As Turkey prepares to vote on a constitutional referendum that would limit the power of the country's military and secular establishment, the first public signs are showing of a split between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gulen movement, an influential religious community named for its leader, Imam Fethullah Gulen. Though divisions have long existed between the two sides, public tensions first emerged in the aftermath of the Gaza flotilla incident and accelerated with the AKP's decision to compromise with the military on promotions. While these two groups have long worked in tandem to undermine the power of the unelected secular elite in the military and judiciary, the AKP appears to be realizing more that its association with the Gulen movement could jeopardize its political future and make it appear too extreme. The Gulen movement, for its part, believes the AKP has been too cautious in taking on the military and judiciary, and wants to enact fundamental changes to the country's institutions while its erstwhile political allies are at the peak of their power. Though the AKP and Gulen movement are unlikely to break any time in the near future (and certainly not before the Sept. 12 constitutional referendum), the nature of their partnership is likely to change as the two groups' aims diverge. The Gulen movement's interests largely aligned with the Islamist-rooted AKP when it came to power in 2002, and the Gulenists saw the AKP as a political vehicle through which it could achieve its goals. Besides their religious links, these two groups, along with non-religious elements looking to assert civilian authority in Turkey, have adopted a common position against Turkey's traditional power center from which they perceived a threat: the staunchly secular Turkish military. In the course of their struggle against the army, the AKP benefited from Gulenist supporters' votes and the Gulen movement's broad network (which it has built up over decades and has members in key posts across various government institutions). Indeed, much of the evidence in several alleged coup plots by the military against the AKP — the Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and Cage cases — is believed to have been leaked by the Gulenist network within government institutions. However, as the threat posed by the military to the AKP has gradually diminished and the party has asserted the predominance of civilian control over the government, fissures have emerged between the two groups over how far to go in limiting the military's power over Turkish political affairs. Undermining the military's influence in politics has been a decade-long effort for the Gulenists, a response to the overthrow of several democratically elected, Islamist-rooted political parties for allegedly violating the constitutional principles of secularism set at the foundation of the state. Because of this experience, the Gulen movement would like to see the AKP take a harder line with the military, while the AKP feels the need to maintain a working relationship with the army to get things done politically. Both the Gulen movement and the AKP also continue to struggle with being seen as "too Islamist," particularly in their portrayal to the West. Thus, both sides have increasingly sought ways to distance themselves from each other in public and use such fissures in an attempt to appear more pragmatic than the other. The first public sign of a divergence surfaced when Gulen openly opposed the Turkish government's decision to allow an aid flotilla to sail toward the Gaza Strip in an attempt to break the Israeli blockade, which resulted in a May 31 Israeli raid on Turkish vessels that left nine Turks dead. Gulen's statement was intended to demonstrate the transnational character of the Gulen movement and a desire to avoid being linked too closely with the AKP's hard-line official stance on the issue. Gulen was also seizing the opportunity to portray his group — a movement with businesses and schools across the world — as more pragmatic than the AKP and thus more acceptable to the West to counter common criticism that it follows a purely Islamist agenda. Further differences appeared when the Supreme Military Council, composed of the civilian government and army members, convened to decide on top military appointments Aug. 1. A Turkish court had issued arrest warrants for 102 military officials — some of whom were generals expecting promotions — before the council convened, in an attempt to weaken the army's position and allow the AKP to impose its decisions on military appointments, which has traditionally been the army's prerogative. However, none of the 102, save for one low-ranking soldier, were taken into custody despite the warrants. The Gulenists had pushed for arrests, but the AKP annulled the warrants to reach a compromise with the military on promotions. The AKP also ignored later Gulenist calls for the resignations of the interior and defense ministers for failing to arrest the officials. The annulment angered the Gulen movement, which had pledged its support for the AKP-initiated constitutional referendum altering the makeup of the secularist-dominated Constitutional Court and Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors. While the AKP says the amendment will make these institutions more democratic, its opponents say that the package will allow Gulenists to infiltrate the high courts more easily, which would give the AKP more power over the judiciary. Tensions between the Gulenists and the AKP appear to be building in the lead-up to the referendum, and the recent publication of a book by a prominent police chief detailing the Gulenist infiltration of the Turkish security apparatus is now causing waves within Turkey over Islamist clout in key institutions, particularly police intelligence. The timing of the book's release, just weeks prior to the referendum, was designed to damage the Gulen movement's relationship with the AKP, which has already begun to view its Gulenist allies as a liability as much as they are an asset — the Turkish justice minister said allegations against the group laid out in the book will be seriously investigated. Though the AKP still needs the Gulen network's support for the September referendum as well as the July 2011 parliamentary elections, the AKP is likely to become more active in trying to curtail the Gulen movement's influence after the vote.