On March 10, in a speech marking the 52nd anniversary of the Tibetan people's uprising against Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama announced plans to relinquish his role as political leader of the Tibetan movement, saying he would propose a formal change in leadership at the upcoming session of the Indian-based Tibetan government-in-exile. Beijing was quick to respond, with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson calling the plan a "trick to deceive the international community." The statements by themselves were not unexpected. The Dalai Lama has long suggested a formal division between the spiritual and political leadership of the Tibetan movement, and Beijing has made a habit of characterizing the Dalai Lama's comments and actions as deceptions. But beyond the rhetoric, both the Tibetan movement and Beijing are looking at the implications of the day when the 75-year-old Dalai Lama is no longer around. The Dalai Lama's proposed change in leadership, which would involve the official recognition of the exiled government's elected prime minister as the political leader of Tibetans, is an attempt to prevent a power vacuum and ensure that the movement does not fracture when he is gone. Although the Dalai Lama serves as the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan movement — despite his claim that he defers political leadership to the exiled government's prime minister — he also is the face of the Tibetan cause for Tibetans in exile and foreign governments worldwide. His charisma, as well as the way he has shaped international perceptions, has made it politically difficult for world leaders to refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama, even if the meeting would complicate their own relations with Beijing. In this way, the Dalai Lama retains significance beyond his official roles. He has been able to keep the often-fractious overseas Tibetans relatively unified and to promote a moderate path toward relations with Beijing while also shaping an international image that elicits support for the cause and limits Beijing's options. But there is little guarantee that his successor, either to the political or spiritual leadership positions, will be able to maintain this balance. Within the overseas Tibetan community, and among its foreign supporters, there are elements that consider the Dalai Lama's "Middle Way" to be ineffectual and advocate more direct action to achieve not just greater Tibetan autonomy but Tibetan independence. By actively promoting the authority of elected political Tibetan leadership, the Dalai Lama is trying to create a system that will encourage the various elements of the overseas Tibetan community to continue to cooperate after he is gone, thereby reducing Beijing's ability to exploit the differences and divide the movement. In addition to the question of political leadership, at times the Dalai Lama also has suggested alternate ways to choose the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism. Traditionally, the naming of the next Dalai Lama comes only after the death of the existing Dalai Lama, when senior monks in a formal ritual identify his reincarnation. The Dalai Lama has offered alternatives, including selecting his own successor or having the leader elected. These suggestions have left the Communist leadership of China making the perhaps ironic call to maintain the traditional reincarnation policies, which since ancient times have required that the central Chinese government approve the new leader. Such confusing statements from Beijing, along with its tendency to paint the Dalai Lama as a villain despite his receiving a Nobel Peace Prize, reflect the difficulty Beijing has in dealing with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community abroad. Chinese leaders and scholars have discussed different ways to deal with the Dalai Lama, with some quietly recommending that Beijing make a deal with the Dalai Lama now, taking advantage of his age, reported desire to return to Tibet and promotion of peaceful methods to gain greater Tibetan autonomy. Others, however, argue that any concessions would only strengthen the movement toward Tibetan independence. Beijing fears that the Tibetan movement is both an internal security risk and one that is exploited by foreign powers. Tibet makes up part of China's southwest buffer region, with a population that constitutes the 10th largest of China's 55 official minority groups. Thus, instability in the region could lead to ethnic conflict and risk spreading to other buffer regions, challenging Beijing's strategic core. Meanwhile, India, where the Tibetan government-in-exile resides, is always trying to leverage the Tibetan issue in its dealings with Beijing. Beijing also fears the issue will prove a useful bargaining tool for the United States, which has supported Tibetan guerrilla operations in the past. The question for Beijing is one of risk. Once the Dalai Lama is gone, the unity of the Tibetan movement abroad is likely to falter. In one sense, this gives an opportunity to the Chinese leadership, which can attempt to manipulate or exploit these factions and perhaps weaken the movement as a whole. At the same time, there is an expectation that without the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans and his more moderate path in dealing with China, more extreme factions could break away, shifting from the current non-violent approach to become more aggressive and militant. This could allow Beijing to label Tibetan activists as terrorists, but it would also create a more difficult domestic problem for Beijing. This concern has been heightened with the ongoing calls for "Jasmine gatherings" in China, which have expanded to include Lhasa among the target cities. At the same time, China faces not only the anniversary of the 1959 uprising but also the anniversary of the 2008 Tibetan riots. Beijing has heightened security in Tibet around these sensitive anniversaries, but that only addresses the problem in the short term. On the horizon, both the Tibetan leadership and the Chinese government are seeing the potential for a shift in Tibetan-Chinese dynamics after the Dalai Lama's inevitable departure, and this poses greater uncertainties for the movement and Beijing.