Click here to download a PDF of this report In the past few years, the
Kremlin Wars — between Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and
Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov — have seen each side oust the other's supporters from myriad positions in the Kremlin, big business and strategic sectors. This battle has been kept in check, for the most part, by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who understands the need for balance between the two clans and their power bases — Sechin's base being the nationalist-minded
siloviki and
Federal Security Service (FSB), and Surkov's being the business-minded
civiliki — including President Dmitri Medvedev — and the
Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU). In this contest, Surkov and Sechin have tried to
not only consolidate their power over Russia's prized assets and government positions, but also gain tools that will help them in the ongoing power struggle. One such tool is control of
Russia's critical Muslim regions. Muslims make up just 12 percent of Russia's population, but they are concentrated in a series of republics stretching from the Caucasus to Central Russia just north of Central Asia. Muslim groups and republics in Russia have enormous power because they control various militant groups and occupy strategic geographic locations, often times with natural resource wealth. But controlling the Muslim regions is more complex than simply placing a clan loyalist in charge of a business or ministry. Each Muslim region comes with its own delicate and dangerous problems, and even at its strongest and most unified, the Kremlin has found them difficult to contain.
The Caucasus
Russia's Northern Caucasus — comprising seven republics — has been a sore spot for the Kremlin because of its militant and secessionist movements. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has fought two bitter wars there, mainly in Chechnya but with conflicts spreading across the Caucasus. One clan-related battle over the Muslim republic of Chechnya has already occurred, and Surkov's group controls the troubled region. Surkov is half-Chechen and reportedly is the nephew of deceased militant leader Dzhokhar Dudayev. Surkov worked closely with Sechin and Putin in the
Second Chechen War to help contain the militant threat and create a pro-Kremlin group in Grozny. In doing so, Surkov won the loyalty of Chechen presidents Akhmad and Ramzan Kadyrov and the latter's 40,000-strong Chechen military, made up of former insurgents who are now pro-Russian.
Control over Chechnya is tenuous — the region has created problems for Russian authorities for centuries — but Surkov's ability to keep instability in check while maintaining the loyalty of Chechnya's war-hardened forces is a powerful tool. Sechin's clan has challenged Surkov's hold over Chechnya, trying to oust Kadyrov and replace him with someone in or connected to the FSB. But Putin has blocked the Sechin clan's moves, valuing the stability in Chechnya over any imbalance of power it might create among the Kremlin's clans.
Not only is stability in Chechnya valued, but the region is also a key transshipment point for oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea region and holds its own energy reserves. Furthermore, Kadyrov's forces can be useful in conflicts around the region, such as in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The loyalty of such a force, which has been known to cross international borders, gives Surkov even more leverage. Surkov seeks to strengthen his position in the Caucasus by placing another of his loyalists in a position Medvedev recently created: chief of the federal district for the North Caucasus. Krasnoyarsk Gov. Alexander Khloponin will take this new position and oversee the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia. Khloponin is an unexpected choice, since he does not come from either a security background or a Muslim background (a critical attribute for such a position in the past). Khloponin's experience is in economics, which Medvedev says is key to the region's future stability. This move is an attempt to consolidate control of Chechen security under Kadyrov — and essentially Surkov and the GRU — while consolidating investment and economic influence in the region under a Surkov loyalist. But the Interior Ministry, led by Sechin loyalist Rashid Nurgaliyev, and the FSB control security in the areas surrounding Chechnya (Ingushetia and Dagestan), creating a tense security situation in the region. Another shift in control over key Caucasus republics could occur in mid-February, when long-serving Dagestani President Mukhu Aliyev's term expires. It is unclear whether he will attempt to (or be allowed to) run for the position again; Sechin and Surkov have both been lining up their candidates to take his place. The problem with Sechin and Surkov fighting over a region like Dagestan — which is also a key energy transportation corridor for oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan — is that any sign of weakness or instability in the republic's leadership could lead to an outbreak of Islamist militancy. Attacks in Dagestan are already increasing with elections on the horizon. Putin will have to ensure that any struggle between the clans over the Dagestani presidency does not allow militancy to intensify or bleed over into the other Caucasus republics.
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan
The regions of
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are also not immune to the Kremlin clan struggles. These autonomous republics, located in Russia's Muslim belt but much closer to the country's heart, highly value and fiercely guard their sovereignty. Tatarstan tends to watch over Bashkortostan and is so powerful that, even under Putin's government, it regularly manages to extract terms and treatment from Moscow that other parts of the Russian Federation cannot hope to match.
Controlling Tatarstan and Bashkortostan is not about ensuring the stability of Russia or wielding power over militant groups, but about controlling the republics'
significant oil and mineral wealth. Furthermore, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan geographically are the gateway to Siberia and Central Asia. Longtime Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiyev will step down in March, leaving the door open for a shift in the leadership of the fiercely independent republic — something each clan would like to exploit. Shaimiyev has long been critical of the Kremlin, even though he is a member of Putin's United Russia party. Surkov and Medvedev have already started campaigning for their chosen successor, Tatar Prime Minister Rustam Minnikhanov, while STRATFOR's sources in Moscow say Nurgaliyev, the interior minister loyal to Sechin, could take Shaimiyev's position. The coming leadership change in Tatarstan has led each clan to consider taking the leadership in neighboring
Bashkortostan, where longtime President Murtaza Rakhimov is rumored to be on his way out. Rakhimov has also been a vocal critic of the Kremlin, saying in 2009 that Moscow should not rule over either Bashkortostan or Tatarstan. A list of candidates to replace Rakhimov reportedly has been sent to Medvedev and Putin; Surkov's candidate is former Deputy Economic Minister Andrei Sharonov, and Sechin's is Sen. Rudik Iskuzhin. STRATFOR sources say preparations for a leadership change inside Bashkortostan have already started, with the republic's security apparatus being purged of those that would oppose the shift.
The Kremlin clans' attempts to consolidate their control over the Muslim republics could spark a large anti-Kremlin blowback from the region's Muslims. Regardless of which Muslim republic is targeted — Tatarstan, Bashkortostan or one of the Caucasus republics — historically, when one has been targeted the others have joined in the fighting. There is a strong affinity among Russia's ethnic and religious minorities. For example, in the past, the Tatars — who are relatively affluent — have politically supported Bashkortostan and funded violent separatists in the Caucasus. Once again, it will be
up to Putin to ensure that the battle between the Surkov and Sechin clans does not create greater instability in Russia — though any shifts or struggles over the Muslim regions are more likely to spiral out of control than tensions created by the clan wars on other fronts.
