On Jan. 30, reports emerged of 100 to 150 Egyptian army soldiers moving into the Sinai Peninsula as early as Jan. 28-29. This was confirmed Jan. 31 by an Israeli Defense Ministry official speaking anonymously — and followed by subsequent reports, also citing anonymous sources — suggesting that two battalions totaling as many as 800 "security forces" of unnamed affiliation had moved in, supposedly in violation of Egyptian-Israeli agreements. As with many other aspects of Egypt's current crisis, much remains unclear. But the situation in the context of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's tottering regime, along with several potential anomalies, warrants mention. The report of some 800 troops suggested that the soldiers were in violation of a 750-troop limit. But the Camp David Accords regulating Egyptian military and security forces in the Sinai do not mention a 750-troop limit, nor are troops limited to that number in the entire Sinai Peninsula. (There are a number of zones with different rules, with stricter rules and lower limits prevailing as the zones progress eastward toward Egypt's border with Israel.) The 750 limit comes from a subsequent 2005 agreement related to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in which Israel and Egypt agreed, separately from the peace treaty, to allow the deployment of up to 750 Egyptian border guards under the Interior Ministry, not the Defense Ministry, into what is now known as the Border Guard Force Area of Operations (BGF AO) on the Egyptian side of the Philadelphi corridor where the Gaza Strip borders Egypt. Previously, only Egyptian civilian police and the Multinational Force and Observers were permitted anywhere in "Zone C," which runs the length of eastern Sinai. Indeed, the support of air and sea components and their crews was explicitly authorized in 2005, as was a provision for further increases under subsequent bilateral agreements. And there were, in fact, serious negotiations in 2008-2009 between Egypt and Israel about allowing Egypt to add 750 police to the zone to combat rampant smuggling into Gaza. Temporary reinforcements of 1,300 and 500 police were also allowed by Israel in 2006 and 2010, respectively. This is another area — the support of the Israeli blockade and isolation of the Gaza Strip — in which Mubarak has angered the general Egyptian population. And the issue has only intensified in the recent crisis. There have been reports of intensifying Bedouin unrest and of Egyptian police and border guards (both under the Interior Ministry), with whom corruption was already an issue, allowing more blatant smuggling of people and arms or even outright abandoning their posts. During this time there were potentially enormous prison breaks, and Egyptian Interior Ministry forces had abandoned their posts across the country Jan. 29 only to begin returning Jan. 30. So there was certainly a hole to be filled by Defense Ministry forces. Here is where the anomalies come into play. First, do all these potential correlations actually represent the actual disposition of forces? If the Egyptian military has moved in to lock down the suddenly far more porous border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, why has Hamas been so quiet? In this rare moment of large-scale opposition to the Mubarak regime, why not draw attention to this? Hamas is playing a careful game, and STRATFOR will examine its position more closely later. But the lack of complaint from Palestinians in general does seem potentially noteworthy. Second, the foundation of Israeli security for more than three decades has been the peace treaty with Egypt. Israeli national interest dictates the maintenance of a stable regime, with or without Mubarak at its head, that will continue to observe the Camp David Accords. This is an enormous concern for the Israelis. So while the massive influx of militants and weapons into Gaza is a very significant additional problem, and one for which the Israelis may be amenable — as they have been before — to adjustments to the status of security forces in the BFG AO, without a regime in Cairo that supports the peace treaty, Israel faces a far greater problem. The Israeli people are nervous, and the unofficial story that recent supposed changes in the disposition of forces in Sinai have been made in close coordination with Israel could have potentially significant domestic political ramifications in Israel. Officially, the Israeli government has denied that there has been any treaty violation by Egypt, and reports claim the two sides negotiated the Egyptian deployment together with the United States. Israeli defense officials reportedly have said they assented to the Egyptian deployment. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said at a press conference that Egypt has always respected the peace agreement and has not breached it, and that it has not been broken in the past few days. Of course, there is only a treaty violation if one side or the other disputes it. Israel, meanwhile, has allegedly moved troops to its side of the border with Egypt. The Egyptian troops allegedly were deployed to stop Bedouin riots in the Sinai, and the Israelis say they are anticipating Bedouins fleeing the Egyptian army and are expecting refugees and militants to attempt to enter Gaza. Finally, if these things do not add up, is there some sort of disinformation or deception campaign going on? If these troops are not all in the BFG AO, where are they, and why? Are they being held in reserve for some contingency? If so, how are they armed and equipped? There has been speculation since Jan. 29 — which STRATFOR has been unable to confirm — that Mubarak has taken shelter in one of his homes in the Red Sea resort community of Sharm el-Sheikh. This is not outside the realm of possibility, as one of the places Mubarak would likely take at least temporary shelter if he needed to flee the country would be Saudi Arabia, a country far easier to reach from Sharm el-Sheikh than from Cairo. So has the military presence in Sharm el-Sheikh changed? And is the military positioning itself to ease Mubarak out of the country, or are they positioning themselves for a coup? This is not a forecast or a prediction. This is a series of questions. Paying attention to anomalies is a part of good intelligence, and Mubarak's position is becoming increasingly intolerable, so we need to be open to all possibilities.