If there is one thing each of these powers can agree on, it is the need to keep the highly contested city of Kirkuk out of Kurdish hands and to force the KRG into sharing oil revenues with the central government. Al-Maliki in particular has discovered the value in playing the Kurdish card to elicit support from Sunni and Shiite supporters. The Iraqi leader, now being labeled by Kurds as the next Saddam, can be expected to become more aggressive in his anti-Kurdish moves and push for greater central control in the lead up to Iraqi provincial elections in December. With al-Maliki conferring with the Turks against the Kurds and with the United States turning its attention further east to Afghanistan, the Kurds know they are in a race against time to hold onto whatever autonomy they achieved since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The best option that the Kurdish leaders see is to adopt a conciliatory approach with their neighbors and Iraqi rivals and attempt to negotiate their way out of this corner. Talabani has already acknowledged privately that the Kurds are unlikely to win their battles with Baghdad over Kirkuk and oil revenue sharing. After all, the Kurds remain dependent on the central government and on Turkey's good graces to access the oil export market. In an attempt to stave off Turkish military action in northern Iraq, the Kurds also have offered Ankara their cooperation in curbing the PKK militant threat against Turkey. To this end, Talabani and Barzani are planning to hold a summit for Kurdish leaders from Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria in April or May in the KRG capital of Arbil to strategize over how to induce the PKK to lay down its arms.
While this summit will be a chance to put Kurdish unity and cooperation with Turkey on display, it is unlikely to do much toward resolving the PKK issue. The Kurdish parties are already severely divided over how to deal with the PKK. The leading Kurdish party in Turkey, the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), has criticized Talabani for trying to "liquidate" the PKK in the first, as opposed to the last, step of negotiations with Turkey. Talabani has been the key Kurdish figure conducting the various negotiations with the Iraqi Arabs, the Americans and the Turks. However, age and poor health have caught up with him, and it is only a matter of time before he follows through with his pledge to retire from politics before the end of the year. Talabani will not be stepping entirely out of the political picture, but his main rival, Barzani — a firebrand leader who is largely viewed as a nuisance by the Kurds' array of rivals — is already attempting to fill his shoes.
The Kurdish summit was thus reportedly Barzani's idea, and Barzani will be meeting one-on-one with Gul during the Turkish president's trip in Iraq for the first time since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Both events will allow Barzani to present himself as a statesman on par with Talabani in the lead-up to Talabani's retirement, but they will do little to quell fears of a reignited Kurdish rivalry once Talabani steps down. Turkey, meanwhile, has an interest in emphasizing these cooperative efforts with the Kurds. Local elections will be held in Turkey on March 29, and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has a long-standing campaign strategy to win the support of Kurdish voters in Turkey, taking votes away from the Kurdish DTP.
In the 2007 general election, the AKP developed a large voting base in Kurdish cities by pledging economic development for the poorer, Kurdish southeast. The AKP has been campaigning heavily in the Kurdish areas to win more votes, gradually allowing greater cultural freedoms for the Kurds, such as the recent launch of a state-run Kurdish language television station and the publication of a Kurdish-language Quran. By showing it can work with the Kurds at home and next door, the AKP is hoping to undermine the legitimacy of the PKK while also denying the powerful Turkish military the chance to claim exclusive rights over handling the "Kurdish problem."
Beyond local politics, Gul's interaction with the Kurds is also about Turkey's resurgent influence in the Middle East. With the United States withdrawing and the Iranians rising, the Turks can be expected to play a much more active role in Iraqi affairs in days, months and years ahead. The top priority for the Turks will be to keep the Kurds in line through a combination of diplomatic and military pressure. The United States will hear out Turkish demands on Iraqi Kurdistan in exchange for being able to rely on the Turks to help keep the Iranians in line next door. The Turks also are looking to expand trade ties with Iraq, both by developing Iraqi oil fields for the later transport of oil through Turkey to Western markets and by boosting Turkish exports to Iraq to compensate for trade contractions in the European markets. No matter which way the Kurds look, they will be dealing with the Turks, and more Kurdish compromises on autonomy can be expected. Rather than a sincere display of Kurdish-Turkish cooperation, Gul's visit will be more about laying out strict parameters for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey's backyard.
