Russian President Dmitri Medvedev arrived in Kiev on May 17 for a two-day visit. He chaired a meeting of the interstate commission and held talks with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. The leaders made several joint statements during the meeting — the latest in a series of visits and consultations since the pro-Russian Yanukovich was elected in February — that could end up producing several agreements between the two countries. Energy and military deals have gained the most attention as Russia and Ukraine have begun strengthening their ties under Yanukovich. However, there could be an even more comprehensive deal in the works involving another former Soviet republic — Moldova — which would put crucial components of Ukraine's foreign policy under Russian control. Energy has been one of the most significant areas of cooperation between Moscow and Kiev since Yanukovich was sworn in as president. Russia and Ukraine signed a comprehensive deal on April 21 that lowered the price Kiev pays Moscow for natural gas by 30 percent, allegedly in return for another agreement which saw Russia's lease in the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea extended by 25 years to 2042. After this deal, Russian officials called for the merger of Russian energy giant Gazprom and Ukraine's state-owned energy firm Naftogaz. Indeed, Medvedev reiterated this position during his current visit, saying that such a merger was "possible on a mutually beneficial basis" and that it would be a pragmatic move. The idea has met resistance and created controversy in Ukraine. Certain officials, including Ukrainian Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov, have acknowledged that the merger is being considered, but others, like leading opposition figure and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, have flatly rejected such an agreement. Even Yanukovich has been careful not to endorse the merger, saying that no such deal would be made "without the protection of Ukraine's national interests." But Yanukovich's lack of endorsement of the Gazprom-Naftogaz merger does not necessarily mean the unification will never materialize; rather, it represents Yanukovich playing a delicate rhetorical game for public and political purposes while negotiations are under way. Ukraine is still a politically divided country. Much of the public — particularly in western Ukraine, which is more oriented toward Europe than toward Russia — would be infuriated if a merger occurred suddenly. The furor would threaten the strong mandate to rule that Yanukovich has gained since his election. Yanukovich also wants to wait to move on the Gazprom-Naftogaz issue because he is focused on trying to sideline his primary political foe, Timoshenko, by getting her charged with judicial tampering during the presidential election. Furthermore, if Yanukovich immediately endorsed the deal, it would send a message to Europe that Ukraine has become nothing more than a Russian lackey. Yanukovich — who has pledged to be non-aligned between Russia and Europe and to pursue a "dual-vector" foreign policy — has a strategic interest in not making large moves too suddenly. But this does not mean he will condemn the deal. Such large energy mergers are technical and the two parties involved will have many issues to work out; Russia even said the deal will not be finalized until October at the earliest. And with the current pace of visits and meetings between Russia and Ukraine, it is likely that momentum could build — albeit slowly — toward the Gazprom-Naftogaz merger. Energy deals are not the only important agreements Medvedev and Yanukovich are discussing. STRATFOR sources in Kiev report that Medvedev and Yanukovich will declare a "coordinated effort" for conflict resolution in Moldova's breakaway province of Transdniestria. Mediation efforts over Transdniestria — with participants including Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as official members, and the European Union and United States as observers — will thus be given a renewed focus and energy, but with a twist. This agreement is meant to make Ukraine feel like it is a strategic part of the mediation and foreign policy decision-making process in Moldova. Ukraine is important: It borders Moldova proper and the Transdniestria region, and roughly 100,000 Ukrainians reside in the country. Add to this the presence of 150,000 Russians in the country, as well as the 5,000 Russian troops stationed in Transdniestria, and the two countries form a formidable force in Moldova. While this agreement nominally will fulfill Ukraine's desire to become a bigger part of the negotiation process in Moldova, it is likely more of a Russian attempt to entrench its influence in both countries. Kiev will now fully support Russian troops remaining in Transdniestria — an issue on which former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's administration held a skeptical view. That regime also was prone to border closings with Transdniestria, but under Yanukovich, this could change to more positive relations as Russia attempts to integrate the region more closely with Ukraine — and by extension, Russia. But such attempts will face resistance from Moldova proper. Though the country is in political deadlock and has been without a true president for more than a year, the government is led by a coalition that favors European integration and has reached out to EU countries, particularly Romania, which holds influence in Moldova via cultural and linguistic ties. But the Europeans are mired in their own political and financial problems and do not have much energy to spend on Moldova at the moment. That opens the door for Russia, which has enlisted the Ukrainians' help. If the agreement on Moldova between Kiev and Moscow does materialize, this will represent Ukraine's transition to a formal Russian foreign policy tool. While energy deals are significant, Ukraine could be moving into roles beyond pipeline politics, marking a different and deeper level of reintegration with Moscow.