The Netherlands has blocked two key EU foreign-policy deals in the past week. On Sept. 10, Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen said in a session of the Dutch Parliament that the Netherlands would not support a relaxation in economic and travel sanctions with Belarus. And, on Sept. 15, it was the Dutch veto at a meeting of EU foreign ministers that effectively blocked the unfreezing of an EU-Serbian trade deal. In both instances, the Dutch claimed that without a firm commitment to human rights by Serbia and Belarus, no progress in their relations with the European Union would be possible. With their actions, the Dutch are essentially pulling a plug on the European Union's only effective means of checking Russian resurgence: diplomacy and economics. As a bloc, the European Union essentially has no military capacity, but it does have the lure of potential membership (in the case of Serbia) and increased trade (in the case of Belarus and Serbia) to pull Russian allies away from the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. In the case of Belarus, Brussels was hoping that it could use economic incentives to pull President Aleksandr Lukashenko, a Russian ally with a mind of his own, away from dependence on Moscow. In Serbia, Brussels was hoping to reward the pro-EU government in Belgrade for its electoral success, ouster of the pro-Russian nationalist alternative and arrest of Radovan Karadzic, the war criminal wanted by the tribunal at The Hague. Time is of the essence, and stalling on both openings is costly for Brussels. With a resurgent Russia, Brussels needs to push back on the Russian periphery, and the opportunity to do so lies in Belarus, where Lukashenko has only a narrow window through which to establish economic and trade ties to the European Union before Moscow tugs on its leash. In Serbia, the current pro-EU government will eventually be judged by the electorate on its ability to move the country toward the European Union. The more the union stalls, the more Russia will be considered the obvious alternative. So what are the Dutch thinking? On one hand, commitment to human rights has been a long-standing policy of The Hague, particularly in the Balkans, where many — including the Dutch public — blame the Dutch peacekeepers for failing to prevent the Srebrenica massacre. On the other hand, the mere threat of a resurgent Russia ought to be enough to overcome the Dutch sensibilities in this matter, particularly with pressure from other European states. But Dutch sensibilities have not changed, which begs for an explanation that must be rooted in geopolitics. The Netherlands is flat — very flat. It could be (and has been) easily invaded and conquered by any one of its powerful neighbors — Germany, France, Britain, even Spain on occasion. The Dutch have learned to make their country indispensable to their neighbors as an independent nation rather than an occupied one. To achieve this they have built a transportation and business infrastructure — which they excel at managing — that is interconnected to their neighbors and indispensable for wider European trade. They have also become fluent in everyone else's languages — just to keep their neighbors happy. And they are committed to the spread of international humanitarian norms and the rule of international law, since such a framework favors the indefensible, but very economically efficient, Netherlands. Geopolitics gives the Netherlands two broad strategies to pursue: One of being a proactive balancer, the other of being a harsh pragmatist. Maintaining the alliance structure that ensures Dutch independence is a delicate balancing act, but when they are confronted with outside threats, the Dutch must be pragmatic. Within alliance structures such as NATO and the European Union, the Dutch make sure that everyone's interests are aligned and moving in the same direction. But this balancing act requires that all members of the alliance are at least reading from the same playbook (if not actually the same page). This makes the Netherlands opposed to outsiders, those countries whose interests are not already aligned with the common goals of the alliance. As it happens, human rights serve as a good litmus test for potential allies such as Belarus and Serbia to show the Netherlands how committed they are to a unified alliance. This would be an alliance in which great powers could not be pulled in different directions in ways that would negatively impact the Dutch. On a less abstract level, the Netherlands is also cautious about antagonizing Russia, which considers Belarus a crucial part of its periphery. Russians are heavily invested in the Netherlands, and the Dutch are among the largest investors in Russia. This is not a relationship the Dutch can ignore. Their geopolitical goals of vetting outsiders before admitting them to the Euro club and preserving the Russian relationship align perfectly in their position toward Belarus and Serbia. The longer the European Union delays its decision on the two countries, the more time Moscow has to build its relationship with them.