For the third time, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on May 22 refused to sign an accord drawn up by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that would require him to step down within 30 days and turn power over to the vice president ahead of early elections in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Saleh's stalling prompted the GCC to suspend the power transition negotiations.
Clashes meanwhile broke out the next day in the Yemeni capital between Saleh's supporters and detractors. When the first GCC-brokered deal was introduced in early May, STRATFOR laid out the list of
pitfalls to the deal and concluded that Saleh would likely use the negotiations to buy time to reassert his authority in the capital through loyal security forces and sow divisions within an already highly fractious opposition without ever seriously intending to strike a deal. Saleh's delay tactics over the past month and the GCC's repeated failures in mediation leave little doubt that this was Saleh's agenda all along.
Saleh's Credibility Hit
In the last iteration, Saleh refused to sign the accord in the absence of the opposition leaders, arguing that he could not work out a transition deal if the other negotiators refuse to show up for the signing. Even if the opposition had been present at the signing, Saleh likely would have found another technicality to use to delay the negotiation. Saleh's ability to stall the talks indicates the still-significant amount of support he maintains in Sanaa and other parts of the country. Though the country's army, tribes and civil society are split between pro- and anti-Saleh camps, there is no clear geographic divide that allows one side to impose its will on the other. The nebulous nature of the country's political and tribal landscape, the president's support among the most elite military units and a general fear of Yemen devolving into civil war if one side pushes the physical battle too far are contributing to Saleh's staying power. That said, Saleh is not in a comfortable position, either. On May 22, the day of Saleh's third refusal, a group of Saleh loyalists armed with machine guns, knives and pistols besieged the UAE Embassy, where U.S., EU and GCC diplomats were meeting over the troubled peace deal. The demonstrations appeared orchestrated, and though no one was injured, the security forces loyal to Saleh failed to provide safe passage for the diplomats, who were trapped in the embassy compound and then forced to make an emergency evacuation. U.S., EU and GCC leaders already weary of Saleh's latest stalling tactics and upset that their diplomats had come under direct threat by pro-Saleh tribesmen strongly criticized the Saleh government May 23. Saleh quickly attempted to repair the damage by denouncing the embassy siege and by placing a direct call to the Emirati leader to apologize for the incident, but the United States, European Union and GCC did not hide their extreme displeasure with the Yemeni president.
The Opposition's Opportunity
The opposition could see an opportunity in the days ahead. The futures of opposition leaders such as
Brig. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and tribal sheikhs belonging to the
influential al-Ahmar family, who have already given Saleh an ultimatum, depend on their ability to bring Saleh down. More specifically, the opposition must convince foreign stakeholders that it is capable of bringing Saleh down and that Saleh can no longer be tolerated as president. To sustain pressure on Saleh and resist falling prey to internal divisions, the opposition kept a significant presence in the streets of Sanaa outside the main university entrance under the protection of al-Ahmar's forces. Now that Saleh's credibility is suffering, the opposition has a chance to build international support against the president and his allies, using the May 22 incident at the UAE Embassy to depict Saleh as an unreliable and irresponsible leader while increasing pressure on Saleh's forces. However, the opposition will also face major credibility issues outside Yemen, especially as tribesmen loyal to Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar were seen attacking government buildings and clashing with pro-Saleh security forces throughout the capital May 23. Armed men belonging to the sheikh's Hashid tribe reportedly attacked buildings housing the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Tourism, Yemen's official Saba news agency and Yemen's state-owned airlines. The main gunbattle was centered on the al-Ramah school, located next to the al-Ahmar family complex. The al-Ahmars claim pro-Saleh forces in Yemen's Republican Guard were storing weapons in the school (currently out of session for the summer) and were building up a strategic vantage point to surround and defeat their forces. A cease-fire was eventually reached, but such clashes will continue and will raise concerns of the unreliability of all parties to this conflict. Brig. Gen. al-Ahmar's forces stayed out of the clashes on May 23 but could seriously escalate tensions should they attempt a sustained battle against well-entrenched pro-Saleh forces in the capital. Detecting the likelihood of further violence, the U.S. Embassy in Yemen has shut its consular section to the public through at least May 25. With the GCC deal collapsed, Saleh losing his credibility and the threat of civil strife in Yemen increasing,
Saudi Arabia finds itself in a major dilemma. Saudi Arabia typically can use its tribal, religious, business and political links
in Yemen to sway factions one way or another, but Riyadh has several bad options to try to put the Yemeni crisis to rest. Toward the beginning of the uprising, the Saudi leadership supported the al-Ahmar sheikhs and Mohsen in their efforts to raise the pressure on Saleh, but they also refrained from pushing for full regime change. Fully dismantling the Saleh regime would entail a
highly intensive and complicated process, one that Saudi Arabia did not have time for while trying to deal with the more strategic issue of countering Iranian moves throughout the region, quashing a Shiite uprising in Bahrain and trying to avoid instability within the Saudi kingdom itself. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has been hesitant to fully support a democratic uprising so close to its borders for fear that one revolution's success in the Persian Gulf could embolden others in the region to step up their protests in hopes of achieving the same results. The ideal solution from the Saudi point of view was to mediate an orderly transition, one in which Saleh — as the target of ire in the protests — would be removed and arrangements could be made for a revamped government suitable to Saudi interests. Saleh's intransigence has evidently foiled the Saudi plan, and instead of receiving credit for a successful mediation, Saudi Arabia is fighting the embarrassment of not being able to exert sufficient influence in Yemen to resolve this political crisis. Saudi Arabia will be spending the next few days deliberating its next steps for Yemen, but the current conditions within Sanaa indicate there may be little that even Riyadh is willing to do to deal with the consequences of breaking Yemen out of its current stasis.
