Spearheaded by Prime Minister Taro Aso, Japan's Headquarters for Ocean Policy has compiled a draft plan for exploration and development of seabed resources in the waters around Japan, and expects to have a finalized plan in March. The 10-year plan covers undersea surveys of mineral and energy resources, development of new technologies to access the various deposits, and the eventual licensing for exploitation of the resources. At the same time, Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is preparing to submit a bill to the upcoming Diet session authorizing the deployment of the Japan Coast Guard and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to engage in anti-piracy operations with expanded rules of engagement. Tokyo's renewed attention to its maritime activities has triggered the usual tensions with its neighbors. South Korea has expressed concern that Japan might try to use the surveys to re-state its claims on the Dokdo islets, known as Takeshima in Japan, which Seoul claims as undisputed South Korean territory. Meanwhile, China has responded defensively to Japan's protest that China continues to engage in undersea exploration of natural gas deposits in the East China Sea despite a 2008 agreement for Tokyo and Beijing to jointly develop some of those resources. (China argues that its current activity takes place on the Chinese side of the maritime middle line, which even Japan recognizes.) In spite of the tensions, Tokyo is pressing forward with its expansion of maritime activity, steadily eroding self-imposed limits on the use of its naval forces. The idea of exploiting mineral resources on the seabed is not new for Japan, but technology and cost have long delayed serious exploration and production. Tokyo's current initiative is based on the idea that mineral resources from land-based sources will grow increasingly scarce or expensive, that foreign sourcing is inherently risky and can leave Japan economically at the mercy of its suppliers, and that technological developments will reduce the costs of exploration and development to acceptable levels. This reveals a long-standing problem for Japan. As an island with limited resources, Japan must look abroad for its supplies and markets, something that puts its economic future always at risk of interference or interdiction. Japan's expansion in the 1930s and 1940s was largely about resource acquisition and vulnerability. Tokyo is now looking closer to home in technically less-contentious areas for resources. But the seabed exploration also serves defensive purposes, not the least of which is to create and improve undersea mapping as a resource for refining anti-submarine warfare operations. Over the last few years, there has been an increase in Chinese submarine activity in the waters around Japan. Tokyo thus not only wants to find, map and claim its seabed resources, it also wants to protect them. And while there is a possibility that technology makes it feasible to start large-scale undersea mining operations around Japan in the future, Japan also must protect its current and future supply lines around the world. As part of this, Tokyo has undertaken a steady redefinition and expansion of the allowable roles for its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The latest bill the LDP plans to submit to the Diet will further expand the role and mission of the JMSDF, and will give the Defense Ministry authority to dispatch without first asking for permission from the Diet. Japanese officials have quietly lamented that they are the only G-8 country not taking part in anti-piracy operations off Somalia, and were rather disturbed when China announced the deployment of two of its own destroyers to waters off Somalia. Tokyo could deploy the JMSDF to the waters off Africa under existing SDF regulations, but with very limited allowances for action and under regular review by the Diet. (The JMSDF support mission to the U.S. Navy for operations in Afghanistan faced such limitations.) In addition, the JMSDF could only protect Japanese ships, limiting "international collaboration," as Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada noted in December. Ultimately, for the LDP and the Defense Ministry, the deployment to Africa is less about anti-piracy (the area is already full of ships from other countries) than about expanding the current and future role of the JMSDF. Both the maritime exploration plan and the JMSDF anti-piracy bill are expected to assume a more complete shape by the end of March or early April. Neither is patently aggressive, but both emphasize the continued expansion and evolution of Japan's recognition of its maritime requirements. The initiatives also recognize the expanding naval competition in Northeast Asia, and the more activist roles of Japan's neighbors — China and South Korea — in international affairs. And they acknowledge the challenge of distant supply line issues. Japan simply cannot afford to be left behind and vulnerable.