The Chief of Russia's General Staff Nikolai Makarov said Sept. 18 that Russia will aid Cuba in the near future in modernizing its Soviet-era military equipment and in training the country's military personnel. This statement comes at the end of Makarov's weeklong visit to Cuba, in which the military leader has been meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro and visiting military facilities to meet with the country's top personnel. Makarov also announced that preparations are under way for Russian warships to visit Cuba soon, although no exact date was given. These developments in Russian-Cuban military cooperation follow an oft-repeated pattern, which dates back to the Cold War-era relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This pattern has seen visits and military deals between Moscow and various Latin American countries ramped up in the context of power plays between Russia and the United States. In March, Makarov announced that Russia was considering building an air base in either Cuba or Venezuela right before Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama were set to meet on the sidelines of the G-20 summit on April 1. In July 2008, just before the Russo-Georgian war, Russian bombers appeared in Cuba, complete with rumors flying of Moscow reopening the Lourdes base. The latest power play is represented in the current standoff over Iran's nuclear program, in which the United States has threatened "crippling" sanctions on gasoline imports to get Tehran to come to the table, while Israel is seriously considering taking a military option. On the other side, Russia has myriad tools it can use to help Iran out of its corner, and is using these tools to gain leverage over the United States. In Latin America, these tools range from political and economic support for anti-U.S. states like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. But while Russian announcements of military deals are nothing new, the realities of serious logistical constraints remain as well. For Moscow, maintaining a significant military presence in Cuba or elsewhere in Latin America is costly in terms of financial and military resources, both of which are not in surplus in Russia, as the Soviets found after decades of buying influence in Latin American satellite states. Also, specifically in Cuba, U.S. forces at the Naval Air Station Key West are only a stone's throw away, making the Russians vulnerable to U.S. intelligence assets in the area. Another potential option for Russia is using its relationship with countries that are opposed to the United States in order to support ongoing insurgencies in South America (like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) — a tried-and-true trick from the Cold War. This is a relatively low-cost way of starting fires in the Western Hemisphere that the United States will likely feel obliged to help put out. For its part, the United States has slowly been making its own play for Cuba by lifting restrictions on remittances and travel for Cuban Americans, as well as lifting restrictions on certain types of trade. Though the United States is not yet prepared to lift the embargo (and indeed just renewed it), it has made clear that it is ready to seek a rapprochement (of sorts) with Cuba. This competition for influence on the Caribbean island is a product of Cuba's critical position between the mouth of the Mississippi River and global trade routes. And while promises of major military cooperation with Cuba may never materialize, for Moscow, Havana will always be a useful point of pressure on Washington — particularly ahead of presidential meet and greets.