The Iranian parliament approved 18 out of the 21 candidates Sept. 3 that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had nominated for his Cabinet. All of Ahmadinejad's picks for the critical ministries of defense, intelligence, interior and economics were accepted. The nominees for the ministries of energy, welfare and social security and education were the only three candidates who failed to receive a vote of confidence. The Cabinet selection process could have gone one of two ways. Given the opposition Ahmadinejad faces from powerful members of the Iranian establishment — including parliament Speaker Ali Larijani — the parliament could have used its oversight powers as it has numerous times before to shoot down the president's Cabinet picks one by one and deprive the Iranian president of an executive team packed with loyalists. Larijani threatened as much in the lead-up to the parliamentary vote, chiding Ahmadinejad in stating that the Cabinet was not a place for "tryouts" in politics. But Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently feels that this political knife fight has gone on long enough, and with a deadline fast approaching for Iran to negotiate with the West, or face gasoline sanctions or worse, the time had come for the supreme leader to get his house back in order. Over the past three weeks, the supreme leader has been busy threatening and cajoling Iran's rival factions into a complex power-sharing agreement that would allow Ahmadinejad to proceed in his capacity as president, while at the same time keeping enough checks and balances firmly in place to limit the president's authority and appease Ahmadinejad's bitter rivals. According to a STRATFOR source, Khamenei sent a "secret" message to members of parliament ordering them to approve Ahmadinejad's appointments. In return, the supreme leader would ensure greater oversight of the president's performance. In line with the supreme leader's wishes, Ahmadinejad invited all of Iran's members of parliament to attend the opening meeting of his Cabinet in Mashad — the second-largest seminary city after Qom — as a sign of good faith toward the parliament. The labyrinthine Iranian political structure already has a number of built-in mechanisms to constrain the executive branch. The supreme leader has final say on all major decisions, parliament must approve the president's Cabinet, the Expediency Council helps formulate state policies, the judiciary can challenge the president's actions, and so on. But in maneuvering between Iran's various factions, the supreme leader's most effective instrument in containing Ahmadinejad has come through the power of appointment. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad's most powerful and influential opponent, is a case in point. When Ahmadinejad, a dark horse candidate, emerged to upstage Rafsanjani in the 2005 presidential election, it did not take long for the supreme leader to expand Rafsanjani's oversight powers to all branches of government as head of the Expediency Council. This expanded role in the Expediency Council, as well as his 2007 election to the head of the Assembly of Experts, made Rafsanjani one of the most influential figures in the history of the Islamic republic. At the peak of the election crisis, Rafsanjani went so far as to publicly (albeit subtly) condemn Khamenei for backing Ahmadinejad and threatening the survival of the Islamic republic. In the past few weeks, however, Khamenei and Rafsanjani appear to have come to terms. A STRATFOR source claims the supreme leader has permitted Rafsanjani to deliver the Friday sermon for the Quds Day celebration later in the month (toward the end of Ramadan). Rafsanjani's script will be coordinated with the supreme leader, and will be designed to demonstrate his loyalty to Khamenei while maintaining a critical, yet measured stance, against Ahmadinejad. Larijani, now speaker of the parliament, had resigned as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) during Ahmadinejad's first administration. Khamenei then had him stay on the SNSC as his personal representative, and has relied on Larijani to use the parliament's clout to keep Ahmadinejad in line. Kazem Jalali and Alaeddin Boroujerdi, both senior members of parliament who have controlled the Majlis Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy, also will be playing a key role in providing parliamentary oversight on Ahmadinejad's international moves. The supreme leader appointed Larijani's influential brother, Mohammed-Sadegh Larijani, to head the judiciary shortly after Ahmadinejad's re-election, replacing Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a prominent pragmatic conservative figure who had gone to bat for Ahmadinejad in the wake of the election crisis. In a controversial move, Ahmadinejad sacked Iranian intelligence minister Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and a few of his deputies, a move that the president's hard-line conservative allies approved of. This step gave the president access to intelligence reports on his political rivals, namely Rafsanjani, in the wake of the election — but Khamenei quickly countered the move. When Mohammed-Sadegh Larijani became the head of the judiciary, Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei was appointed chief prosecutor of the judiciary and Judge Saeed Mortazavi — Tehran's chief prosecutor and a staunch ally of Ahmadinejad — was demoted and made Mohseni-Ejei's deputy. Khamenei also has technocrats placed throughout the establishment to drive Iran's foreign policy agenda and mitigate Ahmadinejad's influence in this sphere. Ali Akbar Velayati, a seasoned veteran in Iranian politics, served as foreign minister for the Iranian regime for 17 years working under defeated reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi when he was prime minister (from 1981 to 1989) and under Rafsanjani when he was president (from 1989 to 1997). Since he stepped down as foreign minister in 1997, Velayati has served as one of the most senior foreign policy advisers to Khamenei, and is believed to be deeply involved in back-channel communications between Washington and Tehran. Hassan Rohani, a close ally of Rafsanjani and vociferous opponent of Ahmadinejad, was the chief negotiator with the West for Iran's nuclear program from Feb. 2003 to Aug. 2005 and has continued on as one of Khamenei's two personal representatives to the SNSC in helping shape Iran's national security strategy. Khamenei has also kept checks on Ahmadinejad in Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). When former IRGC chief Major Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi was replaced with Major Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari in 2007, Khamenei made sure to appoint Safavi, who has been a quiet critic of Ahmadinejad, as his senior military affairs adviser. The supreme leader also kept former IRGC chief Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaie, who challenged Ahmadinejad in the June presidential race, appointing him to the expediency council after Rezaie stepped down from his IRGC post. There are numerous other examples of the supreme leader using his powers of appointment to keep a check on the Iranian executive branch. A firebrand president with an array of powerful enemies could pose a liability to the supreme leader's hold on power, but if Khamenei can delegate authority to his various appointees and parliamentary committees to take the lead on key policy issues, Ahmadinejad will not be able to run a one-man show. While he wants to see the president constrained, Khamenei also sees utility in keeping Ahmadinejad in power. The supreme leader himself has expressed how his foreign policy views are more or less in harmony with those of Ahmadinejad. In nominating and approving a defense minister — Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, who is wanted by Interpol in connection to the 1994 attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires — the Iranian regime appears to be deliberately poking Western sensitivities as tensions already are ratcheting up between the Islamic Republic and the West. With a deadline set by the West for Iran to negotiate over its nuclear program fast approaching, Khamenei wants to send a clear message to Washington that he is getting his regime back in line — and that any hope of exploiting an internal Iranian power struggle would be futile. In reality, the Iranian power struggle is still ongoing and very fluid, and Khamenei will continue to have his hands full in mediating between the warring factions. But the supreme leader is indeed regaining control of the Iranian political imbroglio.