Both open source reports and STRATFOR sources have confirmed that the alleged arrest of U.S.-born al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn on March 7 was falsely reported. STRATFOR sources have reported that the individual mistaken for Gadahn is another American, but this has not been confirmed; certainly more than one Caucasian is in the al Qaeda-led jihadist nexus, and no one has a master list of what that organization looks like. Regardless, the Pakistanis clearly have had an important role in a spate of recent arrests — including the capture of two al-Qaeda linked personalities March 7, though neither was Gadahn. The precise details of the false announcement are not clear, but it appears that the Pakistanis thought they had nabbed Gadahn, and unnamed sources leaked the story before they were able to confirm his identify. This is not altogether uncommon in Pakistan, so any such reports from unnamed Pakistani security sources should be viewed with skepticism. Furthermore, especially considering the number of individuals the Pakistanis have arrested lately, it is not too surprising that the Pakistanis are not entirely adept at identifying non-Pakistani and non-Afghan suspects. But ultimately, Gadahn was an identified and targeted personality in the al Qaeda leadership. This severely limits his mobility, ability to travel and operational utility to the organization. (He likely would not even be in Karachi, where he was thought to have been arrested, because of the risks of capture.) In any event, he serves al Qaeda Prime as an adviser, helping senior leaders shape their thinking about the U.S. government and public, and a spokesman, primarily representing As-Sahab's agenda targeting potential Western recruits (his most recent video aired the day he was supposedly captured). He is not a military commander or technical expert critical to the physical campaign. His capture would be a symbolic and public relations victory, but not a major operational blow to al Qaeda. Most of the suspects Pakistani forces have arrested recently have been Afghan and Pakistani Taliban operatives, not al Qaeda members. This is an important distinction. Pakistan nurtured the Taliban, facilitating their rise. Getting Islamabad to crack down on the Taliban has always been an issue of willpower and good-faith intent, not a matter of raw capability. Al Qaeda has long been a different story. Al Qaeda is not as directly dependent on nor nearly as directly connected to the Pakistanis, so targeting al Qaeda operatives is more than an act of good faith on Pakistan's part, involving a major intelligence breakthrough. The apex al Qaeda leadership has been identified and on the run for nearly a decade, and has established effective operational security practices. The surviving al Qaeda leaders are still alive because they are careful and conscientious survivors who enjoy consistently loyal local support. Serious questions remain about the durability of the Pakistani cooperation underlying recent arrests. Actionable intelligence can be gleaned from seizures and interrogation, so even without Gadahn, the arrest of lesser al Qaeda-linked operatives may yet prove significant.