Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thuagsuban said the government would pursue the "terrorists" responsible for firing on police and military forces during clashes with protesters on April 10 that resulted in 21 deaths. The violence was the worst the country has seen since the military crushed protesters during "Black May" in 1992 and marked the second consecutive year in which the Songkran New Year festival was marred with civil strife. This bout of mass protests is the most recent — and most violent — episode in a political crisis that began in 2005. But Thailand's instability is endemic, and the underlying causes stem from its geographic and socioeconomic conditions. (click here to enlarge image) The Thai heartland consists of the fertile alluvial plains along the Chaophraya River, which flows north to south through the center of the country and empties into the Gulf of Thailand. The Thai core — traditionally known as Siam — extends northward along the river in a sliver consisting of some of the prime farmland in the Southeast Asian peninsula. Bangkok, the capital of Siam and economic center, lies at the mouth of the river and has served for hundreds of years as the center of political and economic power. Bangkok is the point of origin for Thailand's exports — traditionally rice and other farm produce — and the entry point for foreign technology and wealth. Today, the capital retains its power and has about 10 percent of Thailand's population. To protect itself, Bangkok extended its control in every direction. In the west it pushed to the Dawna mountain range bordering Myanmar (Burma), to the south it extended along the Malay Peninsula, and to the east it pushed its territory as far along the gulf coast as possible against Cambodia. However, there were two major regions that Bangkok found difficult to control: the mountainous far north and the grassy highlands of the northeast or Khorat Plateau. The north was an older and rival Thai kingdom, based in the modern-day city of Chiang Mai, and frequently disputed with Burma, while the northeast historically was heavily populated and the subject of contests between the Siamese and Khmer empires for its labor force — evidenced by the ongoing border dispute with Cambodia. The north and northeast resisted central Thailand's rule, and they also were the most susceptible to foreign influence — originally, the Burmese and Cambodians struggled to wrest control away from Bangkok, and British and French colonists later took them over. Bangkok gained full formal administrative control over these areas only in the late nineteenth century, but this did not translate into actual control until after World War II. Since then, Bangkok has held onto the north and northeastern periphery, occasionally sending the army to put down rebellions in these regions. The northeast was part of the Golden Triangle of regional opium growers and was therefore the focus of the Thai army's attempts to quash narcotics production and smuggling, as well as minority independence movements. Meanwhile, with about one-third of Thailand's population, the northeast has been particularly susceptible to populist movements. During the Cold War, it briefly formed an independence party and then came under the influence of communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These regional struggles persist today but have taken on a new shape in light of the changing nature of the Thai economy and politics. Beginning in the 1960s, Thailand underwent rapid economic development, urbanization and modernization, and by the mid-1980s it entered the ranks of the so-called "East Asian tiger" economies. At the same time, major political change took place. After the end of the Cold War, the United States withdrew its support from Southeast Asia, where Thailand had been a bulwark of the U.S. alliance system. Thailand's military staged another coup in 1991 but was resisted by popular protests in 1992, which resulted in elections, a new civilian government and an "end" to the era of dictatorship. The accumulation of wealth and internationalization of the economy sharpened the disparities between Bangkok and the provinces, breeding resentment in the countryside. At the same time, it gave rise to a class of wealthy provincial business magnates who could leverage their wealth and rural voters to enter into politics. Democratic political reforms also made it possible for the first time for rural masses to try to make their voices heard, and they would do so by taking their protests to Bangkok. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Thailand sought both to revitalize its economy and to bring the benefits of globalization to the masses. The leader of this movement was Thaksin Shinawatra, a powerful businessman from Chiang Mai in the far north who founded the Shin Corporation, a major conglomerate. Thaksin used the combination of big business and rural populism to gain electoral support greater than any politician before him. His popularity, along with democratic constitutional changes adopted after the financial crisis, led him to win successive elections with overwhelming support from the rural poor in the country's north and northeast. But Thaksin was a threat to the traditional power structure of Thai politics. This power structure consisted foremost of a military that acted as the country's ultimate power broker; a revered monarchy that united Thais and promoted social stability; and the civil bureaucracy and educated urban classes, where political influence and wealth were concentrated. Thaksin made a series of moves that turned these institutions against him. He used his political power to strengthen his company's position and buy influence in critical government bodies, made controversial deals selling strategic assets to foreign companies and generated a cult-like following among the rural masses through big spending programs, which urban elites opposed. Thaksin also tried to put the police in charge of handling security in the deep south, where a Muslim insurgency long has been fought. Thaksin pushed the military out of an area it considered its turf; moreover, the security situation deteriorated afterward until military operations were reinstated. Thaksin also alienated the monarchy by playing the role of rural benefactor and speaking of staying in power for several terms. In other words, Thaksin seemed to become the embodiment of the rural periphery's challenge to the traditional Thai core. Hence, powerful groups in Bangkok opposed him. The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a