Leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — the so-called BRICS — met in Sanya city, Hainan province, China on April 14 to promote economic cooperation and diplomatic discussion between each other and to criticize the global order, which they see as dominated by traditional Western powers. The BRICS began as a concept by a high-profile Western financial investor but has grown into an actual talk shop with annual meetings. The participating states are distant geographically, politically and militarily, and despite being more plausibly labeled as the world's leading developing countries, their economic structures are substantially different. The differences are so stark as to make the group incapable of meaningful alliance or binding agreements. Tensions between China, with its giant economy, and the others in particular impede collective action. India and China are longstanding rivals; Russia and China are occasional rivals; and Brazil and China are suffering new strains from growing economic interdependence. Moreover, each state has a different relationship with the United States, which remains powerful enough that it can still divide any one member of the group from the others. But the BRICS can serve their individual interests by dealing with each other on specific bilateral or multilateral issues and creating the appearance of presenting a new coalition of states that stands apart from the U.S.-led world system and is worthy of foreign investment. This year, the group has touted the inclusion of South Africa, helping Pretoria seal its position as a regional African leader and adding more credibility to the claims by the BRICS of representing the entire developing world. It also has criticized NATO operations in Libya, warned against destabilizing capital inflows into emerging markets blamed primarily on American money printing and pledged to work toward stabilizing commodity prices. And the group has repeated promises to try to reform the United Nations and the global financial system, namely by promoting not only cross-border trade in each other's currencies but also cross-border local-currency credit, while denouncing the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency.

China as the Host

One theme at this year's BRICS summit stands out: China's attempt, as host, to use the affair to display its amiable and cooperative side. China's general international friendliness contrasts with its behavior in 2010, when Beijing alarmed the United States and its neighbors by supporting North Korea amid surprise attacks on the South, increasing its naval activity and hardening its stance on territorial claims. China's neighbors — India foremost among them — repeatedly emphasized concerns over this increasingly assertive behavior. China was framed, especially in its region, as an increasingly strident and forceful power whose regional intentions were becoming more threatening even as it concealed its growing capabilities. Near the end of the year in 2010, STRATFOR began receiving word from Washington and Beijing that China would adjust its foreign policy away from these obtrusive positions in order to deflate the concerns. Beijing's rhetoric on the South China Sea security disputes seemed to soften in the latter half of the year. The United States and China made a show of warming relations in January when presidents Hu Jintao and Barack Obama met, and since then China has re-emphasized the positive side of relations with most of its neighbors and competitors. In the lead-up to the BRICS summit, Beijing seemed especially congenial. After reportedly stopping the issuance of a different kind of visa for citizens of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, a practice that greatly incensed India in recent years, Beijing and India said defense exchanges would resume. Beijing also sought to appease the Brazilians with large business and investment deals during President Dilma Rousseff's bilateral visit before the BRICS summit to mitigate rising tensions over China's massive exports and undervalued currency, which the nascent Rousseff administration has prioritized. China is also emphasizing that its cooperation with South Africa is not limited to a desire for more natural resources but will benefit South Africa's other economic sectors. Negotiations over energy cooperation with Russia are ongoing and said to be on track for a natural gas pricing agreement by mid-2011. China's apparent friendliness extends beyond the BRICS. In addition to its high tempo of friendly diplomacy with smaller states, Beijing has invested in European economic recovery; is preparing for a high-level meeting with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in April (and released an Australian citizen suddenly after detaining him amid a domestic security crackdown); and will host Philippine President Benigno Aquino III to talk about big new investments. In the past month, the Chinese security forces and military have also had exchanges with their Vietnamese counterparts. China and South Korea have claimed to step up strategic ties after Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik met, and China is facilitating six-party talks, which could occur in the next two to three months. It has held exchanges with the United States leading up to the next round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue, increased military to military communication and facilitated Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming visit with Vice President Xi Jinping. Beijing so far has even avoided taking advantage of Japan's weakened position after the March 11 earthquake. What appears increasingly to be an all-around Chinese charm offensive — or at least an all around attempt to be inoffensive — seemed confirmed when U.S. Pacific Command chief Adm. Robert Willard explicitly said April 12 that the Chinese navy has retrenched somewhat and is acting notably less assertive in 2011.

Balancing Internal and External Concerns

None of the above should suggest that Beijing has discarded its assertive tactics. China has revealed growing military capabilities with its supposed fifth-generation fighter and first aircraft carrier. It has continued sending naval forces near Japanese ships in disputed areas, clashed with the Philippines in the Spratlys and continues supporting North Korea, which Washington and Seoul warn may be plotting another provocation for this spring. Beijing is attempting a more moderate and pragmatic approach to foreign relations. Realizing it cannot play a game of constant assertion, China seems to be holding these tactics in reserve. Foreign states are not fooled by this change, though they are eager to resume business as usual. China's recent attempts to adopt a friendlier face come as Beijing is undertaking a large-scale security operation at home to silence dissidents and tighten control over society amid fears that socio-economic troubles could erupt into political unrest similar to the Middle Eastern and North African turmoil. Therefore, renewed attempts at smoothing relations with neighbors may have something to do with a need to mitigate external problems so they do not distract from the government's response to domestic challenges. While China occasionally may use confrontations with foreign states as a way to instill nationalism in its citizens, now is not the time it wants people gathering in the streets. Smoother foreign relations may help to prevent international criticism of China's domestic crackdown from developing into concerted international action. Whether this policy shift is the result of coherent central decision-making, or the reassertion of certain factions and institutions over others that drove the more assertive policy, is an open question. Countries like India, Brazil and South Africa are already uneasy about China's mercantilist economic policies. And China's human rights problems have in the past inspired Western states to impose sanctions, such as after Tiananmen Square. Now that China is larger economically and has a particular advantage over other states in terms of economic growth at the moment, states are more reluctant to take a stand against China. Whether driven by domestic pressure or the desire to use Chinese internal troubles as a lever against the country, foreign states may attempt to punish China if there were to be a glaring incident. Beijing still depends on a high degree of forbearance internationally because of its need for exports to survive as it attempts to restructure its economic model. And since regime preservation is its primary goal, it will suppress domestic opposition brutally if it must, which may necessitate a policy for mitigating hostilities abroad. Now is a good time for China to try to stay on the world's good side, and that means maintaining cordial relations with the United States and other major developed states and working to minimize rifts with major developing states. It would not be a good strategy for China to drive its competitors in the developing world into the arms of a U.S.-led coalition aiming to control China's rise. Ultimately, Beijing is not likely to meet with great success in any kind of charm offensive, but it may reduce foreign frictions at a time when it is fragile in a domestic sense.