Somali media outlets and STRATFOR sources have described a possible split within the Somali jihadist group al Shabaab between its nationalist and internationalist elements. Tensions within al Shabaab are believed to be as intense as ever, with this most recent spat beginning in 2009, though disputes have existed since the group emerged in 2008 from the shadow of its original patron, the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (aka the Islamic Courts Union), which controlled much of central and southern Somalia in 2006. Tensions within al Shabaab reportedly revolve around leadership claims, a failure to defeat the Somali government and the role and presence of foreign jihadists. Al Shabaab chief Ahmad Abdi Godane (aka Abu Zubayr) has been at odds with one of his top commanders, Muktar Robow (aka Abu Mansur), over strategies and control of al Shabaab forces. Abu Zubayr is considered the leader of the internationalist elements of al Shabaab, coordinating closely with foreign jihadists from al Qaeda who have joined its ranks over the last few years. There is no concrete number on al Shabaab's foreign elements, but foreign leadership elements may number a dozen, while foreign foot soldiers may number several hundred. Abu Mansur is considered to be more aligned with nationalist elements of al Shabaab as well as the interests of his Rahanweyn clan, though, like Abu Zubayr, his fighting background is also transnational, having fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Though Abu Mansur denied Oct. 8 that a break is under way, STRATFOR sources describe a lull in militant activity due to the wrangling within al Shabaab's leadership and with Aweys. The spat within al Shabaab may be leading Abu Mansur to negotiate the re-creation of a militant group called al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) together with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a staunch Somali nationalist warlord and leader of Hizbul Islam, whose own negotiations to combine with al Shabaab appear to have broken down. It is likely that the failure of Aweys and Abu Zubayr's al Shabaab to reach an agreement is a clash of personalities and of differences over their respective strengths. To Aweys, his history of having fought in AIAI in the 1990s and probably in nationalist campaigns going back to at least the 1980s gives him precedence over al Shabaab, whom he likely regards as upstart youths. For Abu Zubayr, his group has been the primary force battling the Somali government in recent years and is responsible for propelling the Somali theater onto the global jihadist radar. Aweys, with his relatively small force, does not bring a material benefit to Abu Zubayr, apart from his nationalist credentials. Nationalism is a potent rallying cry in Somalia — fighting to defend Somalia against foreign aggression can win traction among the mainstream population. On the other hand, fighting to bring jihad to Somalia and basing such efforts in Somali territory is unpopular. Al Shabaab jihadists disguise their actions through nationalism, and this is where a warlord like Aweys, with his history of fighting Somali struggles, can benefit al Shabaab. An Abu Mansur-Aweys match-up in a recreated AIAI could number in the range of 2,000 fighters (an estimated 1,500 under Abu Mansur's command in the Bay and Bakool regions of southern Somalia, and some 500 from Awey's Hizbul Islam in northern Mogadishu and central Somali regions). This would significantly weaken the fighting capability of the remaining Abu Zubayr-led al Shabaab elements, whose strength, when combined with Abu Mansur, is estimated at 4,000-5,000 regular members (plus up to several thousand irregular members, hired as extras when necessary and as funding permits). It is also not clear how an Abu Mansur-Aweys pullback from the Abu Zubayr-led al Shabaab would impact the latter's network of relations with other clans and warlords in the rest of southern and central Somalia, contacts who supply Abu Zubayr with manpower and materiel. What is clear in Somali society is that allegiances are fickle, and should a new militant force show itself to have the upper hand, a balance of forces could shift its way. Forming a new AIAI would be a setback for al Shabaab, but it would not necessarily be a welcome move by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) or its foreign backers. All these top leaders — Abu Zubayr, Abu Mansur, Aweys — are designated terrorists by the U.S. government, and each has fought in Somali, regional or international Islamist campaigns. Neither the TFG nor Washington would like to see any of these men in any leadership role. Secondly, while the TFG would enjoy the breathing space that a breach in al Shabaab would create, AIAI would likely soon make its own move against the TFG. A pullback of Abu Mansur and Sheikh Aweys' forces from Mogadishu would translate into more security for the TFG in the capital, but the TFG and its main protective force comprising African Union peacekeepers have no presence beyond the city. If not an outright military advance of its own, the new AIAI would likely before long claim that its forces and nationalist elements should be the ones to rule Somalia rather than the foreign proxy — an accusation previously alleged against the TFG government under President Sharif Ahmed by Abu Mansur and Aweys. Thirdly, Ethiopia, a main backer of the TFG, remembers very clearly its own war with the AIAI and Aweys in the 1990s. Seeing Aweys gain power in Somalia would quickly invoke fears in Addis Ababa of future AIAI moves to create a "Greater Somalia," which would mean forcibly seizing the ethnic Somali enclave in Ethiopia known as the Ogaden. The two countries fought a war over this region from 1977-1978. The breakup of al Shabaab is not a done deal, according to STRATFOR sources, but negotiations to reposition various nationalist and international elements of al Shabaab and related Islamists in Somalia is clearly under way.