Chechen warlord Sulim Yamadayev vowed revenge Sept. 26 for the death of his brother, Ruslan Yamadayev, who was gunned down in Moscow two days earlier. At a small funeral for Ruslan in the town of Gudermes east of the Chechen capital of Grozny, Sulim accused Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov of killing his brother, and said the Yamadayev clan would seek vengeance after the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which ends Sept. 30. The Sept. 24 assassination of Ruslan Yamadayev was rooted in the longtime rivalry between two of Chechnya's major factions. In the chaos of the Soviet breakup in 1991, former Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev seized on the opportunity to declare Chechnya independent while the Russian state remained in disarray. At that time, Dudayev had complete authority over all the Chechen clans, including the Yamadayevs, the Kaydrovs and the Islamist faction led by Shamil Basayev, in the fight against the Russians. The Russians sent troops into Chechnya to put down the rebellion in a bloody battle that raged from 1994 to 1996 and resumed in 1999. The fighting left the Chechen capital in rubble and the Chechen front in disarray. In a plan laid out by the half-Chechen Vladislav Surkov — the right-hand man of then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin — the Kremlin seized upon an opportunity to divide and conquer Chechnya. Surkov's plan exploited a split that emerged between Islamists such as Basayev — who wanted to fight for a greater Islamic state that would encompass Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia — and the Yamadayev and Kadyrov clans — who essentially were Chechen nationalists uninterested in any Islamist agenda. Through a combination of brute force and bribery, Surkov succeeded in bringing the Kadyrov and Yamadayev clans to the Kremlin's side, placing the bulk of fighting in the Second Chechen War on the Chechens themselves rather than on Russian soldiers. Kaydrov and Yamadayev followed through in their commitment to the Kremlin to put down Basayev's forces. At the end of the Second Chechen War, both were duly compensated: The Kaydrovs were given control over the political leadership of the republic, while the Yamadayev clan was put in charge of the security forces — specifically, the Vostok and Zapad elite special operations battalions. The Russian military provided training, weapons and support to both factions, but the FSB took the lead in backing Kadyrov's group while the GRU was in charge of the Yamadayev clan. This arrangement was intended not only to balance between the Kadryovs and the Yamadayevs but also to balance between the FSB and GRU in the Russian intelligence apparatus. As the years have passed, however, Ramzan Kadyrov has been steadily expanding his power base, threatening to assume solitary control of the Chechen republic, as Dudayev did. The Yumadayev clan ran to the Kremlin in protest, claiming that Kadryov's attempt to bring nearly all of Chechnya's security, intelligence and special operations forces under his control was a move toward totalitarian rule over Chechnya. In no mood to see another united Chechen front turn unfriendly, the Kremlin answered the Yamadayevs complaints by allowing a group of Yamadayev fighters to claim glory by participating in the most recent Georgian war, leaving Kadyrov in the cold. The assassination of Ruslan Yamadayev has now set this intra-Chechen rivalry into full motion, with the Yamadayev clan apparently ready to take on Kadyrov's men as early as next week. The odds are against the Yamadayevs. While both sides have highly trained forces under their control, the Kadyrov clan outnumbers the Yamadayev clan 10 to 1, according to estimates from STRATFOR sources within the FSB. Yamadayev has about 4,000 troops still under his control, while Kaydrov's forces range between 30,000 and 40,000. To improve their odds, the Yamadayev clan will be relying heavily on the GRU to come to its aid. But Kadyrov has an open credit line with the FSB's weapons facilities. Despite these obvious disadvantages, the Yamadayevs are not about to back down — meaning, one way or another, Chechnya will be giving the Kremlin a serious migraine after nearly four years of relative calm. Between managing a financial crisis at home, consolidating Kremlin control over former Soviet states, rebuilding militaries in Latin America and sabotaging U.S. strategy in the Middle East, it is no stretch to say the Kremlin's hands are full. The pressure is now on for Putin to rapidly clamp down on FSB and GRU support for the two Chechen factions — for example, cutting off access to Russian military supplies and forces — in order to prevent this Chechen spat from spiraling out of control. The last thing Moscow needs right now is for Chechnya to flare up and absorb its attention at home. Interestingly enough, this is exactly what the West — namely, the United States — would like to see happen right now. Simply put, the more Russia can be preoccupied with chaos within its own borders, the less likely Russia will be able to sow chaos abroad. STRATFOR earlier pointed out the potential for the United States, with Saudi financing, to spin up insurgencies within Russia's Muslim republics, relying more on a covert strategy in the shorter term to fight the Russians until the United States can free itself militarily from the Middle East. STRATFOR has no clear evidence that Washington has a hand in the latest flare-up in Chechnya, but there is no question that a covert opportunity now lies within Washington's reach.