Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov said on June 11 that Bulgaria was "giving up" on the $1 billion-$1.5 billion Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline project decision, and that construction on the planned Belene nuclear power plant had been suspended. The comment was unexpected and threw off even Borisov's own energy minister who, when asked about the decision, remarked that he "could not believe" his prime minister had said that. In a dramatic twist that left all of Europe confused, Borisov retracted his statement on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project hours later, saying that "the Bulgarian government hasn't made a final decision regarding the construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline." The statements, although quite contradictory, bring into question the Moscow-Sofia relationship. Russia was supposed to play a key role in the building of both projects. The purpose of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline was to avoid congesting the Turkish Straits by allowing Russian tankers to dock at the Bulgarian port of Burgas and pipe oil to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis. Cash-strapped Greece was hoping that the project would give it some much-needed capital. The Belene nuclear power plant, meanwhile, is supposed to replace the aging Kozloduy nuclear power plant built in 1967 that produced around 40 percent of the country's electricity until reactor Units 3 and 4 were shut down. The four oldest reactor units of Kozloduy were taken out of operation as a condition of Bulgaria's entry into the European Union. According to Borisov's initial statement, the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline was canceled due to environmental concerns, as well as fears that the pipeline could adversely affect Bulgaria's budding tourism industry. Meanwhile, Belene is perceived to be economically unfeasible for Bulgaria in the midst of its economic crisis. While there is no reason to doubt Sofia's explanations for canceling the infrastructure projects, they come on the heels of the revelation by the Bulgarian government at the beginning of 2010 — and confirmed by the Foreign Ministry in April — that it was considering hosting elements of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in the country. It also comes right after a two-day visit to Sofia by the CIA Director Leon Panetta, who was apparently feted by the entire government during his stay. In other words, Bulgaria's relationship with the United States is on the upswing, which brings into question Sofia's longstanding "special relationship" with Russia.

The Geopolitics of Russian-Bulgarian Relations

Bulgaria is located at the southeastern corner of the Balkans. It commands overland routes used by the Ottomans in their conquest of the Balkans in the 13th century. To this day, the primary routes that go through the river valley created by the Maritsa remain key arteries between Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor. As such, Bulgaria's strategic importance to Russia has always been as a "plug" atop Turkish ambitions in Europe. Russia's close relationship with Bulgaria also ensures its presence in the Balkan Mountains, which stretch in an east-west direction down the middle of the country. This allows for the consolidation of the Danubian plain to the north — the fertile Wallachian plain of Romania — and the Bessarabian gap further to the northeast, a key transportation route between Europe and Russia that avoids the Carpathians. Bulgaria owes its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century to Russia, which fought the Russo-Turkish War with the intent of creating a "Greater Bulgaria" with access to both the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea — precisely the route the modern day Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline would take. The plan backfired when the rest of Europe realized that Russia would be gaining warm weather ports in the Mediterranean. This was one of the issues that prompted the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which in part decided to resolve the Balkan question by greatly reducing Bulgaria's territory. The relationship between Russia and Bulgaria continued. Sofia fought on the side of the Central Powers in World War I and the Axis in World War II, but refused to join the attack against the Soviet Union in the latter conflict. Even the subsequent communist period in Bulgaria — and the Soviet influence that went along with it — did not elicit the same kind of anti-Russian feelings as seen in much of the rest of Central/Eastern Europe. Although Bulgaria was glad to be rid of the Soviet yoke as much as anyone in Central/Eastern Europe, the country did not attempt violent uprisings against Soviet rule during the Cold War. The oft-stated reasons for Bulgaria's affinity with Russia are the countries' cultural and religious ties. But realistically, Sofia has geopolitical reasons to side with Moscow as well. Bulgaria is hemmed in along the southeastern corner of the Balkans, surrounded by more powerful rivals on all sides: Turkey is to the south, Romania is to the north and Serbia is to the west. As such, an alliance with (or domination by) a distant Moscow has been an acceptable alternative to domination by a closer rival. Moscow also prefers to deal with Sofia in the Balkans because it has historically been more reliable as an ally than independent-minded Belgrade, which has launched its own campaigns for domination of the region that do not necessarily correlate with Moscow's interests. This was especially true under Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, but also in the 1990s under Slobodan Milosevic.

