STRATFOR sources within Turkey's Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) humanitarian organization confirmed the rumors that it is delaying until late June the launch of a new flotilla to deliver humanitarian goods to the Gaza Strip by breaking the Israeli-imposed blockade. Instead, on May 31, IHH will organize a commemoration day for nine people who were killed during an Israeli raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara last year. IHH's stated reason for delaying the flotilla is that the restoration of the Mavi Marmara is not completed yet. However, more significant factors are contributing to the change in IHH's plans. Turkey will hold parliamentary elections June 12 and the competition between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its opponents is intensifying, as expected. The AKP still appears ineffectual in handling the crisis with Israel after the Mavi Marmara incident, as it has not been able to have its demands for an apology and compensation met. Thus, the Turkish government does not want to risk another international crisis ahead of elections that would give its opponents a chance to portray the religiously conservative AKP as incapable of dealing with Israel beyond rhetoric. The Turkish government denies any link with the Islamist-leaning IHH, but it is unlikely that a controversial international action like the launch of an aid flotilla to Gaza would be organized without consultations with the AKP government. In fact, reports in Israeli media April 12 claimed that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan personally opposed another flotilla campaign before the elections, fearing it would scare off the politically moderate support base the AKP needs to get more seats in the new parliament. If Israel backed down under Turkish pressure and allowed an aid flotilla to reach Gaza, it would be a strategic boon for the AKP ahead of elections. But even though Israel indicated that it would use diplomatic means to prevent the flotilla, there is no reason to believe the Israeli government would not take the same military measures to halt the flotilla before it reaches the Gaza Strip (though it likely would adjust its tactics after the previous experience). Recent developments in the region could also factor into the IHH's decision. A reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah, which is supposed to lead to elections in eight months, began in Cairo on April 27. The reconciliation is still shaky, as the two Palestinian factions still disagree over the recognition of Israel and leadership of the interim Palestinian unity government. As a regional player increasingly involved in the Palestinian issue, Turkey supported the efforts to ease the tension between Israel and Hamas in April to portray itself as a stabilizing force in the region. A possible crisis in Gaza caused by a Turkish-initiated flotilla campaign would be seen as a move to sabotage the already fragile Palestinian reconciliation process and undermine Turkey's image as a constructive actor. Then there is Egypt, which is not happy with Turkey's efforts to encroach on its historical role in handling the Palestinians, especially since Cairo has been reasserting itself as a regional leader since the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Moreover, Egypt's current military leadership is concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood becoming an overly emboldened political movement and is aware that any such crisis in Gaza would give the group an opportunity for growth in that direction. Egypt knows that it needs to act in advance to ward off such a possibility; Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Elaraby said April 28 that Egypt's old policy toward Gaza was "disgraceful" and that Egypt would "fully open the Rafah crossing to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip." By halting the flotilla campaign, Turkey avoids creating a conflict with Egypt for now and denies Cairo an opportunity to blame Turkey should the reconciliation process fail. Just as these factors affected the IHH's decision to delay the flotilla, the domestic and international conditions will determine whether the Turkish aid group will send ships toward Gaza in June.
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