Reacting to the recent mutiny in Bangladesh, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee wrote to Bangladeshi Prime Minister and Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina to express India's solidarity with the government and offered to "extend whatever support and assistance that Bangladesh may require," the Press Trust of India reported March 2. External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vishnu Prakash added that Mukherjee condemned "all efforts aimed at destabilizing a democratically-elected government (in Bangladesh)." In making these statements, India is clearly indicating that there is more than meets the eye in Bangladesh's recent bloody mutiny and that New Delhi has good reason to be concerned about the further destabilization of its already restive northeast. The 33-hour mutiny began Feb. 27 when more than 9,000 soldiers of the Bangladesh Rifles (BRD), a paramilitary unit responsible for border security in the urban areas of Dhaka, rose up against their officers, allegedly over poor pay and working conditions. The mutiny revealed just how deeply discipline had been shaken in the Bangladeshi army. The revolt was put down within two days after Hasina threatened to use force and offered amnesty to BDR troops who would surrender by March 2. By the time the revolt was over, more than 80 army officers' corpses were found buried in mass shallow graves and stuffed in sewers (the search is still on for some 60 more officers still missing and now feared dead). The Bangladeshi army deployed across the country March 2 to launch Operation Rebel Hunt to find the 1,000 additional guardsmen and accomplices believed responsible for the BDR revolt. The large scale and coordination of the revolt has led to justifiable speculation that a stronger hand was involved in this mutiny meant to destabilize the freshly elected government in Dhaka. The timing adds to this speculation, as the revolt comes shortly after Hasina's Awami League defeated its bitter political rival and predecessor, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in a landslide election in late December. That election pitted the more secular, left-leaning and India-friendly Awami League against the right-of-center nationalist, Islamist-influenced and Pakistan-friendly BNP, led by Begum Khaleda Zia, after two years of military intervention — a common theme of Bangladeshi politics. The Awami League already has a tumultuous history with the country's military establishment. Hasina's father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, led Bangladesh to independence in 1971 and ruled the country as the first head of state until he, his wife and three sons were killed in a military coup in 1975. Shortly after the army coup, the BNP was created in 1978 by former military ruler Lt. Gen. Zia-ur-Rehman, and despite certain periods of tensions with the men in uniform the party has since maintained a tight relationship with the country's military apparatus. The BNP, upset by its loss, would have a strong interest in trying to topple the Awami League government by triggering a massive and bloody showdown between the military and the civilian government. There are already unconfirmed reports in the Indian and Bangladeshi press hinting of links between recently sidelined army leaders and certain BNP politicians, such as BNP Parliament member Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury. These hints of foul play are of critical concern to New Delhi, which has been counting on the new Awami League government to improve strained relations between India and Bangladesh and help contain the security threats plaguing India's northeastern corridor. India has monitored closely the gradual rise of Islamist militancy in its insurgent-wracked northeast — a trend that has been aided by the BNP's past policies of catering to Islamist political groups Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) that have allowed a number of Islamist militant training camps to take root in the country. The number of Islamist sympathizers in the army's ranks are believed to have increased significantly during the BNP's second term in 2001-2006, adding to India's concerns that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which has long pursued a policy to provide covert support to Islamist militant outfits in Bangladesh and the Indian northeast, was stepping up its covert operations in this region in an effort to destabilize India. The gradual building of an Islamist militancy in Bangladesh and northeast India has led to a serious degradation in security along India's already largely porous border with Bangladesh, allowing a number of Islamist militant proxies on the ISI's payroll to infiltrate India undetected. India reportedly has uncovered evidence that several of the perpetrators involved in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks had come across the Bangladesh border, a revelation that reinforces its fear. India will not take the Bangladeshi mutiny lightly. At the very least, the danger of the Bangladeshi army discipline shattering and the potential for further splits within the military does not bode well for Dhaka's ability to keep a lid on the existing security threats in the region. Add to that the threat of the BNP working covertly to bring down India's allies in the Awami League government, and New Delhi could soon be dealing with a coup on its northeastern border. For now, India likely will restrain itself from getting directly involved in the mutiny case to avoid fueling existing anti-Indian sentiment among large swathes of the disgruntled BDR forces and the BNP. At the same time, the Indian government will be doing everything it can behind the scenes to try and bolster the Awami League and keep the Bangladeshi military intact while it continues to worry about an even greater security threat on its western border with Pakistan.