, knowing that they remain outgunned and outnumbered in the capital. According to a STRATFOR source, Saudi Arabia had pressured Mohsen to leave Yemen to allow for the army to reunify and avoid a civil war. In return, Mohsen would likely be able to position himself in a post-Saleh regime. The status and details of those negotiations remain unclear, but it is notable that Mohsen and his forces have so far kept to the sidelines of the conflict erupting in Sanaa between Hashid tribesmen and pro-Saleh forces in spite of the al-Ahmar brothers' pleas to Mohsen to join their fight.

A Troubled Tribal Code

The Hashid offensive on Sanaa has brought to light the fundamental tension between the modern Yemeni state and its tribal foundation. When Yemen climbed out of civil war in 1994, Saleh, while taking care to co-opt sheikhs in political and military arenas, sought to ensure his power through clansmen and relatives who now dominate Yemen's state institutions. As Saleh came to personify the state, tribalism and the tradition of urf fell largely to the periphery, yet the tradition was maintained as a state tool to manage the wider society when modern legal tools proved insufficient. Meanwhile, in the more fertile south, tribalism was weak to begin with due to historical and economic factors that gave rise to a socialist and semi-feudal tradition. Now that the state personified by Saleh is under siege, Yemen's northern tribes are naturally resurrecting themselves. Only this time, they are struggling to operate in a modern political system. Up until this time, Yemen's widely varied opposition, consisting of tribesmen, politicians, students, Islamists, Arab nationalists, southern separatists and northern al-Houthis, was relying on modern political means of mass civil demonstrations and GCC-mediated political negotiations to deal with the current crisis. Once it became clear that Saleh was exploiting the modern political procedures to hold onto power, a large segment of the opposition began returning to tribal custom. But the power of urf is not what it used to be in Yemen. This can be seen in the events of the past six days, as Saleh's forces showed little compunction for violating urf and waging an attack on a tribal mediation. Attempts by Sadeq al-Ahmar's brother Hamid to set up an inter-tribal negotiation have collapsed due to the excess number of mediators present, the lack of overall structure to the mediation, and the alienation felt by many tribesmen from sheikhs like the al-Ahmars whose involvement in politics and big business over the years has distanced them from the tribal landscape. At the same time, Saleh and his closest family members cannot place their full trust in the modern political process when tribalism is on the rise. For example, Saleh and his family members remain extremely reluctant to buy into GCC guarantees on immunity from prosecution since, according to urf, the deaths of Saleh and his family are the appropriate response to the deaths of rival tribesmen. The divergence between tribal and religious leaders in interpreting urf further complicates matters. It is this strain between tribalism and the state that will continue to hamper GCC, U.S. and EU attempts to force a political resolution on Sanaa. Mass demonstrations and negotiated political settlements may be the model of the Arab Spring, but in Yemen, an eye for an eye will be the catalyst for change, whether that change is for better or for worse.