China's need for iron ore to support its industry continues to increase. In 2010, China's implied demand for iron ore stood at 987 million tons. Since 2002, China has imported more than half of its iron ore requirements, leaving it at the mercy of international suppliers and the prices they set — which continue to rise. This is a strategic vulnerability that China chafes against but cannot escape. At present, three multinationals control two-thirds of global iron ore production. The foreign iron ore producers hold most of the cards, as the Communist Party's need to continue fast economic growth to stay in power and forestall social problems means that its demand for iron ore is inelastic. Although China consumes nearly half of world iron ore exports, China has not been able to leverage this to gain more influence over the industry. China has become especially aggravated by the fact that iron ore prices rose throughout the global recession. And, despite its massive consumption, it has been unable to affect pricing to the extent that it desires. By volume, China imported 9.13 million metric tons less in 2010 than it did in 2009, but China spent $29.28 billion more due to price increases. So while volume decreased by 1.45 percent, the amount spent increased 58 percent. According to a STRATFOR source, China's iron ore imports will increase between 9 and 10 percent in 2011 and prices are pushing all-time highs. Chinese investment and production-heavy growth model are responsible for its ever-increasing demand for iron ore. Its 12th Five-Year Plan, which calls for heavy investments in construction like high-speed rail and for 10 million new affordable housing units, and a wealth of other infrastructure projects, has only further increased demand. China's plans to remedy its dependence on iron ore imports include increasing its domestic production of iron ore, attempting to acquire exclusive control over foreign resources and increasing its leverage in negotiations with foreign suppliers over prices. (click here to enlarge image) Some of these plans are unrealistic, while others face significant hurdles. As a result, China is exposed to price volatility and Chinese steel mills face slimming profit margins.

Beijing's Plan and Obstacles Ahead

China has ambitious outlines in its 12th Five-Year Plan to reduce its dependence on foreign-controlled iron ore companies by obtaining control of or influence over half the companies providing its imported supply through mergers and acquisitions abroad. But foreign countries have not responded favorably to allowing China any say over their iron sectors, preferring to be the ones to set prices for a buyer who cannot say no. Australia, for example, has rejected deals that would have given China the ability to acquire assets in the Australian iron ore industry. Similarly, the foreign mining giants have the ability to set prices. This foreign resistance to Chinese control is not likely to change. China also plans to increase its domestic production to meet half of its total ore demand, requiring an increase of almost one-fifth from 2010. But a domestic production boom will be difficult to orchestrate. China's domestic reserves of iron ore contain only a quarter to a third of iron per unit of ore. Brazilian and Australian iron ore, by contrast, contains almost two-thirds iron per unit of ore. Thus using domestic iron ore requires excavating twice as many rocks to get the same amount of iron that one would get from higher-grade imports. It also costs more to transport and smelt higher volumes of cheaper, low-grade domestic ore. Moreover, international shipping rates are low, making imports even more attractive. (click here to enlarge image) Beijing also plans to alter its negotiating tactics to give it more sway over iron ore producers and prices. After problems with yearly negotiations with foreign suppliers, China was forced in 2009 to buy iron ore on spot markets. The major miners abandoned the process of setting contract prices once a year in intense negotiations, seeking quarterly or even monthly schemes for setting prices that better reflect international price changes. Since then, more and more Chinese steel mills have been signing monthly deals, in essence removing the need for yearly or quarterly negotiations — and simultaneously increasing mills' exposure to the international market. Fixing negotiating tactics means fixing the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA), which has mishandled iron ore negotiations since 2009 and is now seeing a leadership change. Executive Deputy Chairman Luo Bingsheng, General Secretary Shan Shanghua, and Chen Xianwen, the director of CISA's market investigation department who was lead negotiator during the failed 2009 price negotiations, all submitted their resignations at the organization's annual meeting Feb. 20. The three are blamed for CISA's failed strategy of leveraging its role as megaconsumer in the global market to extract deep discounts in which CISA refused to make concessions. Former CISA Vice Chairman Zhang Changfu, who is considered fairly low profile, will replace Shan. From China's point of view, the reason CISA failed in previous negotiations was its inability to prevent small steel miners from breaking ranks and striking their own deals with iron ore producers. The Chinese steel industry is extremely fragmented, and this undermined CISA's bargaining power. The government is attempting to hasten the long-running consolidation of the steel sector to enable CISA to present a united front in future. And finally, China plans to hedge against shifts in international prices by developing more strategic reserves or stockpiles, another changed outlined in the Five-Year Plan. Reserves are currently required to have enough iron ore to last for 20 days of consumption. This equaled about 40 million tons but will need to increase as consumption expands to meet the time requirement. Yet current prices for iron ore have reached all-time highs, so it is a bad time for Beijing to seek to increase iron ore stockpiles. It may be betting that international prices will continue to increase from current high levels. Alternately, sources suggest that the iron ore is needed for immediate consumption, regardless of the claim of building stockpiles.

Lower Margins, Government Assistance and Continued Dependence

According to a STRATFOR source, over the past year the price of coking coal has almost doubled and the price of iron ore has increased by more than half. The price at which the steel mills must sell steel in order to break even has already risen by one-third. And as iron ore and coking coal prices rise, profit margins for steelmakers become slimmer. According to tracking done by CISA, 77 large and medium Chinese steelmakers earned $13.6 billion in 2010, about 52 percent more than in 2009. The profit margins on steel were only about 2.9 percent, however, which is far below the 7.3 percent recorded in 2007 — though a bit higher than the 2.5 percent in 2009 — signaling a dangerous state of affairs for an industry critical to China's economy. With Chinese steel mills seeing slimming margins, Beijing most likely will have to step in to support the companies. The government may well try subsidies, tax breaks, and more investment in iron ore infrastructure, technology and exploration. It might also offer its usual solution of more below-market interest rate loans. This may save the steel industry for a time, but it will only add to the financial risks building in the Chinese economy. Contrary to Beijing's strategy, dependence on the outside world for iron ore will likely increase, and costs pressures will expand. Ultimately, China is unlikely to reduce its demand until the eventual economic slowdown occurs, and at that point it will have more to worry about than bargaining down iron ore prices.