Rumors of Russia's interest in buying a French-built Mistral-class (L-9013) helicopter carrier have circulated for some time. However, the French seem to be lending credence to the rumors. The French economic journal Les Echos on Oct. 13 reported, citing unnamed sources, that Paris had made the decision Oct. 12 to enter into negotiations, was finalizing its terms for Moscow, and that talks are expected to conclude by the middle of November. (The Russians are also purportedly examining Dutch and Spanish options, though the Mistral design has been the only one to receive any major attention in the Russian press.) Even though the sale is not final, the prospect of it has two important implications: buying defense equipment from abroad, and acquiring a warship with capabilities unfamiliar to the Russian fleet. First, the Russians do not buy warships from abroad; they do not buy very much defense equipment from abroad, period. The Russian naval shipbuilding industry is outraged over the prospect of that changing, even though the industry has serious troubles. Following more than a decade of scarce funding and few new projects — along with broader neglect and decay in the post-Soviet period — a significant contraction of the shipbuilding industry was necessary in the post-Soviet world, especially since it was arguably at its height when the Berlin Wall fell. Graft, corruption and incompetence became rife; even now, projects are chronically behind schedule and there are concerns about the quality of workmanship. The Kremlin has long been frustrated by attempts to improve the situation. It appears that Moscow is at least considering exploring its options abroad, which may reflect its hopes for meaningful, short-term reform in its shipbuilding sector. Buying an off-the-shelf design may help the Russians in several ways. It will help Moscow avoid some of the costs of designing and constructing a new ship tailored for their own purposes. The Mistral design is already in active service with the French fleet; the second ship of the class, Tonnerre (L-9014) commissioned in 2007, and the French are considering building a third Mistral-class warship. Most of the worst problems and unforeseen expenses with a new ship design crop up with the first ship of the class. The more ships that are constructed, the more kinks are worked out of the design and production process. Another benefit for Russia is the possibility of acquiring a license to lay down hulls in its own shipyards. If Russia gets a license, it means that its workers could gain experience with a more modern design and learn from French expertise. Furthermore, it could be used as a catalyst to speed up the reform of the naval shipbuilding sector. The second major implication of the French-Russian warship deal is that the Russian fleet does not posses anything similar to the Mistral design. Designed as a multipurpose amphibious warfare ship capable of deploying helicopters (as many as 16 or more mid-sized transport helicopters), a contingent of several companies of combat troops, their supplies, vehicles (including tanks) and landing craft, the Mistral is a force-projection design useful for deploying and sustaining forces far afield. This is not something Russia does. Even at the height of the Soviet Union, Moscow limited its major troop deployments to contiguous territory over land. Of course, Russia sent troops and equipment to places like Cuba, but not by ships capable of operating without fixed-port facilities. And Russia's experience in World War II was nothing like the allies', which orchestrated major amphibious landings across Europe and in the Pacific. Although the Russian navy has little historic or doctrinal foundation for incorporating such vessels into its fleet, it does not mean that the raw capability is not significant, or that the Russians are incapable of employing them in the future. Indeed, with only a single aging aircraft carrier (that deploys only occasionally), the focus on Mistral-class could signal a Kremlin moderating its naval ambitions from a robust carrier fleet to a few strategic force projection vessels that would allow Russia to maintain some influence beyond its own periphery. The deal is not done, and there are several hurdles to overcome even if it gets signed — from doctrinal integration, to operating landing craft in a well deck, to the issues of building in Russian shipyards a French-designed ship tailored for construction in French shipyards. But it is a development that will merit close scrutiny as Moscow prepares itself for the day when Washington is not so bogged down in the Middle East and South Asia.