The government of Brazil has set Oct. 2 as the deadline for three foreign aircraft manufacturers to put in their improved offers for 36 fighter aircraft that Brasilia hopes to purchase to replace its aging fleet of U.S. F-5E/F Tiger II fighter jets. Competing for the sizable contract are French Dassault Aviation's Rafale, U.S. Boeing's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Swedish Saab's Gripen NG. Until recently, the consensus pick to receive the bid was the French Rafale, which Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva preferred over the rival bids due to the burgeoning military cooperation between France and Brazil. However, Saab's recent aggressive counteroffer — including a slashed price and improvements to its promise to share production and technology transfers — throws a new wild card into the mix. The Brazilian bid for an initial 36 fighters estimated at $2 billion to $4.4 billion is heating up the competition between the three manufacturers. Due to the ongoing global economic crisis, Brasilia's willingness to spend money on new foreign-produced aircraft is bound to be noticed. But like India, Brazil is seen as not just a place to sell a few extra airframes, but rather a burgeoning regional power, one with whom firm foundations of a more robust defense relationship can have potentially broader benefits. Indeed, this deal could eventually include as many as 120 fighters with a price tag approaching $30 billion. A formation of French Dassault Rafales At one point, Saab was the outside bidder. But it has recently offered to sell its Gripen NG at half the price of the Rafale, and is offering to move 50 percent of manufacturing to Brazil. The Rafale is estimated to cost $130 million, with the F/A-18E/F estimated at $90 million and the Gripen NG at $60 million. Boeing has reportedly countered the Saab price cut and the French bid by offering Brazilian suppliers contracts to build some parts of the F-18. Additionally, it is rumored that U.S. President Barack Obama has lobbied da Silva personally to both assure him that the United States would transfer technology to Brazil with the deal and that Congressional approval for the transfer would not be a problem. But the Saab offer has thus far intrigued Brazil's aircraft manufacturer Embraer (one of the leading regional jet manufacturers in the world) because it is the only one that offers an actual manufacturing deal with Brazil. While Dassault and Boeing have improved their initial tenders by offering technology transfers, only Saab is ready to give Brazil the opportunity to manufacture parts of the aircraft. Embraer has therefore come out publicly supporting the Gripen bid, which is a significant show of support — a central tenet of the tender has from the beginning been to allow Embraer to acquire technology on how to manufacture a modern jet fighter. Therefore, even though the Gripen NG may not have outmatched the U.S. and French planes in performance, the more extensive manufacturing experience would likely help Brazil in terms of independence in military aircraft production. Brazil has its sights set on developing a full spectrum domestic defense industry as it works to expand its military's capacity after decades of neglect in the wake of a deleterious flirtation with military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. Having moved into a period of relative economic and social stability, Brazil has begun to turn its sights toward revitalizing its military alongside its economic growth. The discovery of major oil deposits and a growing sense of self-sufficiency and economic might have lent momentum to the project. Brazil has long focused on achieving the technological expertise necessary to become a leader in industrial production, and this is what makes Saab's offer exactly the kind of deal Brazil is looking for. Meanwhile, for Saab, the Brazil deal could be the saving grace for the Gripen line of fighters, an important part of the country's powerful military-industrial complex. Sweden's geography makes it extremely vulnerable to the other two European powers on the Baltic Sea: Germany and Russia. During the Cold War, Stockholm's long-standing neutrality policy — developed in the early 19th century following a number of disastrous entanglements on the European continent, particularly against Russia — left Sweden outside of NATO's security blanket. Nonetheless, Stockholm did not want to leave its independence to chance (or the Kremlin's benevolence) and so was prepared to defend itself aggressively, both by developing a remarkably powerful and independent military industry and by working on a nuclear program in the 1960s. Ultimately, Sweden signed a secret military deal with NATO that in the case of a Soviet invasion, NATO would come to its aid. As such, Stockholm's military doctrine called for an air force that would be capable of operating against a more powerful invader even once command and control capabilities were cut off, leaving the jets in effect "stranded." The Gripen is therefore famously capable of landing on the country's highways and can be refueled very quickly, something that may entice Brazil, which has to patrol the expanse of the Amazonian basin (though its two competitors for the Brazilian contract are both capable of landing on carriers and consequently boast robust landing gear). With the end of the Cold War, however, has also come an identity crisis for the Swedish military industry. Its military needs have been refocused from trying to stave off a massive Soviet invasion to projecting military and economic power in its Baltic near abroad, which requires far less production for domestic use. With fewer orders being filled for the domestic market, an important focus is therefore export-oriented production. The Gripen, both its C/D and NG variants, were supposed to be sold to middle-rank powers looking to upgrade their old Cold War air forces, but also not spend too much on U.S., Russian or French-built fighters. Successes were found with sales of the C/D variant to South Africa and Thailand (as well as leasing agreements with Czech Republic and Hungary), but bids were lost in Croatia and Romania due to the global financial crisis and in The Netherlands and Norway due to competition from the U.S. manufactured Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. However, if Gripen manages to win the tender for the 36 (not to mention the possibility of up to 120) Brazilian aircraft and subsequently a deal with India worth $10 billion and totaling 126 fighters, it could mean an important lifeline for the Saab unit that accounts for about 20 percent of total sales of the aeronautics producer. Of course, Saab still lags in one department that may end up being the most crucial element of the winning bid: diplomatic heft. Both French President Nicholas Sarkozy and Obama have lobbied Brazil personally on the deal. But for countries like India and Brazil, the Gripen is a good bridge between importing military technology and becoming proficient in it themselves, particularly because Stockholm is open to technology transfers and unlikely to make political conditions part of any deal or subsequent parts sales. Indeed, some of the Swedish production and design considerations could well also dovetail well with India and Brazil's nascent aeronautics industrial capabilities.