The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted 12 submarine patrols in 2008, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates obtained by the Federation of American Scientists on Feb. 3. This is more than twice as many patrols as in any other year and indicates a potential sustained rise in long-term Chinese naval operations. "Patrol" is an internal U.S. Naval Intelligence metric that the Pentagon declines to define. It nevertheless almost certainly entails more than a Chinese submarine simply leaving port, suggesting that these 12 patrols signify significant time under way. Because the numbers do not distinguish among types of submarine patrols, the 12 patrols may have included conventionally-powered patrol submarines and/or nuclear-powered attack submarines. But the Naval Intelligence estimates are clear that the PLAN has still yet to carry out a single strategic deterrence patrol with its ballistic missile submarines. Two or three of the Jin class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines have been launched, and the first was slated to be commissioned in 2008; indeed, the latest biennial White Paper explicitly acknowledged their existence. Though they did not patrol in 2008, some sea trials were almost certainly conducted, and they may see operational service soon. STRATFOR has noted increased PLAN attack and patrol submarine activity before, including activity near Japanese waters; however, this latest estimate is noteworthy not simply for its unprecedented nature, but also within the context of broader trends in PLAN deployments. In short, the Chinese military has been moving toward more active engagement around the world — a path clearly spelled out in its White Paper. This includes a higher operational tempo for the PLAN, which has long spent the vast majority of its time alongside the pier, with little at-sea training and experience. This increased operational tempo comes on the heels of years of effort on the part of Beijing to professionalize and educate the ranks of its military — and is the next logical step in expanding its capability. This step could well begin to have a meaningful impact on Chinese officers' and sailors' capability to competently and proficiently employ their submarines. (click image to enlarge) Though the most overt development has been the deployment of a small but highly-publicized squadron of two guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment ship to the pirate-infested waters off Somalia, the doubling of the submarine patrols from six in 2007 to 12 in 2008 (up from zero patrols in 2006) is clear evidence that the impetus to accelerate deployments extends to the submarine service. The cramped waters around China are likely to become more crowded, opening up the potential for increased maritime competition and raising the likelihood of military incidents as the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean navy all try to keep tabs on PLAN activity.