The U.S. military is capable of shooting down any North Korean ballistic missile fired at the United States according to comments made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on June 9. Gates expressed confidence in the capability of the existing ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to defend the United States in testimony before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. He has been even more explicit in this confidence in recent weeks, including in earlier testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces May 26 — as well as statements by senior uniformed leaders in the Missile Defense Agency. Although North Korea may test more missiles in the coming weeks and months, STRATFOR does not foresee a North Korean long-range missile launch toward Alaska — much less an actual attempt to launch at the continental United States — as this could well provoke a severe response from the United States. (North Korea normally launches to the southeast in the general direction but significantly south of Hawaii.). As STRATFOR has pointed out, Pyongyang is not irrational or suicidal. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that North Korea could even carry out a successful ballistic missile strike against U.S. territory. Nevertheless, we examine the U.S. military's capability to intercept such a missile. When Gates talks about intercepting a North Korean missile, he is talking about a crude intermediate or intercontinental-range ballistic missile — likely one of North Korea's Taepodong series. The Taepodong-2 is currently Pyongyang's longest-range ballistic missile, with an estimated range from 4,000 to 6,000 km (Alaska is within this range; Hawaii is not). However, the April 5 launch of the Unha-2, a satellite launch vehicle (SLV) version of the Taepodong-2, gave important clues to the design. It demonstrated the successful separation and ignition of all three stages before the third stage failed — this sequence of events is an essential yet challenging capability for long-range ballistic missiles. A Taepodong-2 with significant modifications or a hypothetical Taepodong-3 could incorporate much of what North Korean engineers have learned from the Unha-2 launch — potentially increasing the missile's range. (click to enlarge) It is important to point out that North Korea has no test data about the accuracy of its missile systems at such ranges. It is doubtful that Pyongyang has missiles accurate enough for military purposes at intercontinental distances. It is not even entirely clear that North Korea would be able to be confident of hitting Hawaii or Guam. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union accounted for the inaccuracy of their early ballistic delivery systems with increasingly massive nuclear warheads — an option not currently available to Pyongyang, despite its recent nuclear test. In the past, Pyongyang launched its SLVs to the southeast, with the first stage landing in the Sea of Japan before the missile overflies the Japanese home island of Honshu, north of Tokyo. This puts the SLV heading in the general direction of Hawaii (though significantly south of that island chain). Any launch toward Alaska or the continental United States (which Pyongyang cannot currently range) would be to the northeast, with the missile traveling north of Japanese territory over the Russian island of Sakhalin. (click image to enlarge) These very different azimuths would be quickly distinguishable by radar both by U.S. and Japanese destroyers and by land-based radars, which acquire and begin to track a missile immediately after launch. Ascent-phase interceptors would have to be launched immediately after the missile is acquired by radar. There would be no time to call the White House and debate the potential response. These matters are decided beforehand and commanders in the region and captains at sea are given standing orders based on specific criteria for launching an interceptor. If the decision has been made in advance to intercept a missile on a trajectory that could strike Alaska or the continental United States, two BMD systems come into play. The first is the Aegis/Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) system. Thirteen American Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers and three Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers based in the Pacific have this BMD capability. Two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force destroyers are also equipped with it, and two additional destroyers are being upgraded. The SPY-1 series radars on these warships have been integrated with the larger American BMD network, and can feed tracking data to other systems and plot their own intercept with the SM-3. Because these systems are ship-mounted, they are more flexible in their positioning. And because North Korea's long-range missiles take days to move to the launch site and fuel, there is ample warning to move one of these ships into position (some of the U.S. BMD-capable destroyers are based in Japan). Infrared sensors on the Defense Support Program satellite constellation would detect the infrared plume of the launching missile, immediately notifying the U.S. BMD network. Properly positioned in the northern Sea of Japan, an Aegis-equipped warship would likely be one of the first to acquire and track the missile launch by radar in the boost phase while the missile was still under power. Several SM-3 interceptors would likely be launched in order to maximize the chances of successfully bringing down the target. (click image to enlarge) The SM-3 Block IA (the variant currently deployed) is capable of ascent and descent phase engagement. It was successfully proven not as a BMD interceptor but as an anti-satellite weapon when it was used to bring down a wayward satellite last year. Based on its operational performance as well as in testing, the SM-3 is widely regarded as one of the most mature and capable BMD systems in the world. And because an intercept in the ascent phase would likely take place before the missile would be able to deploy countermeasures or decoys, there is good reason to think that the missile could be intercepted — especially with multiple interceptors. Gates' confidence here is not without merit. But should the SM-3s fail, there are also the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, with 33 interceptors total based at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. This is an earlier system and was deployed aggressively in 2004, even as its operational maturity was still questioned by many. The idea is known as "spiral" deployment, in which the operational interceptors would be upgraded as testing continued and the design was refined — but the system would be available in an emergency. Long popularly reviled as the poster child for the waste, excess and immaturity of missile defense efforts, the Missile Defense Agency is now expressing confidence in GMD. However, some experts are still skeptical. But the larger problem is with the nature of midcourse intercepts. By this phase of flight, the missile has time to deploy the reentry vehicle as well as countermeasures and decoys. North Korea is capable of developing basic decoys, though they do not come without the cost of their weight. Though these decoys can be fairly light, the payload of the Taepodong-2 is limited. The use of decoys would certainly complicate an intercept because of the questionable capability of GMD interceptors to distinguish a fractionalized target. In theory, an additional SM-3-equipped BMD-capable warship could be positioned to attempt descent-phase engagement (decoys fall away as the reentry vehicle enters the atmosphere). Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD — now being deployed) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3 - already deployed) interceptors could also provide terminal-phase defense. But since North Korea is unlikely to target the United States and Pyongyang's estimation of its own missile's range is unknown, it would be difficult to identify a possible target and deploy these defenses. Especially in the case of THAAD and PAC-3, the batteries must be positioned comparatively close to the target. Ultimately, Gates has expressed confidence without being specific, but he is almost certainly referring to this two-tiered system of SM-3 in the ascent phase and GMD in the midcourse phase. BMD-capable warships deployed to track and monitor North Korea's April 5 launch were undoubtedly plotting intercepts for their SM-3s even if they had no intention of launching. There is considerable justification for confidence in this system in this scenario. In addition, GMD has long been geared specifically toward the North Korean threat, even if the threat remains crude, if improving. Though there are problems inherent with this the midcourse stage of flight, it would essentially serve as the safety net if SM-3 for some reason failed. It is an imperfect safety net, but taken as a whole, there does seem to be cause for at least cautious confidence in the system as a whole — especially if decoys are not used. However, there is also the larger geopolitical context. There are reasonable grounds for Gates' comments from a technical perspective. But Gates also needs to express confidence in the system so that it can also serve as a deterrent to North Korea even attempting to launch towards the United States. A robust BMD system has a tremendous effect on Pyongyang. Overcoming the BMD deterrent lessens the chances of a launch toward Alaska or the continental United States.