Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, the top al Qaeda operatives in Iraq, have been killed, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said April 19. Al-Maliki showed pictures of the two bodies, and his announcement has been confirmed by the U.S. military, so even though both men have been falsely reported dead before, there appears to be considerable confidence behind this claim. The two reportedly were killed early April 18 in Salahuddin province by Iraqi intelligence operatives supported by U.S. forces. Al-Baghdadi (also known as Hamid Dawud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi), an Iraqi, was the head of the al Qaeda-led jihadist alliance in Iraq called the Islamic State of Iraq and went by the title "Leader of the Faithful." Al-Masri (also known as Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir), an Egyptian national, was the military leader of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al-Masri came to the fore after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006. Al-Zarqawi alienated many Iraqi Sunnis with his ruthlessness. Al-Baghdadi is thought to have been largely a figurehead intended to reverse that alienation by putting an Iraqi face on AQI efforts, while al-Masri was considered the real brains and operational leadership behind AQI. It is his death that holds the most potential significance. The importance of competent and capable senior leadership, especially in terms of operational expertise, is not to be underestimated. As long as the ideological struggle of radical Islamist thought continues, there will be volunteers to step up and carry on the fight. But when these willing figures step up, if they are denied training from experienced leadership and institutional knowledge is disrupted, a group's operational capabilities face the possibility of substantial erosion. Al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were at large for years and remained primary targets of U.S. special operations forces in Iraq. They clearly demonstrated sufficient operational security expertise and protocols to remain at large and conduct attacks through the height of the U.S. surge, which entailed extensive, rapid and devastating special operations forces raids across the country. Thus, the deaths of both in one safe house suggests a very significant breach of that operational security — perhaps by local Sunni leaders looking to break from the AQI movement (the Sunni have become quite fractured of late). Ultimately, the location of this safe house could have been only a fraction of the actionable intelligence gleaned from such a breakthrough. Though other moves and raids may have been curtailed to prevent these two primary targets from being spooked, more arrests may take place in the coming days and weeks from further raids. Already, some 16 other operatives reportedly have been rounded up based on actionable intelligence gained during the raid that killed al-Masri and al-Baghdadi. In any event, the loss of al-Masri may prove to be a very significant blow to AQI's operational capability, which is a positive development for both Baghdad and Washington. The break between Iraqi Sunnis and the foreign jihadists dating back to 2006 in Anbar province was a major contributor to some semblance of stability in Iraq. The further erosion of AQI's capabilities could mean that subsequent attacks will not be as effective (and thus will pose less of a risk of reigniting wider ethno-sectarian violence). Of course, before al-Baghdadi and al-Masri's deaths, AQI's status had already started to wane. The focus for many foreign jihadists has shifted away from Iraq to Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere. And in any event, the fate of Iraq no longer turns on AQI or the Sunnis, but the status of the government in Baghdad, the capability of its security forces and Tehran's intentions to either support or destabilize the situation. The deaths of AQI's top operatives in Iraq certainly are a positive development for both Baghdad and Washington, but it is the struggle with Iran for control and stability in Iraq that matters in 2010.