The Philippine government will begin a review of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States after a Senate vote Sep. 23 calling for the president to renegotiate or terminate the VFA. The agreement, signed in February 1998 and ratified by the Philippine Senate in May 1999, provided a legal framework for U.S. soldiers to re-enter the Philippines after the closure of the Subic Bay Naval Station in 1992. The issue of U.S. forces in the Philippines is once again rising to the top of the Philippine political agenda and shaping the 2010 presidential election. According to members of the Legislative Oversight Committee on the VFA, the agreement violates Philippine law because it is too vague about what U.S. forces are allowed to do on Philippine soil, and the length of time they can stay is not clearly delineated. A major accusation is that the VFA treats the Philippines as a second-class partner and that Manila has not really benefited from what is essentially the re-establishment of a U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Rather, opponents of the VFA say all the Philippine armed forces have received, aside from training, is used U.S. military surplus. One of the main elements of cooperation under the VFA has been a series of joint training exercises in the Philippines, called Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder). In 2002, these took on new meaning as the United States stepped up its counterterrorism training and assistance to the Philippines in the wake of the Sep. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. At the time, Southeast Asia — not Iraq — was seen as the likely second front in the fight against jihadism, and the United States set its eyes first on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Initial training and cooperation focused on the island of Basilan and neighboring smaller islands, where ASG was based. To a great degree over the next few years the Philippine forces, backed by the United States, broke the back of the ASG. However, the United States realized that neither the ASG nor other Southeast Asian militant groups with links to the al Qaeda network — like the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah — were a strategic threat. As Washington turned its focus to Iraq, the idea of Southeast Asia becoming a major U.S. antiterrorism battleground faded. But U.S. forces continued to participate in Balikatan exercises, and the almost steady stream of forces flowing in and out of the Philippines created a nearly continuous U.S. military presence. A rape case against U.S. soldiers in 2005 raised an outcry against the U.S. presence and the rules that governed the behavior of the soldiers. Over the past year, attention has again been raised as the U.S. forces began to shift their training from dealing with the mostly-defunct ASG to the more active Moro Islamic Liberation Front and potentially the Communist New People's Army. The fear was that the U.S. forces would ultimately become engaged in active fighting against these rebel groups on Philippine soil. The VFA review comes both as the Philippines is heading into a potentially volatile presidential campaign and as the United States is beginning to re-engage Southeast Asia and considering the Philippines as a place for a relatively permanent forward deployment of troops for training and regional contingencies. Any expansion of the VFA will first have to address the perceived inequalities of the treaty, including the status of U.S. forces accused of criminal acts and the repayment in equipment to the Philippine armed forces to augment their capabilities. With the Philippines' May 2010 presidential campaign now heating up, the VFA is becoming a hot-button issue and a major point of contention between the two main parties' likely candidates. Philippine Sen. Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III, son of former President Corazon Aquino, likely will represent the main opposition Liberal Party in the presidential election and supports the VFA review. Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, who represents the ruling Lakas-Kampi-CMD, favors the maintenance and even expansion of the VFA and has called for more defense alliances, citing Singapore as an example of a country that has numerous training agreements with different countries but does not lose its sovereignty in those agreements. Teodoro supports a review, but only after the presidential election, to avoid having it caught up in politicking. It is quite possible for the VFA review process to drag out, and for any renegotiations with the United States to take even longer. The reaction in Manila reflects not only domestic politics, but also the general reassessment in Asia of U.S. agreements. For the most part, Asia (aside from North Korea and its nuclear weapons) has not been a high priority for the United States over the past decade, and the Obama administration's announcements that it will become more engaged in the region are prompting countries to look for ways to benefit from the renewed attention. Reviews of defense agreements are taking place from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines, and each will look for ways to have more say — and gain more benefits — from whatever arrangements are worked out.