The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is set to hold a special conference Sept. 28 amid speculation that plans may emerge for North Korean leadership after Kim Jong Il. Attention has focused on the little-seen Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il's youngest son, and on Kim Kyong Hui and Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Il's sister and brother-in-law, who have risen in importance as power-brokers and have been used by the North Korean leader to stress the importance of the Kim family in leadership. But the WPK conference itself may be as important as the answer to the oft-asked succession question. The WPK was once a core power center within the North Korean government but has faded in significance since Kim Jong Il's rise to power. The WPK and the Korean People's Army (KPA) were roughly coequal parts of the leadership structure, while the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) and Cabinet comprised a third faction. Each had overlapping roles and responsibilities, as well as networks to watch the others, and North Korean founder Kim Il Sung sat in the middle, coordinating the three and using their rivalries to balance power and avoid or counter any surprise challenges. The naming of Kim Jong Il as Kim Il Sung's successor initially was not well-received among North Korea's elite. The younger Kim had little experience in government and no military experience. It was this latter element that seemed most troubling to the two Kims as the younger began training for his role as supreme leader. In the early 1990s, under the direction of Kim Il Sung, the National Defense Commission (NDC), the coordinating body that oversees the military and security apparatus, became the path for Kim Jong Il to gain authority and support over the military. A change in the Constitution removed the concurrent role of the president and NDC chairman, allowing the younger Kim to take on the chairmanship in 1993 and begin currying favor with the military, stacking the ranks with his own supporters or appeasing the military elite with promises and favors. But in doing so, Kim Jong Il began undermining the power and role of the WPK. When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, it took Kim Jong Il another three years to sort through the politics of North Korea's elite before he could fully take charge. In that time, he became even more indebted to the military establishment while simultaneously purging the WPK of many of the older political elite — supporters of his father and potential challengers to his authority. What emerged in 1997 and 1998 was a less-balanced North Korea, where the military had a stronger influence and the Party started to fade in relevance. At the same time, the role of the NDC began to grow, and Kim Jong Il centered his rule of North Korea here, more so than through his position on the WPK. Kim Jong Il never took the post of president, leaving his deceased father president in perpetuity. Working from the NDC gave him a place to walk the line between the economic and political polices of the WPK and the defense-focused interests of the KPA, a balance that often tilts in the short term, but has steadily leaned toward the KPA since Kim Jong Il rose to power. But as Kim looks to the next leadership transition, it is apparent that once again a balance is needed. If rumors and speculation are true, and Kim Jong Un is the chosen successor, he will need a lot of assistance and support behind the scenes to hold on to power. One step is the solidification of the Kim family in military and political leadership. The day before the WPK conference, Kim Jong Il has reportedly promoted Kim Jong Un and Kim Kyong Hui as generals in the KPA, among four other promotions. This would give an element of military authority to the youngest Kim, and it was a military delegation that has purportedly nominated Kim Jong Un as a delegate to the WPK. But there is also the need to balance the strength of the military in regard to succession and future policymaking, and there appear three things in the works to assist with this. First is the potential for a live leadership transition. For several years, North Korea has floated the idea of Kim Jong Il stepping down in 2012 and handing power over to his son, leaving the elder Kim the ability to continue to balance things behind the scenes, as Deng Xiaoping did in China, until Kim Jong Un can get his footing. The second is the idea of an unofficial group leadership structure, with Kim Jong Un mostly standing in front and learning. This group, likely led by Jang Song Thaek, and including representatives of the military, political, economic and foreign policy elites, would coordinate and run North Korea through Kim Jong Un, acting as a very powerful advisory body. The final piece is the WPK itself. The rising significance of the military in all aspects of foreign and domestic policy has left North Korea unbalanced, and Kim Jong Il appears to be attempting to restore the balance by rehabilitating and strengthening the WPK once again. The WPK has held two special conferences in the past, one in 1958 and another in 1966. In 1958, five years after the end of the devastating Korean War, the theme was national unity and economic rehabilitation, with a focus on matching light industry and agriculture simultaneous with the heavy industry development. In 1966, the theme was North Korea's position in the international socialist movement and striking a balance between military and economic development. Six years after this latter conference, North Korea codified in its Constitution a combined political, economic and security solution to defining and focusing the nation's path and goals; the Juche ideology of self-reliance in all aspects. This concept of self-reliance, even if unachievable in its extreme, has colored North Korea's domestic and international policies since. Even Kim Jong Il's addition of Songun, or military-first, policy, has not overshadowed the concept of Juche in shaping how the North Korean elite interpret international opportunities and threats and direct the country's policies. While it is unlikely that the new WPK conference will announce a new North Korean ideology, it is almost certainly going to discuss new directions for North Korea's economy. Pyongyang has already reportedly rehabilitated former Premier Pak Pong Ju, who had flirted with Chinese-style economic ideas for North Korea, and during Kim Jong Il's most recent visit to China, there was talk again of perhaps opening more special economic zones in North Korea and applying a modified version of China's economic opening and reform to North Korean circumstances, something Chinese President Hu Jintao also reportedly urged on Kim Jong Il during the visit. Perhaps more so than naming a successor, these economic policies could present opportunities for changes or adjustments in the North Korean system — certainly not large-scale change, but something that will require North Korea to become more engaged internationally. This may explain why Kang Sok Ju, First Vice Foreign Minister, who helped negotiate the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994, just days before the WPK conference had been appointed Vice Premier, and North Korean nuclear negotiators Kim Kye Gwan and Ri Yong Ho have been promoted to First Vice Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister, respectively. These moves may signal a planned opening to the United States, one that may seek to move past the nuclear question and the limitations of the six-party talks to one of economic development and international integration for Pyongyang.