With tensions escalating between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, the Iranian regime has spent much time lately highlighting the many retaliatory levers it possesses in the region with which it can inflict pain on the United States and its allies should the Islamic republic be sufficiently provoked. Tehran's Shiite militant proxy force in Lebanon and Iraq is well known, but less well known is that the Iranian regime also selectively supports militants across the Sunni jihadist landscape. This is most notable in places like Yemen, where al Qaeda has a burgeoning presence, combined with the intent to attack U.S. and Saudi interests beyond Yemen's borders. STRATFOR has explored the warning signals Tehran has been telegraphing to Washington over the instability it can create in Iraq through its Shiite allies in the lead-up to March elections. STRATFOR has received reports from sources connected to Hezbollah and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that reveal rather grandiose Hezbollah plans to pre-empt an Israeli attack on Iran with a cross-border assault into Israel from southern Lebanon this spring. While this particular threat is questionable, that it was disseminated at all was designed to give Israel and the United States pause in their military planning. Iran has a proven ability to move beyond its traditional Shiite militant strongholds in Lebanon and Iraq and develop non-Shiite militant assets. For example, the Sunni militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip has witnessed a surge of Iranian support in the past three years as Tehran quickly worked to exploit the group's isolation in the Palestinian territories. Even hard-core Wahhabi and Deobandi ideologues in al Qaeda and the Taliban have worked with the IRGC over the years. Iranian support for al Qaeda in Yemen has attracted particular attention. In the summer of 2009, Iran directed resources toward a rebellion by Zaidi al-Houthi rebels in the northern Saada Mountains along the Yemeni-Saudi border. STRATFOR sources at the time reported that IRGC and Hezbollah military trainers were in Yemen supporting the al-Houthis. The Iranian role also came to light when the Saudi Interior Ministry revealed in May 2008 that Abdullah al-Qarawi, one of Saudi Arabia's 85 most-wanted militants, had been operating from Iran for three years, where he allegedly had 100 other Saudis working under him. The al-Houthi insurgency escalated rapidly in the summer and began spilling into the Saudi kingdom, pulling Riyadh into a proxy battle with Tehran. The United States, however, refused to take the bait. Though U.S. military advising, training and intelligence support in Yemen runs deep, Washington was careful to avoid openly acknowledging the Iranian role in the al-Houthi conflict. Whereas Iran wished to use the al-Houthi proxy battle to complicate and prolong its nuclear negotiations with the United States, the U.S. government — under heavy pressure from Israel — was doing its best to maintain some semblance of progress in those talks. Washington thus avoided opening a new front with the Iranians. After having failed to elicit the desired response from Washington with the al-Houthi insurgency, according to STRATFOR sources, Iran began accelerating support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. This is no easy task, particularly given the logistics and sectarian complications involved, but Iran has proven ability to work with certain elements in the Sunni jihadist movement. The IRGC reportedly runs training bases in the northeastern Iranian province of Razavi Khorasan, which borders Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. A number of the militants training in these camps have been brought there from other recruiting hotspots in the region. According to different STRATFOR sources throughout the region, Syrian intelligence was involved in contributing several jihadists to Yemen that it had been running in Syria and Lebanon, much like Syria has done in the past in funneling IRGC-trained militants to Iraq. Syria's intelligence apparatus operates a labyrinthine militant supply chain to support Damascus's foreign policy agenda. In this case, Syria reportedly struck a deal with Iran to relocate some of its Islamist militant proxies to IRGC training camps in Iran. Syria could then claim in its ongoing efforts to extract financial concessions from the Saudi government that it has followed through with its pledge to deny jihadists an operating base. Many of the militants reshuffled in this way are then deployed from Razavi Khorasan to Yemen after their training. Iran's support for the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen thus far may have failed to grab Washington's attention, but Iran's support for al Qaeda in Yemen is a different story. The sophistication of AQAP operations is a far cry from that of al Qaeda prime in the pre-9/11 era, but the group is clearly developing a more transnational targeting philosophy. Rather than focusing attacks on civilian and security targets inside Yemen, AQAP has demonstrated a continued interest in more challenging and strategically valuable targets beyond its borders, evidenced most recently by the failed assassination attempt on the Saudi deputy interior minister in August 2009 and the failed attempt to blow up a U.S.-bound airliner in December 2009. Between being strapped for cash and confronting regular security breaches, AQAP faces a number of challenges in carrying out effective operations from its base in Yemen. The role of an external patron like Iran, however, could make a significant difference in the group's operational capabilities — that is, should Tehran feel strategically compelled to make such a difference.