The transportation infrastructure in Afghanistan is notoriously abysmal. Roads are primitive and few, and regional rail networks do not even enter the country. And the U.S./NATO military machine is notoriously heavy and fuel-intensive, which makes for a mountain of logistical challenges. Although a northern distribution route has opened up, operations are sustained by an army of civilian Pakistani truck drivers who transport most of the supplies — especially fuel — for the U.S./NATO military effort. At the heart of what passes for a road network in Afghanistan is Highway 1, or the "Ring Road" (also known as the Garland Highway), which is the central artery connecting the country's four main population centers — Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. The roadway, parts of it unpaved, has existed in one form or another since before the Soviet invasion, but only since about 2003 have efforts been made to improve and complete it. The section from Leman and Maimana is still under construction, and a stretch from Kabul to Kandahar has had to be repaired due to neglect and damage from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Asian Development Bank have spent some $2.5 billion on the project, but efforts have been hampered by attacks, kidnappings and other forms of intimidation by insurgents and common criminals. Between 2003 and 2008, more than 160 contractors were killed working on the southern arch from Kabul to Herat in a still-ongoing effort to complete the nearly 2,000-mile-long loop. Companies of police officers have had to be organized and dispatched at great expense to secure construction efforts. At the same time, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military and civilian development efforts have identified 80 key districts as priorities.

Governance, development and security programs are in the process of being implemented in these districts, most of which are located on or near the Ring Road. This is no accident. Not only is the highway important logistically, but U.S. estimates put two-thirds of the Afghan population within about 30 miles of the loop. While the Ring Road is of pivotal importance in sustaining surge operations, it is also crucial in facilitating the current U.S. population-centric strategy, which is an economy-of-force move to focus efforts on key population centers. But because almost everything in Afghanistan is an economy-of-force effort, not all sections of the Ring Road can be heavily protected. Some 800 Romanian troops are reportedly responsible for securing more than 100 miles of roadway through Zabul province, part of the critical link between Kabul and Kandahar. And because there are so few roads in Afghanistan, the ones that are heavily relied upon are easy targets for insurgents and IEDs.

The United States is working to deploy better off-road vehicles into the country to provide more logistical and tactical flexibility. But the Ring Road is also about national development and commerce. Afghanistan's economy is minimal, but part of the U.S. strategy is to reshape public perceptions in the key population centers connected by the roadway. If the Ring Road is open and safe to travel, it will greatly facilitate the development of economic and governmental links between and among Kabul and the other key cities. If it is not, the effort will be greatly hindered.

Another consideration, of course, is history. Foreign powers have often tried to rule Afghanistan from the top down, to little avail. The political, demographic, ethnic and tribal realities of Afghanistan mean that the country is best ruled from the bottom up. The U.S./NATO effort is now focused on the district level, more of a bottom-up approach, but whether this strategy can succeed in engaging people at the grassroots in any meaningful way — especially on the 18-month timetable that ISAF chief Gen. Stanley McChrystal is working within — is anything but certain. And success of the overall war strategy will depend on a lot more than just the safety of the Ring Road. But both the roadway and the patchwork of priority districts that lie along or near it will bear considerable watching as ISAF strategy continues to unfold.