Changing Political Geography of the Balkans

In the 1990s, however, Russia retreated its influence from the Balkans, letting developments there follow their own course with very little interference from the Kremlin. With no alternatives in sight, Bulgaria dutifully reformed itself into a free market democracy on the path to NATO and EU membership. However, being considered a laggard even among the Soviet bloc countries, Bulgaria was not expected to join either alliance as quickly as it did. The West, however, wanted to secure the troubled Western Balkans (where post-Yugoslav conflicts still simmer to this day, especially in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina), by surrounding them with NATO and EU member states. This meant rushing both Romania and Bulgaria into the alliance structure. Whether Bulgaria and Romania were ready for the jump is still debated, but what is generally not debated is Romania's commitment to the Western alliance. However, Sofia's commitment has continued to be questioned. Its participation in the South Stream project — the Russian alternative to the EU-funded Nabucco natural gas pipeline project — is often cited as an example of the continuing close collaboration between Moscow and Sofia, and "proof" that Bulgaria remains a Trojan horse for Russia within the Western alliances.

Bulgaria's Calculus Today

The latest decision — or rather confusion over the decision — to cancel the first and suspend the second of two Russian-led infrastructure projects may be an indication of Sofia undertaking a serious shift in its thinking. At the very least, it indicates that the Bulgarian government is seriously split over the issue of its role in the Western alliance and special relationship with Moscow. From Sofia's perspective, it is dealing with a political landscape that has undergone great changes since 1989. Russia is largely disengaged from the Balkans on a strategic level. Its forays into a "strategic alliance" with Serbia are really flirtations more than concrete moves to forge an alliance that would give the Kremlin a foothold in the Balkans. While Russia seems interested in infrastructural energy projects in the region, Sofia does not want to commit itself to a Russian partnership on energy that would draw the ire of its Western allies. Meanwhile, Romania, its neighbor and historical rival to the north, is playing a more aggressive role in the U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in Central/Eastern Europe by offering to host portions of the BMD system, pushing for a pro-Western change of government in Moldova, and fervently supporting Washington on most foreign policy decisions. Bulgaria does not want to find itself isolated between a progressively ever more pro-American Romania to the north and — even worse in many ways from Sofia's point of view — an increasingly independent-minded and confident Turkey to the south. Bulgaria is particularly concerned about the latter because Sofia traditionally worries about Ankara's influence over Bulgaria's Muslim minority. For the time being, Romania and Turkey are firm U.S. allies. It could therefore become quite dangerous for Bulgaria to flirt with Russia. Thus far, all indications in Russian foreign policy have pointed to the consolidation of its former Soviet republics as taking precedence over anything else. From there, Russia wants to nurture its relationship with Western European powers — particularly France and Germany — and rebuild its economy. Moscow does not plan to make any long-term commitments or serious forays into Bulgaria's neighborhood. From Sofia's perspective, this means that a continued alliance with a Russia not willing to invest large sums of money into Bulgaria, and not willing to return to the Balkans in force, is a dangerous proposition that could isolate it between its traditional rivals, Romania and Turkey. The bottom line is that Bulgaria is left with very few choices. As a member of the Western alliance, Bulgaria is surrounded by firm U.S. allies. Russia's noncommittal attitude toward the region forces Sofia to prove to Washington that it is as important an ally as its traditional rivals to the north and south. The question, however, is whether domestic politics will allow such a shift. Borisov's declaration, and its subsequent immediate retraction, indicates that there is still a lot to hash out internally before Sofia makes its choice.