Around the same time that Hamas and Fatah signed a May 4 reconciliation agreement — a deal designed to reunite the Palestinian factions in a unity government and pave the way for peace talks — rumors began circulating that Hamas needed to find a new home for its politburo, currently located in Damascus. The rumor originated in the Saudi-owned, London-based pan-Arab daily Al Hayat, which reported April 30, citing unnamed Palestinian sources, that Jordan and Egypt had denied requests to host Hamas but that Qatar would host the politburo if Hamas' military leadership returned to Gaza (though most of Hamas' military command, led by Ahmed Jabari, is already based in Gaza). Hamas' exiled leadership vehemently denied the reports May 1 in Al Hayat and May 2 in The New York Times, asserting that Hamas is still operating from Damascus and that the group has no intention to relocate. Despite the denials, the rumors have persisted. Indeed, STRATFOR sources in Syria and Qatar and within Hamas have all acknowledged that negotiations on Hamas' possible relocation to Qatar have been taking place. The motives underlying these discussions are somewhat easy to discern in the current geopolitical environment, but the outcome of the talks remains far from clear.

Syria’s Bargaining Chip

Khaled Meshaal leads the Hamas politburo. Meshaal got involved with Hamas in the late 1980s when he was in Kuwait, then was expelled from Jordan in 1999 and lived briefly in Qatar before moving to Syria in 2001. He and several other Hamas representatives direct the Islamist movement from Syria. Meshaal, who was the target of a failed Israeli Mossad assassination attempt in Amman in 1997, has been the face of Hamas ever since the group's founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was assassinated in Gaza in 2004. From their headquarters in Damascus, the Hamas politburo handles the bulk of the group's financing and exerts a great deal of influence over the organization's political and militant strategy. The headquarters' location in Damascus allows the Hamas leadership to operate at a far safer distance from the Israel Defense Forces than if they were operating from within Gaza itself, but it also makes Hamas that much more vulnerable to the demands of its external sponsors. The latest Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, for example, was only made possible after the Syrian government approved of the deal. Syria's acquiescence followed two significant waves of Hamas attacks in March and early April that appeared designed to provoke Israel into military confrontation, raising suspicion that Iran could have been trying to seize an opportunity to trigger conflict in the Israeli-Palestinian theater. Though their interests do not always align, Syria, and Iran to a lesser extent, use Hamas' dependence on Damascus to exploit the organization as a militant proxy with which to threaten Israel or extract concessions in exchange for containing the group when the need arises. Syria has been overwhelmed in the past two months with a spreading uprising that is threatening to unsettle the foundation of the regime of President Bashar al Assad. Though the al Assad government is not yet facing an existential crisis, it has used Hamas as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and by extension, the United States, to limit external pressures. The Syrian regime's increasing vulnerability has been seen as an opportunity for regional stakeholders looking to curb Iran's influence in the Levant to pressure Damascus while it copes with its domestic crisis. Frustrated with Syria's refusal to cut ties with Iran and Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia has instead been pressuring the al Assad and Hamas leaderships to agree to a relocation of the Hamas politburo to another Arab capital. By denying Syria significant leverage over Hamas, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan and others within the so-called Arab consensus can reassert their own influence over the group, hold Hamas more politically accountable in trying to sustain the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation and ultimately deprive Iran of a critical conduit into the Palestinian territories. Egypt, in trying to both keep tabs on Hamas and contain the Muslim Brotherhood's political agenda at home, is especially interested in transforming Hamas into a more manageable political entity. Cairo does not want Hamas' militant activities to create crises between Egypt and Israel while Cairo tries to sort out its own shaky political future. Egypt's intelligence chief, Murad Muwafi, reportedly met with Ahmed Jabari, the head of Hamas' military wing, in late April to seek the group's commitment to the reconciliation and has more recently begun discussing a potential deal for Hamas to release captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit to boost Hamas' political credibility in negotiations and calm tensions with Israel. Meanwhile, Qatar has been trying to raise its international stature through various mediation efforts throughout the Middle East and could see some utility in developing leverage in the Palestinian theater by hosting Hamas (though hosting Hamas' political wing could attract negative attention for a country trying to prepare to host the 2022 World Cup.)

Reasons Against the Move

Though the talk of relocating Hamas' politburo appears to be more than mere rumors, there are no clear indications yet that Meshaal will be moving to Doha. Saudi Arabia and others can try to make the case to an embattled Syrian regime that Damascus will get more regional support and a potential political opening with the United States and Israel if it gives up the Hamas card. Though the Syrian regime would still be hosting Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian militant factions in Damascus, it is unlikely to be talked into sacrificing a useful bargaining chip like Hamas in a time of crisis. Iran will greatly pressure Damascus to keep Hamas' exiled leadership in place. Meshaal and the rest of Hamas' exiled leadership are also likely wary of relocating their headquarters to a distant Arab capital. Some tension has surfaced between the Syrian government and Meshaal more recently as Syria's domestic crisis has intensified, which has prompted rumors that Hamas could abandon what it considers an undependable Syrian regime. In carefully worded comments May 5, for example, Meshaal talked about the need for more freedom and democracy in Syria. At the same time, Meshaal does not want to risk losing relevancy with a move to the Persian Gulf region, far from the Gaza Strip. Meshaal likely understands the Saudi, Egyptian, Qatari and Jordanian desire to try to separate Hamas' political and military branches and undermine the exiled leadership's influence. If Hamas earns credible political recognition in a unity government with Fatah that allows more direct funding in the territories, and Israel and Egypt are able to keep closer tabs on Hamas' military command in Gaza, the exiled leaders will have a much harder time asserting their will over the group's actions. Meshaal has already taken a significant step in lifting his resistance to reconciliation with Fatah and will want to continue to play a major part in charting Hamas' (increasingly uncertain) political future. The negotiations over the fate of Hamas' politburo bear close watching but do not yet indicate that Hamas is ready for a big move.