On Jan. 3, a wave of protests broke out in Algiers, Oran and Tizi Ouzou, Algeria, focusing first on rising food prices then coalescing into demands that a 19-year state of emergency be lifted and civil liberties be enhanced. By Jan. 10, the government had contained the initial protests by increasing food subsidies while other demonstrations failed to attract substantial support. Tensions remained high, however, as 12 Algerian protesters committed suicide by self-immolation, coinciding with escalating protests in neighboring Tunisia. On Jan. 20, the opposition began organizing protests in defiance of laws prohibiting such action, and the next day the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCCDC) was formed by a disparate collection of opposition groups, including the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) party, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights and the National Independent Union of Algerian Government Staff. The dissent culminated with an RCD rally in the northeastern region of Kabylie on Jan. 30. The NCCDC has scheduled a march for Feb. 12 in Algiers that it hopes will draw out additional support. In response to these developments, President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika issued a statement Feb. 3 promising to lift the state of emergency "in the very near future" and emphasizing that protest marches would be allowed in all areas of the country except Algiers, as long as the legal conditions for such marches were met. It is also rumored that a significant Cabinet reshuffle is planned and will be announced this month.

Power Struggle and the Question of Succession

While the Algerian protests bear a strong resemblance to those that have swept North Africa and the Middle East over the past few weeks, they must be viewed in the context of Algerian politics. The real rivalry for power in Algeria is between Bouteflika, who has been in office since 1999 and is currently serving his third term, and Gen. Mohamed "Toufik" Mediene, head of the Military Directorate of Intelligence and Security. Bouteflika has achieved stability in Algeria by offering amnesty to a variety of radical Islamists and by reducing the role of the armed forces in politics. Mediene, widely regarded as a key power broker in Algeria, has held his post since 1990 and has played a central role in containing the Islamist threat. His support is essential to anyone wishing to hold high office in the country, although he is not known to harbor presidential ambitions himself. The past 18 months have seen an effective truce between the two men break down over questions of succession and the threat it poses to partisan business interests. The 73-year-old Bouteflika is also in poor health and rumored to have suffered from stomach cancer for the past five years. Attempts by Bouteflika associates to promote Said Bouteflika, the president's brother, as a potential successor allegedly angered Mediene, who immediately charged a number of high-profile employees of the state energy company, Sonatrach, with corruption. Minister of Energy Chakib Khelil also was forced to resign his post. All of those removed were Bouteflika loyalists, and the purge was seen as a direct assertion of power by Mediene to protect entrenched economic interests. Talk of succession has since subsided, although the unknown motive behind the murder of police head Ali Tounsi in February 2010 and ongoing corruption proceedings indicate that the matter remains unresolved.

Neutralizing the Threats

By consenting to protesters' demands without agreeing to specific timelines, Bouteflika hopes to defuse the unrest while maintaining his ability to politically maneuver. At the same time, the state-of-emergency laws, while useful for consolidating and wielding power in the wake of the 1991-2002 Algerian civil war and the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, may have run their course politically. By repealing them, Bouteflika is also removing the most important enabler of the military intelligence directorate in exerting its control over Algerian society. Indeed, the move can be seen as a way for Bouteflika to protect himself if the power struggle turns against him. If he is successful, repealing the laws will have weakened his rivals and deflected the protests away from his presidency. Whether the unrest genuinely threatens the Bouteflika government will depend first on whether the protesters can achieve a level of organization and participation not yet seen. Ultimately, however, the threat will depend on whether Mediene and his loyalists will see the protests as an opportunity to politically weaken Bouteflika. Given the president's poor health, this would appear to be unnecessary, although Mediene, himself 72, may regard the opportunity as too good to ignore.