On Oct. 18, the United Kingdom made public its National Security Strategy, which classifies Irish nationalist militants as its foremost terrorist threat, noting an increase in activity from militant groups in Northern Ireland over the past 18 months. In the last British National Security Strategy document, produced in 2008, authorities compared the threat posed by Irish republican militants to that of animal rights activists. This year's assessment likens the threat to that of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear weapons. A little less than two weeks before the 2010 report came out, the Real Irish Republican Army (or RIRA, a splinter group from the late 1990s) detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Derry, Northern Ireland. The bombing caused only property damage, since the militants issued a warning prior to the attack. Shortly afterward, a spokesman for the RIRA warned of an increase in violence, including attacks in London. There are certainly conditions in place that could allow the RIRA to expand its operations, but the group also faces significant limitations, making it highly unlikely that we will see a return to The Troubles of the 1970s and 1980s.
History of Militant Irish Nationalism
The Irish nationalist movement consists of a number of groups that span the spectrum, from violent underground cells to peaceful political organizations involved in establishment politics. Obviously, the groups that are the most interesting from a security point of view are the violent underground cells, which are responsible for disrupting security in Northern Ireland.
The war ended with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which gave birth to a nominally independent Republic of Ireland within the British dominion and a Northern Ireland that remained under London's direct control. The treaty split the Irish between the Free State forces that were satisfied with the conditions won from London and the anti-treaty forces that not only opposed limited independence but also wanted Northern Ireland reincorporated under Dublin's control. The two sides fought a civil war (1922-1923) that Free State forces won, although Ireland progressively moved toward full independence throughout the 1930s, ultimately becoming a republic with no formal or informal ties to the United Kingdom in 1948. Northern Ireland, however, remained under London's firm control. The IRA continued to exist following the civil war as a vestige of the anti-treaty forces, conducting limited guerrilla operations against British security forces throughout the island. During World War II, the IRA launched an insurrection in Northern Ireland and even tried — unsuccessfully — to obtain material support from Nazi Germany.
Following the war, the IRA insurrection entered a lull that lasted until the 1960s, when it was re-energized by a rise in communal violence between unionists (citizens of Ireland, many of whom were Protestant), who wanted a continued union with the United Kingdom, and nationalists (represented mainly by the Irish Catholic community), who wanted the entire island to be independent. The second incarnation of the IRA was the Provisional IRA (PIRA), which was established in 1969 as a splinter group from what came to be referred to as the Official IRA. PIRA activity accelerated in 1972, the same year the Official IRA reached an agreement with London to transfer some degree of power to Northern Ireland and called a cease-fire, effectively ending its offensive operations. Because of ongoing instability caused by the PIRA, however, London revoked the agreement shortly thereafter. The PIRA had officially split from the Official IRA over the latter's adoption of Marxist ideology, but the PIRA still benefited from the support of the Soviet Union, which had an interest in stirring up conflict in the United Kingdom (the Irish-British conflict goes back 800 years) and other Western European countries in order to distract NATO powers with domestic unrest during the Cold War. The PIRA maintained the guerrilla strategy of the Official IRA but operated in a much more compartmentalized, diffuse manner. It established cells all across Northern Ireland and just across the border in the Republic of Ireland. These highly compartmentalized units carried out surveillance and executed attacks against British security forces, civilian unionists and occasionally targets in Great Britain. The group was especially proficient at constructing and deploying improvised explosive devices (IED) and carrying out small-arms attacks.
During the period known as The Troubles — the PIRA conducted more than 200 attacks per year across Northern Ireland. The 1979 assassination of Earl Mountbatten, who was killed by a hidden explosive device on his boat, and the Bloody Friday attacks in Belfast in 1972, in which 22 IEDs detonated in 80 minutes, killing nine people, were among the PIRA's most notable attacks. The PIRA also demonstrated the ability to carry out attacks in London; for example, in 1983, the group killed six people and wounded 90 when it bombed Harrods during the Christmas shopping season.
