Armed forces loyal to Ivorian opposition leader Alassane Ouattara are closing in on Abidjan, incumbent Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo's main stronghold, March 31 in a concerted offensive that began March 28. Elements of the pro-Ouattara forces — called the Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI), formerly the New Forces rebels — reportedly are moving south from Yamoussoukro and from the east, entering the town of Aboisso near the border with Ghana. FRCI elements that took control of San Pedro, a major port town in western Cote d'Ivoire, on March 30 are consolidating control of that town. San Pedro is the region's primary export hub for cocoa, the crop upon which the Ivorian economy is based. (The country is the world's top cocoa producer and main supplier to U.S. and European markets.) Inside Abidjan, pro-Ouattara forces called the "Invisible Forces" are clashing with pro-Gbagbo elements in the Abobo and Yopougon districts as well as in central Abidjan. These forces have been in Abidjan throughout the political crisis, which began after the Ivorian presidential election in November 2010, and have conducted clashes and probing attacks especially from Abobo, their main base of popular support in the city. International peacekeepers — contingents from France and the United Nations — are not intervening, which indirectly assists the pro-Ouattara forces. This is a notable change from the end of the 2002-2003 Ivorian civil war, when U.N. and French peacekeepers worked to prevent rebel forces from marching on Abidjan. But the peacekeepers' current inaction is not surprising, given that Ouattara is the internationally recognized winner of the last Ivorian presidential election. Amid the pro-Ouattara offensive is news that Gbagbo's army chief of staff, Philippe Mangou, and his family sought refuge in the South African Embassy late March 30, perhaps believing the South Africans are the main foreign stakeholders who can guarantee his safety and protection against legal prosecution for any crimes committed during Gbagbo's rule. Gbagbo was expected to make a national address late March 30 but postponed it after Mangou defected, likely to consult his remaining advisers. Whatever the reason for the delay in Gbagbo's statement, the incumbent president seems to have bleak prospects. If the FRCI forces link up with the Invisible Forces already in Abidjan, they could overwhelm the remaining pro-Gbagbo Ivorian armed forces in the city. Gbagbo could activate the ultra-nationalist but poorly organized Young Patriots militia — basically armed, xenophobic youths — to fight elements they would perceive to be hostile. Ouattara and his supporters from northern Cote d'Ivoire would certainly be targets, as would other West Africans believed to support Ouattara, foreign peacekeepers and the French, all of whom are perceived as directly hostile to the Gbagbo regime. (Ouattara has received support from other West African countries, particularly Burkina Faso, and is known to have close ties to France, including personal ties to French President Nicolas Sarkozy.) So far, the Young Patriots have made statements and held rallies, but they have not been involved in clashes. If Ouattara can actually assume the Ivorian presidency, his coming to power would be accompanied by the repeal of sanctions against Cote d'Ivoire, including the embargo on cocoa exports that has been in place since January. Under Ouattara, Cote d'Ivoire likely would see more extensive cooperation with its former colonial master, France. As Gbagbo finds himself increasingly abandoned and isolated, he could flee the country. Regardless of whether he leaves or stays to fight, it likely will be a long time before Abidjan is pacified and Ouattara can govern without fear of a reprisal assassination by lingering elements loyal to Gbagbo.