Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is expected to make a state visit to South Africa before the end of 2010. Originally expected in October, this would be his second state visit to South Africa since Jacob Zuma became president of the latter country in April 2009. Dos Santos is not particularly fond of travel, a fact that made his failure to show in October unsurprising (and a fact that would make his absence from the forthcoming meeting likewise unsurprising). However, over the past few weeks both Angolan state media and South African government ministers have confirmed that the visit is expected before the end of the year. STRATFOR sources report that the visit is likely to take place Dec. 14-15. While the issue of Angola's Lobito refinery project will probably be the focus of the agenda, there are also a variety of other items the two sides will want to discuss, namely trade and visa issues. The larger significance of the trip, though, lies in how it fits into the budding relationship between two rising powers in southern Africa that may be simultaneously cooperative and competitive. South Africa and Angola differ in many ways, from their colonial history to their political structure, language, economic base and level of development. Where they find common ground is in the fact that both are effectively dominated by a single ruling party currently transitioning from a "post-struggle" era focused strictly on internal consolidation to an era of foreign endeavor. For South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), this means moving beyond the Nelson Mandela-Thabo Mbeki period that followed the end of apartheid in 1994. Angola's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) may not be as far along in its own process of post-civil war development, but is trying to improve its oil industry so as to expedite the reconstruction process, badly needed just eight years removed from a 27-year civil war. While the two countries may be at different levels in the process, both are starting to set their sights outward, looking around the southern African region to assess where they can best exert influence. (click here to enlarge image) Angola has only one mainland refinery currently in operation, a small facility in the greater Luanda area that produces around 40,000 bpd. This refinery is thought to provide about 40 percent of Angola's consumption needs. The Lobito refinery would provide much more than Angola could consume. With its strategic location along the Atlantic Ocean, Lobito could allow Angola to export refined fuel, something unique in Africa. This is likely the root of South Africa's publicly expressed interest in the joint venture with Sonangol, though a chance to try its hand at deepwater oil exploration and production activities might also be tempting it. Still, whether PetroSA would be willing and able to contribute a sizable amount to Sonaref's construction bills depends on numerous factors in South Africa. South Africa is already planning its fifth crude oil refinery, a massive facility near Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape region. The proposed Mthombo refinery, which will be built in the Coega Industrial Development Zone, would have the largest refining capacity of any refinery in sub-Saharan Africa at 400,000 bpd. This would make it twice as productive as Lobito but still around the same estimated cost of $9 billion-$11 billion. (The reason for the price similarity is unknown, though corruption issues in Luanda are probably a factor.) Mthombo is also still in the FEED stage, but its eventual completion is much more likely than that of Sonaref. Just how much South Africa would be willing to pay to make the Sonangol joint venture a reality (thereby giving Pretoria access to a stake in Sonaref, and likely a certain portion of the finished product) will say a lot about South Africa's desire to establish a foothold in Angola. Helping Luanda out with such a hefty bill would certainly be seen as a sign of good will from Zuma's government, and could help open doors for other investment opportunities for South African businesses in other lucrative sectors of the Angolan economy. The economics of the Mthombo refinery project appear much more logical, but sometimes strategic factors trump financial ones. One South African STRATFOR source describes the Lobito refinery as Luanda's "pet project," indicating Pretoria sees it as important to the MPLA government. This is not to say that a failure to strike a deal would mean South Africa does not factor Angola into its foreign policy, only that Lobito provides an interesting barometer with which to assess relations between the two countries.