However, the PIRA initiated a cease-fire in 1994, with the involvement of its associated political party, Sinn Fein, in the negotiations. With the cease-fire came a dramatic drop in attacks during the mid-1990s and an official end to the armed PIRA campaign in 2005. As PIRA attacks began declining in 1994, the Continuity IRA (CIRA), a PIRA splinter group formed in 1986, stepped into the spotlight and resumed where the PIRA had left off. But the CIRA campaign was short-lived. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement devolved powers from Westminster to Belfast and established the Northern Ireland Assembly, taking much of the steam out of the Irish nationalist movement. (The CIRA never officially laid down its arms and still carries out the occasional attack.) It was around this time that yet another militant nationalist group formed, calling itself the Real IRA (also known as RIRA and Oglaigh na hEireann, or "Army of Ireland," a name used by the IRA in the early 20th century).
The RIRA is the most active militant group in Northern Ireland today, and its recent activities caused the latest warning. Its low-level militant campaign against security forces in Northern Ireland has been steadily escalating since 2008. Since then it has deployed more than a dozen IEDs (most contained in vehicles), although not all of them were successfully detonated. The RIRA also has conducted shootings targeting other nationalist groups opposed to the RIRA's hard-line republican stance. There have been 37 RIRA incidents so far in 2010, compared to 22 in 2009 and about 15 in 2008. But while incidents of violence are increasing in number, that number is still nowhere near the level of PIRA violence in the 1970s and 1980s. But the RIRA has shown a high level of organization, discipline and tactical capability. The bombings it has conducted across Northern Ireland have been uniform in execution and effect, indicating that the cells across the region are operating on the same page. Perpetrators routinely have used hijacked taxis to maneuver IEDs into position and then called in the bomb threats — typically around 30 minutes in advance — in order to prevent casualties from the resulting explosions.
Detonating car bombs in urban settings without killing or injuring people requires a high level of discipline and coordination, more so than detonating a device without warning, since the bombing has to be well-timed and communication lines must be open to the media and security forces so the warning can be issued. Granted, some recent RIRA attacks have been lethal or nearly so. A string of incidents in which IEDs were placed on security vehicles or near specific homes linked to security personnel did appear to have malicious intent. But it is important to note that these attacks were in pursuit of very specific targets and were intended to undermine the authority of security forces by raising the question: If they cannot protect themselves and their loved ones, how can they protect the populace? Specifically targeting security forces, these kinds of attacks are in a different category than bombings that are intentionally non-lethal. While RIRA tradecraft has been improving, the bombmakers don't appear to have perfected their art. In 2008 and 2009, a series of IEDs were discovered that did not go off. Evidently, the RIRA continues to deploy faulty devices, as seen in an Aug. 10 incident in which an IED placed under a security guard's car only partially detonated. Overall, though, the skills of RIRA bombmakers are expected to improve with practice.
What the RIRA is Not
As can be seen from the history described above, many different groups have used the IRA moniker with subtle differences in strategies and tactics. While all have fought for Irish independence, the IRA has become more of a brand than a cohesive movement. Other than its name, today's RIRA has little continuity with the PIRA of the 1970s and virtually no connection to the IRA of the Irish war for independence. (It is interesting to note that other groups with a similar cause, such as the Irish National Liberation Army, have not adopted the IRA title.) As a brand name, IRA has been adopted by the most radical splinters from each generation's core group as these core groups were politically appeased. And each of these offshoots, picking up the IRA banner to continue the fight, has been made up of radical nationalists unwilling to enter the political arena. There are some key differences between today's RIRA and the previous PIRA (which was responsible for The Troubles) that draw a sharp distinction between the groups' threats.
