North Korea claimed early April 5 that it had succeeded in inserting a satellite into an elliptical orbit and provided orbital data. The U.S. military has now refuted this. According to a statement from the U.S. Northern Command, in addition to the first stage, which fell into the Sea of Japan, the remaining stages and the payload fell into the Pacific Ocean. Following the launch just before 11:30 a.m. local time (reports vary from 11:20-11:30), Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency provided orbital data for the insertion, including information on inclination, altitude and the period of orbit. A frequency on which the satellite was supposedly broadcasting the "Song of General Kim Il Sung" and the "Song of General Kim Jong Il" was also provided. None of the stages nor any debris appear to have fallen on Japanese territory, and neither Japan nor the United States appears to have attempted an intercept. The U.S. Northern Command then released a statement denying that any orbital insertion had taken place, saying that all remaining stages of the satellite launch vehicle and whatever payload it carried had fallen into the Pacific Ocean. (The first stage came down in the Sea of Japan as expected.) Though details are still emerging, the second stage might also have successfully separated from the third stage before the failure. There also have not been any reports of other missiles being tested. Inside North Korea, the launch invariably will be hailed as a success. And by one measure, it was. Though little about the satellite launch vehicle (SLV) is known, the grainy silhouette of the Unha-2 SLV visible from satellite imagery suggested some expansion of the Taepodong-2 design. (In its statement, the U.S. Northern Command classified it as a Taepodong-2, though this designation may include several variations.) Although it failed — possibly in the third stage, where the 1998 Taepodong-1 satellite launch attempt is thought to have failed also — the April 5 launch again successfully demonstrated North Korea's increasing mastery of basic staging and separation. According to available data, the early parts of the boost phase appear to have gone largely as planned, with the first and possibly the second stages crashing down relatively close to where they were expected to. This capability is important for both SLVs and longer-range ballistic missiles. The demonstration of this capability should not go unnoticed. For the rest of the world, even if the launch had been successful, statements from world leaders would probably have been about the same — warnings of North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programs and calls for Pyongyang to abandon them. Talk, but little concrete action. In sum, much as it did in the failed 2006 nuclear test, Pyongyang has demonstrated significant progress on technologies of concern to the international community — a key element of Pyongyang's negotiating strategy. In fact, if anything, the failure may take some of the pressure off Pyongyang. Without a successful launch, the various interests that oppose North Korea's behavior may have less to unite them and their efforts, and less to drive them to confront Pyongyang. Japan will continue to clamor and lead the charge for further sanctions. The U.N. Security Council meets April 5 to discuss the matter; however, even if more sanctions are approved, they are almost certain to be relatively ineffective. Indeed, if they are too stringent, South Korea and China may not even abide by them. Nevertheless, the U.S. position is likely to be closer to the Japanese position, though Washington probably will continue to focus on more pressing matters. South Korea may feel more inclined toward milder action. China and Russia will have more cautious responses, aimed more at not inflaming regional tensions and not overreacting than at real criticism. Whatever the case, North Korea will remain somewhere on the international agenda. But not even a successful launch would have pushed it ahead of the more pressing geopolitical issues of the day.