Two seemingly unrelated events on Jan. 5 suggest that Russia's Baltic Sea neighbors, Poland and Sweden, are sending a warning to Moscow. First, Polish Ambassador to Russia Wojciech Zajaczkowski said in interviews with Interfax that Warsaw is actively seeking to diversify its natural gas supply away from Moscow. The comment followed Zajaczkowski's public statement Jan. 4 regarding Poland's extremely critical view of Russia's potential basing of tactical nuclear weapons in its exclave of Kaliningrad and the "futility" of the Russo-German Nord Stream pipeline, which the ambassador criticized on economic and environmental grounds. Meanwhile, on Jan. 5 the Swedish Parliamentary Defense Committee forwarded a formal question to Foreign Minister Carl Bildt on how Stockholm intends to respond to Russia's planned purchase of two French Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Russia signed an official agreement with France to purchase the two carriers, with an option of two more being built in Russia. The first hull is tentatively scheduled for delivery this year and is officially supposed to be based with the Pacific fleet. However, the second will most likely be based in the Baltic Sea, which has irked Baltic states. The timing of both events is notable. Though only recently finalized, the Mistral purchase has been in the works for more than a year, and Poland's unease with dependency on Russian natural gas is certainly not new. Therefore, both the Swedish parliament's sudden interest in the Russo-French military deal and the Polish ambassador's generally aggressive interview, which received considerable negative coverage in Russia, should be considered in the context of the region's evolving geopolitics. First, both statements closely follow Belarus' presidential elections, the subsequent crackdown on opposition leaders during a rally to protest President Aleksandr Lukashenko's re-election and Moscow's support for the regime despite the clashes. Europe, led by the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative, has been hoping that it could slowly erode Moscow's grip on Belarus' geopolitical alignment. However, the result of the presidential elections effectively ended that. The Polish-Swedish statements also follow recent successful moves by Russia in the Baltic states to increase its influence beyond traditional levers, such as influencing Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, to increasing economic and political influence as well. A December visit to Russia by Latvian President Valdis Zatlers illustrated the increased economic links between Moscow and Riga, with Russia becoming Latvia's second-most-important investor after Sweden. Russia also has effectively increased its influence in both Latvia and Estonia through patronage of relatively pro-Russian political parties (which are now emphasizing their broad appeal), Harmony Center and the Center Party, respectively. As such, Poland and Sweden — the other two historical powers in the Baltic Sea region — are looking to counter or at least send a message to Russia that they are watching Moscow's moves carefully. Zajaczkowski's statements in particular should be carefully studied. He was appointed to his post recently by new Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski, who has said that the age of knee-jerk anti-Russian policy in Poland is over. Zajaczkowski has also been a close foreign policy adviser to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has himself personally worked on improving Warsaw-Moscow relations. As such, Zajaczkowski is not a vestige of the former anti-Russian Polish policy and is very much a representative of the Tusk-Komorowski tandem. If he criticizes Russia's foreign policy, the highest echelons of Polish leadership approve the statements. Sweden, meanwhile, largely spent 2010 embroiled in a long election season, one of the most contentious in the nation's recent history. The incumbent center-right government has now returned to power, albeit in a minority. Now Prime Minister Erik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt can begin concentrating on regional affairs. Bildt has already made a joint visit with his Polish counterpart to advance the Eastern Partnership program in Ukraine and Moldova, specifically to try to increase the chances of a pro-European government in Chisinau, and has hosted the Ukrainian foreign minister in Stockholm. In other words, Sweden made it a point to announce its return to regional politics in December. The question, however, is whether Sweden and Poland are willing to increase their own collaboration in the region beyond active diplomacy. For the past two years, STRATFOR sources in Poland have emphasized Warsaw's willingness to enhance its relationship with Sweden to include military and security cooperation. STRATFOR is now also hearing similar thoughts emanating from Stockholm. With the United States — Poland's traditional post-Cold War security ally — likely continuing to be embroiled in the Middle East for the foreseeable future and refusing to offer Warsaw any robust security reassurances, Poland will be looking for alternatives, at least in the short term. Sweden has traditionally defended its neutrality aggressively and thus has a robust military and arms industry. Its interests are also currently aligned with Warsaw as Moscow continues to expand its influence in Eastern Europe, particularly in Latvia and Estonia.