These differences include political support, sectarian violence, targeting, and financial and materiel support. Currently, the RIRA has no associated political party like Sinn Fein (or any party with seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly) that offers any kind of justification or support for the RIRA's activities. The RIRA acts as its own political advocate by releasing public statements, but there is no significant political movement positioned to capitalize on the violence like Sinn Fein could do during The Troubles. This lack of political support, plus the fact that RIRA's leaders remain anonymous, makes it difficult for the group to engage in any kind of dialogue that could exploit its militant capability for political ends. Nor has the RIRA made any serious attempt to stir up sectarian conflict to achieve its goals. Unionists, the longstanding rival of Irish nationalist forces, have largely refrained from violence in recent years. This is because they have not been targeted in any serious militant campaign since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
It is important to remember that sectarian violence was a huge component of The Troubles, when the PIRA had a sparring partner in the form of unionist militias that contributed almost as much to the death toll as the PIRA did. By not conducting blatant attacks against unionist or Protestant communities, the RIRA has avoided an expansion of the sectarian violence that could result from bringing their long-time rivals into the dispute. Despite recent statements from the RIRA that it intends to target London, as its predecessors did, London presents a more difficult target set than it used to. There has not been an attack in London linked to militant Irish nationalists since 2001 for good reason. Militant Irish nationalists have an extremely thin support network in the city and face a very hostile security apparatus that has been focusing intently on preventing terrorist attacks since the al Qaeda-linked bombings in 2005. While militant Islamists currently pose a more immediate threat in London, the steps involved in the execution of a terrorist attack are virtually the same whether you are an Irish militant or an Islamist militant, and watching for one is like watching for all. It would be very difficult — though not impossible — for the RIRA or any other militant Irish nationalist group to conduct an attack anywhere in Great Britain right now.
Any escalation of Irish nationalist attacks would likely occur first in Northern Ireland, where British security forces are more vulnerable targets. While it does not require massive amounts of money to run an underground guerrilla movement, the RIRA still needs resources to survive and continue its campaign. A recent MI5 sting operation against an Irish republican dissident revealed that the man used his business in Portugal to organize weapons purchases. The RIRA has also engaged in criminal activities to fund its campaign, engaging in bank robbery, kidnapping and drug trafficking. Relying on such ad hoc means of raising cash can be disruptive to a group's primary objective; it is an ideological as well as operational distraction to have to conduct bank robberies between bombing attacks on police stations, and often the allure of fast cash earned through criminal means can quickly lead to the corruption and blurring of the mission. Perhaps even more important, it can also allow a government to paint an ideological militant group like the RIRA as a gang of thugs rather than a group of noble nationalists, which is what the RIRA makes itself out to be. When it comes to RIRA funding, as STRATFOR pointed out in 2008, Moscow could be tempted to reactivate old links to the Irish nationalist underground if its relationship with the United Kingdom deteriorates. There is little evidence to suggest that Russia has anything to do with the recent increase in activity, but finding a strategic benefactor like Russia could provide a huge lift to the RIRA and allow it to focus purely on political violence and not have to conduct criminal violence to pay the bills.
Why Now?
The increase in RIRA violence coincided with the global recession, which has hit the United Kingdom, and especially Northern Ireland, very hard. From 2007 to 2009, unemployment overall in Northern Ireland rose from 3.7 percent to 7 percent, and unemployment among working-age males — the primary RIRA constituency — rose from 3.8 percent to 9 percent. Unemployment obviously is not the only factor that contributes to the recent increase in violence, but there is certainly a strong correlation between the rise in unemployment and the rise in militant nationalist activity. And the economic situation in Northern Ireland does not look like it will be improving any time soon. Around 32 percent of the Northern Ireland workforce is employed in the public sector, and Northern Ireland depends on 16 billion pounds ($25 billion) in transfer payments from London each year. This dependency is the result, in part, of the United Kingdom's attempt to pump enough cash into Northern Island to provide jobs and mitigate sectarian tensions. Looming budget cuts could have a direct impact on Northern Ireland's jobless rate and its ability to provide income to unemployed people, thereby driving up discontent and anger toward London.
It is just this kind of discontent that the RIRA can exploit to recruit militants and drum up public support. Our current assessment of the RIRA is that, although it has the capability to conduct deadly and disruptive attacks in Northern Ireland, it has made a conscious decision to avoid fatalities. In following this model, the group has consistently shown a relatively high level of discipline and good command and control. This means that the RIRA could, rather easily and quickly, escalate the violence by not calling in attacks ahead of time and targeting more densely populated areas. It could also exacerbate sectarian and economic tensions by attacking unionist targets. Without a strategic benefactor, however, and facing a sophisticated British security apparatus, the RIRA will have a tough time recreating The Troubles that the PIRA proved so adept at stirring up three decades ago.
