U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates arrived in Japan on Oct. 20 as part of a trip that will include a visit to South Korea. While Gates discussed the issue of North Korea, he also evaluated the state of the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship — something that has concerned Washington ever since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won power in Aug. 30 elections brushing aside the LDP party that had ruled Japan for the vast majority of the past 60 years. There has been some concern in Washington since the DPJ took power that significant changes could be in the works in defense ties. In particular, the DPJ has pledged to end Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, and has called for a review of base relocation plans for U.S. forces in Okinawa. There have also been some calls from within the DPJ for a complete review and revision of the Status of Forces agreement that governs U.S. basing and forces in Japan. Despite its rhetoric, the DPJ is unlikely to pursue a wholesale revision of its defense ties with the United States. Japan has undertaken some significant changes in its defense policies and capabilities in recent years, including floating a helicopter carrier, better integrating communications and interoperability across branches of the service, adding in-air refueling capabilities, pursuing anti-missile system development and deployment with the United States, and instituting a Defense Ministry to replace the sub-Cabinet-level Defense Agency. But changes aside, Tokyo continues to rely on U.S. naval power to ensure stability along its supply lines, and remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The DPJ's calls for rethinking the U.S. defense relationship reflect less Japan's readiness to go it alone than a combination of political posturing at home (the stance was seen as part of the party's overall mantra of change that helped it win the election) and a slight difference in opinion on the best way to strengthen Japanese security in the post-Cold War world. During the Cold War, Tokyo made the strategic decision under the Yoshida doctrine to expend minimal wealth on its own defense, relying on the United States and accepting U.S. military basing. In return, Japan enjoyed U.S. security guarantees and commercial benefits with little cost to itself, focusing its resources on economic growth instead. As Japan's economy boomed in the 1980s, however, the United States began to have second thoughts about its defense partner and economic rival. As the Cold War drew to a close, Washington slowly began to reverse some of the economic concessions it had made to Japan. While for a brief period it appeared the United States and Japan were headed on a collision course as Tokyo's economic might rapidly grew and domestic voices called for Japan to be more assertive and step out from under the U.S. shadow, the onset of the country's economic malaise in 1992 put these fears to rest. Tokyo, however, continued to review its own strategic interests, and as the United States grew less engaged in Asia, a series of events convinced Japan it needed to fundamentally reassess its defense doctrine. Among other things, Japan was unable to respond to the hostage taking crisis at its embassy in Peru, and it was caught off guard by the North Korean Taepodong missile launch and the emergence of China as a rapidly growing regional economic power (which began raising fears of a "China threat.") With Washington focusing less attention on the region, Japan launched into a slow but steady program of updating its defense training and doctrine to better deal with the changing realities of a world no longer polarized by Cold War architecture. Similar changes were also taking place in another major U.S. ally in the region, South Korea, for many of the same reasons. In 2003, President Roh Moo Hyun took office on a wave of nationalism and anti-Americanism. He launched a defense reform program to create a more "independent" defense capability and policy. Rather than focus the South Korean military efforts on backstopping U.S. capabilities, Seoul began to reshape its defense procurement and training to enhance its own capabilities. South Korea accelerated its jump into the regional space race, built its own helicopter carrier, sped up developments in military robotics, and prioritized its aerospace and defense technology research, manufacture and exports. The U.S.-South Korean defense relationship weathered the changes, and despite some modifications to timelines for basing relocations, a fairly robust defense cooperation between Seoul and Washington remains. The United States thus already has been through something similar with South Korea to what it is about to go through with Japan. Certainly, the domestic political situations in South Korea then and Japan today are not the same, but the need to adjust to a realigning world is the same, as is the perceived need to take a stronger role in determining and securing their own strategic interests. The DPJ's talk of a "more equal" and "more independent" defense policy is manifest more in the rejection of specific, publicly unpopular projects than in the rejection of overall defense relationship with the United States. The DPJ is looking actually to increase Japanese defense activity abroad, though under the auspices of U.N. operations rather than as an adjunct to U.S. military operations. One reason for this is that Japan does not want to be painted with a U.S. imperialist brush as it re-engages markets in the developing world. It wants to be seen as its own entity, someone there to help and cooperate, not just to serve as a tool of U.S. interests. This distinction is especially important as Japan competes with China for access and influence, since China has done much to capitalize on trust from states that see it as a potential alternative to the United States. For Japan to embark on this new "independent" defense policy, however, will require changes in training and defense procurement — e.g., greater resources for deployment far from the homeland — and changes in the legal status of Japanese forces abroad, including their use of force. And this will bring Tokyo even closer to considering the possibility of changes in Article Nine (the pacifist article in its constitution) so Japan can act not as a tool of U.S. hegemony, but as a "responsible global citizen." Japan is therefore still on the path for a normalization of its national defense within constitutional—interpretive limits — and a formal reinterpretation or change may be closer now than it was under the LDP. And this is something Washington has been quietly in support of. But it may also begin to raise more concerns from China, which sees an emergent Japanese military as a potential threat — and does not want to see Japan break free from the U.S. defense relationship, as that would likely lead to Japan needing its own nuclear deterrent. For Washington, this means treading more carefully with Tokyo in the near term so as not to strengthen those in the DPJ, and their allies in the Socialist Party, that call for a more thorough revision and even abandonment of the current U.S.-Japan defense agreements. This was seen today with Gates' comments to the effect that the United States has no intention of renegotiating agreements made by previous U.S. administrations, namely on the Futenma base on Okinawa. This is only the first dose of reality for those who thought the DPJ's accension would mean an instant reformation in relations with the United States. Ultimately, like the changes in South Korea, the changes in Japan will not involve abandoning the U.S. relationship any time soon, but will see continuing changes in Japanese defense capability and future deployments.