Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika announced he will appoint a committee to recommend constitutional reforms in an April 15 address to the nation. Bouteflika's address, which mentioned few specific measures, came alongside plans to change the code that governs the approval of political parties, decriminalizing media offenses and a national investment program to alleviate economic grievances. The Algerian opposition, which favors the formation of a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution completely, likely will reject the overture. While Bouteflika's speech has the potential to spark a fresh wave of protests, the opposition has thus far lacked the ability to mobilize popular support, something that is likely to continue. With the regional security situation having deteriorated since the beginning of the Libyan conflict, groups within the political elite may look to use the threat of Islamist violence to keep a tight rein on the reform process. Algeria has seen a number of localized strikes and protests in 2011. These have escalated in frequency in the past month, with participants including doctors and nurses, teachers, the communal police and university students. On April 12, more than 1,000 students marched toward the presidential palace in Algiers before being turned away by police. These protests have been widespread but generally small in scale, showing both the dissatisfaction among Algerian civilians and the lack of a popular movement for the dissatisfied to mobilize around. The government has managed the situation cautiously since protests began in January, with Bouteflika having resisted making public pronouncements on the unrest while introducing placating measures such as extended food subsidies and the lifting of the 19-year state of emergency Feb. 24. However, a bomb threat in Algiers by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on March 30, the confiscation of AQIM weapons transports crossing the border from Libya near Debdeb on March 29 and April 6, and the killing of 13 soldiers by militants April 15 near Tizi Ouzou have raised fears that the situation is worsening. Algeria is governed by a coalition of the National Liberation Front (FLN), the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP). Together this grouping controls 42 percent of the elected parliamentary National People's Assembly and although Bouteflika left the FLN and formally ran for president as an independent in 2009, this grouping backed his nomination. However, the true power rivalry in Algeria is contested by two "clans," one headed by Bouteflika and centered in the northwest of the country around Tlemcen, and the other headed by military intelligence (DRS) chief Gen. Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene, which enjoys support in the ethnic Berber-majority northeast. The timing of the president's announcement nearly two months after the lifting of the state of emergency and coinciding with the second anniversary of his re-election is a calculated concession to opposition demands but is also designed to moderate expectations over the speed of change by committing to but not substantiating a reform agenda. As such, it is also indicative of the factionalism that prevents the ruling elite from acting unilaterally. While agreement between the clans is paramount to any political reform, it remains to be seen how parties within and outside the ruling alliance will react to the proposals. Outside the alliance, opposition parties are widely united in their call for a constituent assembly. Led by Louisa Hanoune's Workers Party (PT), Moussa Touati's Algerian National Front (FNA) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), headed by Said Sadi, the opposition is demanding a fully representative body be formed and tasked with drawing up a new constitution. While the party positions within the opposition do differ, there is also a strong feeling that the reform process should not go through the existing government and that early elections should be called to expedite the process. Despite the concerns of the opposition, they have proved ineffective at bringing together sufficient popular support for their agenda. It remains unlikely that objections to the president's address will fuel a coherent popular uprising, although the prospect of behind-the-scenes manipulation means that the possibility cannot be dismissed entirely. Within the alliance, the ruling FLN and Bouteflika remain in favor of partial constitutional reform but do not want the wholesale change that a constituent assembly would bring. The MSP (formerly known as Hamas and an offshoot of the Algerian Muslim Brotherhood) has strayed from the government position by openly sympathizing with regional protests and suggesting that constitutional reform not be enacted by those currently in power. MSP chairman Bouguerra Soltani announced April 5 that the party would debate its continued participation in the alliance at its national council in July. There is also a growing sense that Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, who heads the RND, will be replaced in a long-anticipated Cabinet reshuffle. At its annual conference April 7, the RND expressed concern that Ouyahia had been the victim of a plot by the FLN to depose him, although it reiterated its support for the FLN position on constitutional reform. These developments reveal that cracks are emerging in the ruling alliance. If one or both of these parties were to leave the coalition, it would substantially weaken Bouteflika's position, and the ability of the MSP and RND to shift the balance of power could prove telling. The Libyan conflict represents a substantial deterioration in Algeria's security situation and raises the threat of terrorism and weapons proliferation among non-state groups looking to profit from the decay of Libyan power in the region. Indeed, the Algerian government has made clear its opposition to the coalition campaign in Libya over fears that AQIM could fill the vacuum created if Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi was deposed. While concerning to the regime in Algiers, the threat of further incidents could serve as a useful tool as the Algerian regime seeks to exert maximum influence over the political transition leading up to legislative elections in 2012. By convincing the public that the militant Islamist threat remains, the regime will be able to justify strict security measures despite the fact that the state of emergency is no longer in place. However, it remains to be seen whether the president and those loyal to him will be able to exploit the situation or whether his opponents will succeed in using the situation to destabilize him. The army's continued loyalty in executing its expanded role in dealing with any future security concerns will remain central to Bouteflika's hold on power. Regardless of this outcome, the greatest threat to stability in Algeria remains the one posed by the rivalry for power within the ruling clans, not the protesting opposition.