In 2003, Myanmar issued its "Road Map to Discipline-flourishing Democracy," which laid out a path to reform the country's political structure. On Nov. 7, Myanmar will take the fifth step on this road map, holding its first general elections since 1990. In the elections 20 years ago, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won 58 percent of the vote, only to see the military junta scrap the election results and put Suu Kyi under house arrest for two-thirds of the next 20 years. The situation is different this time around. Without any real competitors, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by Prime Minister Thein Sein, and the National Unity Party (NUP), a modern rendition of the party founded by deceased military dictator Ne Win, filed a total of almost 2,150 candidates (1,150 and 999, respectively) to compete for 1,160 seats and are virtually guaranteed to win. The NLD, the deprived winner of the 1990 elections and still the major opposition party, is boycotting the Nov. 7 elections because it refuses to recognize the 2008 Constitution, which mandates that 25 percent of parliamentary seats at both the national and the regional level must be filled by military representatives. The party that split off from the NLD, the National Democratic Force (NDF), was able to file only 163 candidates for the upcoming elections. Meanwhile, the junta's reshuffle over the last year saw a number of high-level military leaders stepping down from their posts to participate in the upcoming elections, paving the way for former military officers to contest the remaining 75 percent of the seats allocated for civilian candidates. Hence, there is no expectation that the Nov. 7 elections will bring any change to the country's leadership that would challenge the junta's power, though some localities and ethnic groups may gain a small amount of representation.

China’s Strategy in Myanmar

However, significant changes may occur in China's perception of its southwestern neighbor following the elections. Over the last 20 years, Myanmar's strategic importance to China has grown to the point that Beijing now feels uneasy about any political change in the country that could challenge China's regional interests. China is particularly concerned about border instability, and the junta's policies may undermine the leverage Beijing has between the Myanmar government and the rebellious ethnic armed forces on the border that have various connections with China. And there is the possibility that the Myanmar parliamentary elections will lead to political and economic engagement with the West, a trend now stirring in that part of the world that is of great concern to Beijing. Myanmar sits in a strategic corridor between China and the Indian Ocean. This location is becoming increasingly vital as China tries to diversify its energy supply routes from the Middle East and become less dependent on the Strait of Malacca, which is dominated by the U.S. Navy and where ships are vulnerable to piracy. Starting in June, the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) began building oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar's deep-water port of Kyaukphyu to China's southwest gateway of Kunming (see map). Strategically, Beijing is placing more emphasis on the Indian Ocean to improve its access to these trade lines, to counterbalance India and to break through the encirclement it perceives to be shaped by the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. (click here to enlarge image) Currently, two priorities inform Beijing's strategy: Pakistan in the northwest and Myanmar in the southwest. China and Myanmar share a 2,200-kilometer-long border, most of which is along China's ethnically diverse Yunnan province. However, due to historical fragmentation and rebellion in Myanmar, only 383 kilometers shared with Yunnan are effectively administrated by Naypyidaw and the rest are controlled by several ethnic rebel groups. Many of these groups are made up of Chinese migrants who share a culture with Chinese ethnic minorities across the border in Yunnan and have been fighting the junta's military for decades to achieve autonomy in the border region. There is also substantial cross-border trade. This situation not only has created border security concerns for Beijing but also has forced Beijing to exercise great caution when handling separate relations with both the junta and the ethnic groups. Beijing's main concern is not the elections or Myanmar's democratic path, since there is little possibility that the military-backed regime will change in any meaningful way. In fact, since last year, Beijing has significantly stepped up its political and economic connection with the military-backed government, attempting to solidify its position in Myanmar with the expectation that the government will retain power. High-level exchanges have become more frequent, with Xi Jinping, Chinese vice president and successor to Hu Jintao, and Premier Wen Jiabao both visiting within the past year, and Myanmar junta leader Than Shwe, who is also chairman of the ruling State Peace and Development Council, returning for a visit to China in September. During these visits, several large energy and infrastructure projects worth millions of dollars were agreed upon. In fact, as Naypyidaw's chief international supporter since it fell victim to sanctions by Western countries, China wants the elections to proceed smoothly and for the junta to remain firmly in power so as to secure its strategic interests in the country. One of the biggest concerns for Beijing is the border issue. In late April, as part of the election preparations and in accordance with the 2008 Constitution, the Myanmar government announced plans to transform the ethnic militant groups into official Border Guard Forces (BGF), serving directly under the command of the Myanmar armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw), which are headed by Than Shwe. All BGF troops were to mobilize within their territories and receive military training from the Tatmadaw, with pay and benefits provided by the junta. Naturally, the junta is attempting to divide the ethnic minority rebel groups and extend its control over as many of them as possible. Some of these groups, lacking firepower and afraid that the junta would launch offensive operations, have surrendered and joined the BGF. Still, tensions are running high as the elections approach, and armed groups, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in northern Shan state, with an estimated 30,000 fighters, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin state, with some 7,000 fighters, still refuse to join the BGF. Both of these groups operate on the border with China and have close cultural, economic and political connections with Beijing, which remains on the alert for potential attacks between these groups and junta forces. Over the years, Beijing has enjoyed good relations with both the ethnic armed groups and the military government, and its economic and political influence on both sides of the border have given it a kind of mediator role to ensure border stability. However, the August 2009 Kokang conflict changed this perception. When the Tatmadaw conducted an offensive into Kokang Special Region 1 in the border state of Shan that pushed 30,000 refugees into Yunnan province, Beijing realized the junta's determination to unify the country's armed groups, which would undermine Beijing's leverage as a mediator and cause refugee and border-security problems. Since then, border stability has topped the agenda when Chinese leaders' have visited the country. According to a report by the International Crises Group, China has stepped up pressure on Naypyidaw to stop attacks against ethnic armed groups and has become increasingly involved in negotiations between the two sides, even persuading some armed groups to join the BGF. However, with the junta sure to win in the parliamentary elections, Beijing is concerned that Naypyidaw, armed with a new sense of political legitimacy, will resume attacks against armed ethnic groups to consolidate the holdouts, including the UWSA and KIA. If this happens, it would not only cause another refugee crisis and new security headaches but also destroy everything Beijing has tried to achieve as a mediator.

