North Korea carried out a government reshuffling June 7 during a session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), replacing the premier and the ministers of light industry and foodstuffs, and promoting Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law, Jang Song Thaek, to vice chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). A significant leadership shuffle had been expected since the announcement of the unusual SPA session following Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China. An initial review of the changes suggests two key points: the first is attention to economic policies (and particularly their domestic component), and the second relates to the succession plans. According to a statement released by North Korea's state-run news agency, Choe Yong Rim replaced Kim Yong Il as premier of the North Korean Cabinet, a position that is responsible in large measure for economic policy. Kim Yong Il, a former minister of maritime and land transport, had been appointed premier in 2007, replacing then-Premier Pak Pong Ju, a former minister of chemical industry who took the premiership in 2003. North Korean economic policy priorities can sometimes be revealed, at least in part, through the choice of premier and the affiliated Cabinet positions. Pak, a heavy industry veteran and one of several technocrats appointed in 2003, represented the focus on heavy industry amid economic experimentation. His successor, Kim Yong Il, saw a further shift in attention, not only to strengthening core domestic industries but also to expanding the export industries. Choe's appointment, however, does not seem so revealing, at least on the surface. Choe serves as chief secretary of the Pyongyang City Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and was elected general-secretary of the presidium of the SPA in 2009. Born in 1929, Choe is more than 80 years old (raising further questions about the May firing of NDC member and First Vice Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il Chol, who was ostensibly dropped because he was older than 80) and followed a fairly traditional path for that generation of North Korean leaders, studying at Mangyongdae, Kim Il Sung University, and abroad in Moscow. His background and age suggest less about any new economic policy direction than a desire by Kim Jong Il to have a less ambitious individual in the post, particularly after the recent disruptive currency revaluation. This allows the North Korean leadership to focus on stability ahead of the rumored 2012 leadership transition. The replacement of the foodstuffs and light industry ministers is a bit more revealing, suggesting both the continued fallout from the mishandled currency revaluation and the added focus on domestic goods. When Pyongyang turns its attention to foodstuffs and light industry, it usually indicates the country is trying to raise the standard of living, or at least the perception of that standard of living. With the South threatening to step up its propaganda campaign in the North, rumors of public dissatisfaction with the continued failures on economic policy and reports of spreading dissatisfaction with North Korean leadership succession plans, shifting attention to domestic daily needs may help soften potential discontent. The leadership issue also surfaced in the reshuffling of posts, with Jang Song Thaek's appointment as vice chair of the NDC, the center of North Korean power. Jang, Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law, has been an instrumental player in the behind-the-scenes maneuvering over the plans for just which son, if any, will succeed Kim Jong Il in the future. As a member of the Kim family (even if through marriage), Jang's promotion also serves to solidify the dynastic approach to North Korean leadership. With rumors and leaks continuing to circulate that Kim plans to carry out a live transition of power in 2012 to his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, it will be important to have strong support in key areas of government and the military. The one outstanding question regarding the June 7 SPA session and the government reshuffling is the level of Chinese influence. North Korea rarely holds two SPA sessions in the same year, and never just two months apart. Yet this session was announced only after Kim Jong Il traveled to China, a visit that came amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the March sinking of the South Korean navy corvette ChonAn, for which the North has been blamed. Kim Jong Il has retained Chinese support, or at least a Chinese spoiler role, in avoiding significant South Korean, U.S. or international action in response to the ChonAn incident, but it is unclear how much this Cabinet change, or other policies, may have been the price Pyongyang paid to maintain Chinese support. Beijing has hinted to Seoul that things are more under control in Pyongyang than may appear outwardly and pointed to the announced June 7 SPA session as something to watch for a significant signal. Just how significant that signal is, and whether China remains satisfied with its level of influence in Pyongyang, is not yet clear.