The general manager of China's state-owned Sinopec Group, the country's largest refinery operator and second largest oil producer, has been appointed deputy party secretary of Fujian province, according to an announcement made April 3 by the Standing Committee of the provincial Communist Party Committee. The appointment draws attention not only because it brings Su Shulin, top executive of a state-owned enterprise (SOE), into a career in politics; it also highlights a trend within the Communist Party to promote a kind of exchange program between SOEs and China's political realm. Considering the already close ties between SOEs and the government, the trend reveals an effort by Beijing to exert even more influence on SOEs. For more than 16 years, Su, 49, worked at the Daqing oil field, eventually rising to director of petroleum administration in the field. Daqing, owned by China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC, China's largest oil supplier), is the country's largest oil field. Su became vice president of CNPC in 1999 and served in that capacity until 2006, when he was made head of the Liaoning province Communist Party Committee's Organization Department, working directly under Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang. In mid-2007, Su was appointed general manager of Sinopec, CNPC's rival, replacing Chen Tonghai, who was sacked under corruption charges. The apparently seamless transfer from CNPC to Sinopec reflects the personnel arrangements Beijing has with the SOEs as well as the political purposes behind Su's appointment. His latest promotion to deputy party secretary in Fujian is expected to bring Su the provincial governorship later this year, a position currently vacant. This would make him the sixth chief ministerial-level politician born after the 1960s. In fact, due to his age advantage and extensive experience in the oil industry, Su was widely expected to return to the political path even before this latest appointment. Along with Lu Hao, first secretary of China's Communist Youth League; Sun Zhengcai, current Jilin Party secretary; and Hu Chunhua, party secretary of Inner Mongolia, Su is considered a promising candidate for China's sixth-generation leadership. As it happens, Fujian is a bountiful source of senior leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Among the current nine members of the Politburo's Standing Committee, three have served as party secretary or governor of Fujian, including Xi Jinping (the country's presumed next leader), He Guoqiang and Jia Qinglin. Indeed, there is little doubt that Su's recent promotion to deputy party secretary in Fujian will help facilitate his political rise. Also exemplifying Beijing's political exchange program with the SOEs, Su's appointment is consistent with a growing trend. A number of SOE leaders have been transferred to provincial or central government positions in recent years, the most prominent of whom include:

• Li Xiaopeng, son of former Premier Li Peng. Li Xiaopeng was president of China Huanneg Group, the country's largest state-owned power-generation enterprise. In 2008, Li was promoted to deputy governor of Shanxi province.
• Chen Chuanping was chairman of Taiyuan Iron & Steel, the country's largest stainless-steel producer, before he was appointed Shanxi vice governor in 2008.
• Zhu Yanfeng served as general manager of the country's oldest and fourth-largest automobile enterprise, FAW Group, for eight years before becoming vice governor of Jilin province in 2007.
• Zhou Yongkang was general manager of CNPC before embarking on a political career and is now a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of security and discipline.
• Wei Liucheng served as CEO of China National Offshore Oil Corporation before being appointed Party secretary of Hainan province.
• Miao Wei was president of Dongfeng Motor Corp. and is now China's minister of industry and information technology.
• Liu Qi was general manager of Wuhan Iron and Steel Group before becoming Beijing Party secretary in 2003.

In examining the backgrounds of those businessmen politicians, it is clear that most come from state-strategic industries such as oil, steel and electricity. Their experience in state- administered industries enables them to learn about management and macro-economics while also building extensive personal networks (or Guanxi) within their sectors, in other industries and in Beijing. Such advantages serve as essential elements of a national or provincial political career in China. This is especially true as Beijing strengthens its control over SOEs, promoting consolidation and encouraging them to get in line with state strategy. Having SOE politicians at the provincial and ministerial levels helps Beijing ensure policy enforcement and benefits the SOEs by creating a favorable policy environment. As much as anything else, this cross-pollination is about keeping the relationship tight between Beijing and the SOEs, given the need for China to expand its international economic presence and the desire of the government to lead the drive. For Beijing, of course, there is another consideration. Official corruption has always been seen as an ineradicable problem among senior CPC leaders, particularly at the local level. This has led to growing public dissatisfaction and distrust of public officials and even of CPC rule. To alleviate the problem, Beijing has focused on high salaries to prevent officials from being corrupted. However, government salaries can never compete with the kind of money officials can gain from accepting bribes to wield their power in certain ways (as much as several million yuan, in some recent cases). Thus the appointment of former business leaders to public office whose executive SOE salaries far exceeded those of public officials. Indeed, this is a major theme in Beijing — the idea that having already achieved a higher degree of wealth than is attainable through public service, former SOE executives may be willing to forego bribery once they take up their public posts. The exchange program also works in reverse, with lower-level politicians, after their terms end, being transferred to SOEs to fill senior positions so that their SOE earnings can offset their comparably low government salaries. This form of "reward" theoretically gives them incentive to serve out their tenures in office without engaging in excessive corruption. The promotion path, particularly for former SOE executives, is also lined with risk. Long-term experience and personal networking in a given industry often forms its own kind of loyalty, and this can prompt public servants to seek benefits for the sectors and enterprises from which they came. Such loyalty intertwined with higher political power can be difficult to unravel. Unlike individual corruption, the abuse of power at this scale affects a much broader base, which can hurt the public even more.