As the Sledgehammer investigation deepens, differences between retired Turkish army commander Gen. Hilmi Ozkok and retired first army Gen. Cetin Dogan emerged in Turkish media April 8 over coup allegations leveled at elements of the military hierarchy. Such a public disagreement between two retired generals over the alleged coup plot against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) shows there has been a struggle not just between the ultra-secularist Turkish military and the Islamist-rooted AKP but also within the Turkish General Staff (TSK) on how to deal with the AKP's clout, which has been growing since 2002. Since 2007, two major legal cases — Ergenekon and Sledgehammer — have seen many serving and retired military officials (including generals), journalists and academicians charged with involvement in coup plans against the AKP dating back to 2003. The plans allegedly aimed to create instability and violence in Turkey to create appropriate conditions for a military intervention. Many saw these plans and probes merely as a struggle between the TSK and the AKP. However, as the investigations continued over the past few years, it has become clear that divergences have been emerging between hard-liners within the TSK and more moderate elements. That said, the TSK as a whole has never been comfortable with the AKP's rise. The AKP is the only government that has challenged the military's dominant position in Turkish politics, particularly since the 1960 military coup. As a result, the TSK on a number of occasions tried to undercut AKP's growing power indirectly, such as when the political turmoil over the president's election prompted AKP to call snap elections in 2007. The dissolution case against AKP in 2008 was also one of the efforts of the staunchly secular Turkish establishment to oust the AKP government. But as documents revealed in the course of the Ergenekon investigation (such as diaries of a retired naval commander), it appears Ozkok, who was serving as the commander in chief when the AKP was elected for the first time in 2002, at the time opposed hard-liners like Dogan, who is under arrest now in the Sledgehammer probe. Ozkok's successors, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit and the incumbent commander Gen. Ilker Basbug, have also seen senior military officials under them face charges during AKP's tenure. These commanders all faced the same dilemma. None could accept illegal plans to topple a democratically elected government because the risks would be too great. Though the army ousted many governments in the past, the consequences of a coup in Turkey now would have adverse implications both internally (it could derail Turkey's strong economy) and externally (it would destroy Turkey's rapidly growing global influence). Furthermore, if they acknowledged the existence of these plans the top generals could face charges themselves. On the other hand, the weight of the evidence brought forth by the prosecutors meant the generals could not simply dismiss reports of such plots. Denying the plots' existence also would give the impression that the top generals in the TSK's hierarchy do not know what the generals beneath them are doing. There is no way to tell whether Buyukanit and Basbug approved of the coup plots (or were aware of them). It is also unknown whether Buyukanit and Basbug allowed these investigations because of the emerging rifts within the army. But apparently, accusations and investigations over the alleged coup plans against AKP that have defined Turkish politics for the last few years not only changed the balance between the AKP and the TSK, but also transformed the TSK, which is politically weakening and hence coming under increasing civilian control.