Foreign ministers from NATO member states are holding their annual conference Dec. 2-3 in Brussels, where the hot topic is a U.S.-initiated proposal to extend Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Georgia. Washington, along with the rest of the world, knows that pulling Ukraine and Georgia away from Russia is one of the surest ways to contain Russia's influence and keep Moscow from reaching westward. The West's plan to do just that gained momentum in Georgia with its 2003 Rose Revolution, and in Ukraine with its Orange Revolution in 2004; both color revolutions brought pro-Western governments to power. But since then, Moscow has increased its efforts to either break Western influence or keep that influence from consolidating in Ukraine and Georgia. The United States made a vague promise to both former Soviet states at the April NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, that MAPs would be extended at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December. But in the meantime, Russia helped to fracture the Ukrainian government and went to war with Georgia, thus signaling very clearly that it considers both countries its turf, and that the West should keep its distance. The United States, along with the United Kingdom and most of Central Europe, believes that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia now would end Russia's resurgence before Moscow can make any more moves. Tbilisi and Kiev (or at least the pro-Western parts of Kiev) also take the view that if the West does not formally pull them in now, Russia will most likely be able to reinstate its claim on each country. Western Europe's view on the MAP issue diverges from this. Though containing Russia now makes strategic sense, both Ukraine and Georgia would have to make an enormous number of reforms — politically, economically, militarily and institutionally — before they could be productive NATO members. Some members of the alliance, like France and Germany, want the former Soviet states to delay joining NATO until they can prove they are stable and capable of contributing to NATO's security missions — essentially making for a net gain in security for the alliance, rather than the net loss Ukraine and Georgia would create by joining NATO and requiring more security from the alliance than they contribute. Russia has taken advantage of this divide between NATO members and has actively campaigned Germany and France to prevent the alliance from extending the MAPs. (Within NATO, it takes just one veto to prevent any such move.) Russia also has reminded certain NATO members that Moscow can make life very difficult for them should they go against its wishes. Germany and France have both come out against extending the MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia, largely on technical reasons concerning the states' lack of preparedness and/or unity in wanting membership. Berlin receives most of its energy supplies from Russia — something Moscow could cut off with no qualms. Paris is the current EU president and was the broker of peace between Russia and Georgia during their war in August, and thus does not want another conflict with Russia to erupt. For now, MAPs are not going to happen for Ukraine and Georgia. But U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice toured some key NATO members — like the United Kingdom and Italy — in the run-up to the current NATO summit to campaign for a new plan for Ukraine and Georgia. This plan would greatly expand the Ukraine-NATO and Georgia-NATO Commissions, an action that mirrors the preparations each state would make if it were extended a MAP, and thus prepares the countries for eventual membership in the alliance in practice, if not in name. Rice's plan changes the dynamic of preparing each country for membership. If MAPs were extended to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO — in which each member has a say — would be in charge of reforming the countries in preparation for membership. But simply expanding the commissions keeps the preparations on a bilateral level and gives the United States more control in guiding Ukraine and Georgia. However, the long-term nature of both Rice's plan and MAPs could keep either from ever succeeding. First, Rice is leading the United States' efforts for Georgia and Ukraine even though she only has six weeks left in her post before U.S. President-elect Barack Obama's administration comes in. Without a formal MAP that brings NATO as a whole on board and thus uses the alliance's secretariat to manage the MAP, the push for membership for the two ex-Soviet states is completely dependent upon the United States' ongoing interest in doing an end run around the normal process. And because it is unclear whether Obama's foreign policy group will want to continue an aggressive push against Russia, especially when it has so many other items on its plate, the Ukraine and Georgia membership push could very well fall by the wayside in a matter of weeks. Second, even if Ukraine and Georgia do eventually reform and modernize enough to not only meet the usual MAP eligibility requirements but also meaningfully contribute to the alliance's security (a long shot, to say the least), membership would not be guaranteed. All alliance members would still have to approve, and that possibility is looking smaller as cracks within NATO grow deeper. Third, the longer the West waits to fold Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, the greater the possibility that the pro-Western governments in those countries could fall. Kiev and Tbilisi are both highly unstable, and both have large movements that are pro-Russian (or at least sympathetic to Russia's stance) and could turn or break the countries. Hesitation on the part of the West also gives Russia more time to act to counter Western influence within each country, and to weaken certain NATO members' positions on wanting the two countries to ever become members. Russia doesn't have an unlimited amount of time to work with, especially as the United States will eventually sort through the issues keeping it bogged down. But NATO's inaction will widen Russia's window.