Security Challenges to the Regime

Needless to say, security concerns are also critical to the junta as it attempts to ensure relatively smooth elections Nov. 7 and the renovation of its power-structure facade. Myanmar faces a moderate-level threat before, during and after the elections. Tensions are already high, and bombings or attacks will exacerbate them. Many observers saw the April 15 series of explosions in Yangon as a preview for election-related unrest, and Myanmar may face a few detonated or discovered and disarmed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in smaller cities or ethnic regions. In the last two months, security forces have discovered and disarmed at least seven IEDs or grenades, including one in a Yangon market. Creating false opposition is not outside the ability of the junta, which is typically tight-lipped about who is responsible. The rumor mill in Myanmar is rampant due to the lack of independent news reporting, and a significant number of observers believe regime elements have placed some of the IEDs in the last year. But it is also possible that one of Myanmar's many militant groups is responsible, or the IEDs could be the result of inter-regime squabbles. A renewed dispute brewing with the Kachin Independence Organization and its military wing, the KIA, has only increased the importance of border security to both Naypyidaw and Beijing. The junta negotiated a peace agreement with the Kachin groups in 1994 but recently blamed them for a series of IEDs discovered in and around Thaton in early September. The junta's ability to discover and disarm these devices suggests that the regime may have already known about them, whether through good intelligence or its own proxies. While it is difficult to identify who is responsible for the various IEDs, any explosions around election day will only increase the concerns of the regime and foreign observers. The regime could use them as an excuse to close polling places or mobilize security forces, and Beijing would fear much greater instability in its neighbor.

Openings for International Players

Beijing is also concerned about the junta's potential openness to international players, which would dilute Beijing's political and economic influence. While Beijing welcomes elections that would boost the military government's legitimacy if it would help the government deal with problems affecting Beijing's interests, it fears the junta will move away from China toward other regional powers such as India, Singapore and Thailand, in an effort to counterbalance China’s influence. Economically, Myanmar is self-contained, with nearly half of its gross domestic product (GDP) coming from agriculture. The country also has one of the poorest populations in the world, with little or no access to public services, and because the country is vulnerable to weather-related natural disasters such as cyclones, agricultural output is frequently affected. GDP growth declined steadily from 7 percent in 2006 to 3.6 percent in 2008, according to estimates by Asian Development Bank. While the country is resource rich, sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union for more than two decades because of the military regime's defiance toward the West have seriously limited investment and financial assistance from the outside world. As a result, Naypyidaw faces both domestic and international pressure to develop its economy as well as boost its legitimacy. The elections this year present an opportunity for the junta to gain international recognition and have the sanctions eased, though this will not be easy to achieve and is by no means assured. International criticism is intensifying as the junta asserts more control over the elections and appears unwilling to sacrifice power for recognition. No one expects the junta to embrace deep reforms with good faith, or to ease its authoritarian control over the population. But by shifting to at least a nominally civilian government, Myanmar would demonstrate a token of responsiveness to international demands, and perhaps a semblance of democracy would enable new interactions with the outside world. In fact, both the United States and the European Union have shown an interest in re-engaging Myanmar, as have various regional players. Realizing that sanctions and deteriorated relations with Myanmar would only strengthen its connections to China, the United States sent several high-level officials to the country as part of its broader plan to re-engage Asia and counterbalance China’s influence. Re-establishing a dialogue with Myanmar would also reinforce U.S. interests in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a whole. From time to time, Myanmar has mulled over the idea of economic openness. In the early 1990s, the military government took steps to liberalize the economy, but the effort stalled with the opposition victory in the elections and an outpouring of public protest. A renewed economic plan, likely to take shape after the elections, may invite more regional and international partners to participate in developing Myanmar's infrastructure, especially in its special experimental economic zones. It may also promote greater links to India, the other big power in the region. China was irritated by the fact that Than Shwe visited India first before going on to China in September and saw it as a move toward improving relations with China’s regional archrival. Indeed, China sees Myanmar as one of its strategic priorities, and its first parliamentary elections in 20 years represent a threat to Beijing's geopolitical strategy. If Naypyidaw leverages any newfound legitimacy on the world stage to move away from Beijing, it could threaten China's border security and its plans to diversify its Indian Ocean energy-supply routes. And while no real leadership change is expected to come from the elections, the event could set in motion a significant shift in China's position in the region. This is a possible outcome that the world — particularly Washington and New Delhi — will be watching very closely.