Talks between different Bosnian political parties under EU and U.S. mediation held Oct. 20-21 at the NATO base in the Sarajevo suburb of Butmir failed to make substantial progress. The talks, led by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, were part of a joint EU-U.S. effort to get disparate Bosnian political parties to hammer out a compromise on constitutional reforms for the country that would create a more unitary state. The talks will continue, but at a lower level, and Bildt and Steinberg may return to Bosnia in November. The EU-U.S. Butmir initiative represents an effort to create a coherent state out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995 ended with the Dayton Accords, which set up two ethnic political entities: the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and joint Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (known as the Federation). Under the peace deal, both entities retained most power while the Bosnian central government was hampered by a complex ethnicity-based political arrangement in which the three ethnicities took turns holding key positions. Under this system, ministries are divided along ethnic lines, with the minister and his/her deputies often barely on speaking terms. An internationally chosen high representative can dismiss members of the government and strike or amend laws, essentially playing the role of colonial administrator. 
 From the U.S. and EU perspective, a Bosnia-Herzegovina led by an international administrator and divided into two pseudo-independent ethnically based entities that jealously guard autonomy guaranteed them under the Dayton Peace Treaty is not sustainable for two main reasons. For one thing, it hampers Bosnia's integration into the European Union and NATO, as instead of one political authority empowered to conduct accession negotiations, Bosnia has three. Moreover, under leadership of Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, the Republika Srpska is evolving into a completely independent state with its own security and foreign policy. In an example of the latter, Dodik made time to visit Belgrade and meet with visiting Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Oct. 20, the same day he was participating in the Butmir negotiations. Following his meeting with Medvedev, Dodik announced that the Russian president has confirmed that Moscow is a guarantor of Dayton, and therefore of the Republika Srpska's autonomy. Significantly, Russian business interests in the Republika Srpska are strong, especially in the energy sector. The United States and the European Union are worried that the cozying up between Russia and Dodik could signal a hardening of Dodik's opposition to constitutional reforms — a phenomenon already observed when Russia backed Dodik in his confrontation with former High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in late 2007 and early 2008 over the issue of police reform. With Moscow's rhetorical support, Dodik managed to outlast Lajcak and retain his post. 


 The EU and U.S. effort is therefore an attempt to roll Bosnia into Western political security structures safe from Russia's expanding interests in the region. To this end, the proposed constitutional changes aim to create a strong centralized state by eliminating the ethnic veto and abolishing the international high representative. They also would pave the way for the creation of a strong prime minister and for strengthening the federal supreme court. The federal government would also have full authority over defense, security, foreign policy, international negotiations and intelligence activities.




 Dodik has opposed these proposals from the outset, going so far as saying that Bosnia-Herzegovina would retain its two ethnic entities structure or "it won't exist." He suggested that he would accept constitutional reforms if they also included a mechanism by which one entity may leave the unified state, clearly suggesting he will push for independence rather than accept infringements on the Republika Srpska's autonomy. Though Dodik's position may seem hard-line nationalist, he actually is more interested in preserving his own power rather than in independence per se. 

 And it is not just the Serbs who oppose reforms. Both Serbs and Croats fear a strong and unitary Bosnia because they are in the minority. Bosniaks make up slightly less than 50 percent of Bosnia's population, with Serbs at around 35 percent and Croats at 15 percent. Croats are especially concerned because a strong federal government will make their already-tenuous position in the joint Bosniak-Croat Federation even more so. For Croats, devolving power even further by creating some sort of third ethnic entity that would recognize their status represents the best outcome. 



 The Bosniaks are also divided on the proposed reforms. The Bosniak member of the tripartite Bosnian presidency, Haris Silajdzic, rejected the proposal as not going far enough to create a strong unitary state. Silajdzic leads the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which wants a strong unitary Bosnia and does not consider itself an ethnic political party, although most Croat and Serb politicians see it as supporting Bosniak interests. Meanwhile, Sulejman Tihic — the leader of the main Bosniak political grouping, the Party of Democratic Action — was the only politician to support the reforms, arguing that they were a step in the right direction. Now that the proposals have been rejected by the majority of leaders, the question is which way will the European Union and the United States push the talks. The U.S. effort is led by the State Department. Most Obama State Department employees cut their teeth in the 1990s on the Bosnian Civil War, one of the formative foreign affairs experiences of the modern Democratic Party. As such, there is a sense that with a Democratic president, now is the time to wrap up unfinished business in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bildt also has experience in the Balkans, as he was involved in the Dayton peace talks and later served as the first high representative in Sarajevo. Sweden also currently heads the EU presidency. But times have changed since the international community resolved the Bosnian quagmire through a mix of force and diplomacy in mid-1990s. First, the United States is now embroiled in two conflicts in the Middle East, leaving it with little capacity to commit serious force to the region were this needed. 

 And second, Russia is once more becoming involved in the Balkans, unlike in the 1990s when the West could ignore Russian interests. Russia will use the threat of involvement in the Balkans as a bargaining chip to counter Western encroachment on the Russian periphery. Thus, Moscow wants the West to know that Russian interests in the Balkans must be taken into account, and that a repeat of Kosovo's February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence, a move promoted by the West with no regard for Moscow's opinion, will not be tolerated. For Russia keeping the West unsuccessful in Bosnia, quite a low threshold for success considering the depth of problems in the region, will suffice. The European Union and the United States will consider their efforts successful only if the disparate ethnic groups come to an agreement on a unitary Bosnia, making this a zero-sum game.