royalist protest group, began holding massive street protests in Bangkok. Then, in September 2006, while on a trip to the United States, Thai generals stripped Thaksin of power. It was Thailand's first military coup since the early 1990s, but the 18th since 1932 — military intervention was found not to be a thing of the past. The cyclical massive protests over the past few years have followed from the power struggles in the aftermath of Thaksin's ouster. Living in exile, Thaksin has used political proxy movements and his massive popular following to challenge successive Thai governments. When the Thai army restored civilian government in 2007, the first election was a victory for Thaksin's party. The Constitutional Court disbanded this party for corruption in May 2007, but it reformed under a different name and took power again. All the while, "Yellow Shirt" protesters flooded Bangkok, most notably overrunning Suvarnabhumi International Airport in November 2008. As the government attempted to use more heavy-handed tactics to suppress the protests, it found the military would not obey its commands, and public opinion swayed toward the protesters. The Constitutional Court disbanded the pro-Thaksin party a second time, finally knocking Thaksin's proxies out of power. In December 2008 the current government took power, with the Democrat Party at the helm, enjoying the support of the traditional pillars of central Thai power — the military, monarchy and Bangkok bureaucracy. But within months 100,000 "Red Shirt" protesters, urged on by Thaksin, stormed a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Pattaya, then fought with police and army troops in Bangkok for a week in April 2009. The Red Shirt protesters mostly come from the ranks of the up-country agricultural and lower classes and are rallied by Thaksin and allied provincial political bosses. In other words, there is a distinctly regional cast to the current political conflicts. The Red Shirt protests of March and April 2010 have followed a similar pattern, with protesters storming parliament April 7 and clashing with security in a bloody showdown April 10. Now the Democrat Party is promising to crack down on the Red Shirts, but its credibility has suffered and the Constitutional Court will possibly hear a corruption case that could result in its disqualification from government. Meanwhile, Army Chief Gen. Anupong Paochinda has called for dissolution and new elections, giving the first sign that the army is retreating from supporting the government, after the week's violence brought public sympathy for the Red Shirts and criticism of civilian casualties . Because Thaksin remains tremendously popular, elections could see the appointment of a pro-Thaksin government. While the military does not necessarily want this to happen, it also does not want to see its prestige and influence suffer because of the civilian leaders' mishandling of protests, and it remains reluctant to stage another coup. With so much uncertainty, the question arises as to how Thailand's instability will affect its economy and its region. The mass protests and political struggles have not escalated to widespread violence. But they remain politically motivated and isolated to a few places within the capital or a handful of other cities, and they cease when their demonstrators' political aims are achieved. Over the past decade, Thailand's economy has mostly responded to international macroeconomic trends and has proved resilient during times when unrest momentarily threatens to harm foreign investment or the stock market. Even the massive drop in foreign investment ahead of the coup against Thaksin was quickly reversed. Tourism has suffered somewhat from protests, but it has suffered as much or more from events beyond Thailand's control such as natural disasters and global recessions. Despite large protests, Thailand remains a major financial and export-based manufacturing hub in the region. Bangkok's political crisis also has not affected foreign countries. In general, the same geography that guarantees internal regional struggles in Thailand — the divisions between the wealthy river basin and its peripheral territories — also contains those struggles. Throughout history, Thailand has never projected power, nor has it been colonized. It inhabits the relatively insulated core of the Southeast Asian mainland and has avoided invasion by allying with would-be invaders. Given these conditions, its impact on the outside remains muted. Cambodia has made some attempts to benefit from it but has pulled back from doing anything that would necessitate a harsh reaction from Bangkok. Myanmar remains embroiled in its own, far deeper, turmoil. Relations with Malaysia and Singapore are not necessarily warm but not significantly confrontational, either. The possibility exists for Thailand to become the object of attention for larger foreign powers. The rise of China's economy has brought changes to Thailand — where it has suffered in having to restructure its economy, it has gained in access to Chinese markets. Japan continues to look to Southeast Asia as a way to revitalize its economy, but remains limited by its existing economic baggage. The United States has announced a re-engagement policy in Southeast Asia but has not yet indicated what this means or if it entails reactivating relations with Thailand. None of this is to say that a prolonged, worsening political crisis will not exact a toll. Thailand's current instability looks likely to continue for the short to medium term, as a number of institutional changes are taking place. A generation of military leaders is retiring and attempting to make sure that they are followed by their chosen successors — leading to uncertainties over whether another coup is around the corner, especially if the security and political situation spirals out of control. Moreover, Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej is old and ill and will soon pass the crown to his son. Much of the gravity of the Thai monarchy rests on Bhumibol himself — the last strong king died in 1910 and Bhumibol has ruled since the 1950s, promoting national reconciliation in several domestic conflicts. His son is untested and nowhere nearly as highly revered. With the weakening of the monarchy and the impending period of transition, the struggle between power groups will intensify. During times of uncertainty, the military tends to step in, but the character of Thailand's future military leaders also is unknown, and, as has been shown, the 2006 military intervention resulted in greater political tumult.