Iran's state security apparatus continued to break up demonstrations in the nation's capital June 22. Reports vary, but between 200 and 1,000 demonstrators reportedly attempted to rally in central Tehran's Haft-e-Tir Square to honor the death of a young woman called Neda, who bled to death from a gunshot wound in an earlier protest and is now being represented as a martyr by supporters of defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. Basij militiamen and local police were ready to quell the rally with force and appear to have dispersed most of the protesters with relative ease. In line with STRATFOR's expectations, the size of the demonstrations is dwindling in the face of repression. Demonstrations have not spread significantly outside Tehran, nor have they spread to additional social groups, which would indicate that a broader resistance is taking root. Mousavi remains out of sight, but this has not stopped his more radical supporters from claiming on his behalf that he is preparing for martyrdom in his struggle against the state. Mousavi is still a cog in the clerical establishment's machine and is not interested in breaking completely with the regime. His fight is against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his more measured and credible statements released on his Web site and to Iran's Qalam news indicate that he wishes to remain within the confines of the law in protesting the election results. His statements continue to call on protesters to exercise restraint, refrain from violence and engage in more symbolic acts of defiance, such as keeping car headlights on and burning candles to honor Neda. The unrest that spilled into the streets after the June 12 presidential election does not appear to be anything Iran's state security apparatus cannot handle. So far, local police and volunteer Basij militiamen have been responsible for quelling dissent in the capital. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) — a powerful security institution that operates on a mandate to protect the Islamic Revolution — has been in charge of Tehran's law enforcement since at least June 18, but has not yet sent in any of its elite units to battle the protesters, as it did during a 1999 student rebellion. Given the declining level of unrest in the streets, the IRGC probably does not see the need to enter the fray at this stage. The IRGC has made clear, however, that it is ready to crush any further protests should the need arise. In a June 22 statement on the IRGC Web site, the organization threatened protesters with a "revolutionary confrontation" if they continued to rally in the streets. The IRGC and Iranian state media have been trying to counter the Twitter and YouTube information flow from Tehran protesters and supporters by issuing their own statements and videos depicting rioters as violent, destructive and part of a foreign conspiracy to destabilize Iran. But as this propaganda war continues, a more immediate threat to the Islamic Republic is intensifying behind the scenes. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has made clear to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the unity and stability of the clerical establishment is in danger unless Ahmadinejad is stripped of his powers. Former President Rafsanjani leads two of the regime's most powerful institutions — the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. A spokesman from Kargozaran, a political party allied with Rafsanjani, told the Financial Times in a June 21 interview that the party is calling on Rafsanjani to form an alternative political bloc to Ahmadinejad. A far more suspicious report from Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat also claims that Rafsanjani, after meeting with clerical leaders in the holy Shiite city of Qom, is contemplating setting up an alternative clerical body to oppose Khamenei. These reports cannot be confirmed and are being used to shape the public's perception on the severity of this crisis among the clerics. Still, the Kargozaran proposal for an alternative political bloc could indicate that Rafsanjani is preparing for the possibility that he will not be able to reverse the outcome of the vote and is therefore digging in for the long haul to protect his interests and face off against the supreme leader and the president. Rafsanjani can bring considerable pressure to bear on Khamenei, but he also has an interest in preserving the clerical establishment that allowed him to accumulate his wealth and prestige. He knows where the redlines are and sees what obstacles he faces in competing in a political system that was designed to ensure the diffusion of power across institutions and prominent personalities. Khamenei also understands Rafsanjani's strength well, and on June 22 he released Rafsanjani's daughter and four other relatives who had been detained for participating in the June 20 demonstrations. The Guardians Council, which gives the final verdict on elections and is aligned with the supreme leader in supporting Ahmadinejad, also admitted June 22 that there were some irregularities in 50 cities during the election, but that it was unclear that that the approximately 3 million votes affected would have changed the outcome. These moves are designed to subdue the Rafsanjani-led campaign against Ahmadinejad, but they are unlikely to put the brakes on this escalating power struggle. For figures like Rafsanjani, this is no longer necessarily about the vote; the situation has evolved into a wider and deeper divide within the ruling elite. Also on June 22, Ali Shahrokhi, head of the parliament judiciary commission, told the state-run IRNA news agency that the traditional Islamic punishments of stoning and cutting off the hands of thieves would be outlawed by several newly amended laws that are expected to go to parliament and then the Guardians Council for final approval. The timing of this announcement is interesting; it could be designed to deflect some of the international pressure on Iran that has focused in part on some of these strict Islamic punishments. Meanwhile, additional information on allegations of vote fraud is making its way to the mainstream. A detailed letter to the Guardians Council signed by Mousavi lists the irregularities he and his campaigners observed during the election. An independent study on the voting irregularities by the London-based Chatham House with the University of St. Andrews also has been released, lending further credence to the claims that Ahmadinejad supporters stuffed ballot boxes. The Chatham study offers new insights on the irregularities in voter turnout, but it also makes a number of assumptions that do not strengthen the widespread claim that Ahmadinejad would have lost the June 12 elections without fudging the numbers. STRATFOR will soon be publishing a more thorough examination of the Chatham report and the implications of vote rigging on Iran's political evolution.