Rumors, statements, meetings and apprehension have descended upon the Korean Peninsula after North Korean leader Kim Jong Il failed to appear at a large celebration marking the 60th anniversary of North Korea on Sept. 9. Though Kim previously has skipped major public events, he typically has attended his country's anniversaries in five-year increments, including the 50th and 55th anniversaries in 1998 and 2003, respectively. His failure to show up this time lends credence to U.S. intelligence reports that Kim might have recently suffered a stroke, and subsequent media reports that he remains conscious but partially paralyzed. The reports have caused a frantic reaction in South Korea. An emergency Cabinet meeting was called Sept. 10, followed by Defense Ministry claims that no change has been detected in the North's military affairs and the subsequent raising of the South Korean Unification Ministry alert status to high. More broadly, Kim's potential demise (or at the very least his inability to remain at the regime's helm) has caused jitters around the globe.

North Korea without Kim

Given that Kim is already in his 60s and in poor health, the possibility that North Korea might soon lose the personality around which all its internal workings revolve is very real. Rather than a review of the ins and outs of how and if the "Dear Leader" has been incapacitated, a deeper look at what the Korean Peninsula could look like without Kim is in order. North Korea after Kim could trend toward one of two scenarios: a fairly stable transition (in North Korean style), or instability. To understand the former, it is necessary to look at North Korea's internal power structure. North Korea is governed by a group of elites managed and balanced by Kim. Although disagreements about allocation of resources and patronage occur from time to time, North Korean elites are unified in their desire to preserve and perpetuate their hold on power and the privileges that come with it. The current regime's survival will depend first and foremost on how well the various elites play together in shaping a successor government, how well they can balance their competing interests and whether they open themselves up to external exploitation. (By the third point, we mean allowing neighboring powers like China to direct North Korean politics from behind the scenes.) These internal factors will either push the regime toward a swift and sure demise, or they will cause it to re-emerge strengthened.

The Structure of the Elite

The balance of North Korean politics and the balance of power among its elite are always in flux. The elites are always jockeying for a higher rank, access to more funding or a greater piece of the economy, or for Kim's ear. Kim keeps his hold on the reins by playing competitors off one another, having spent decades setting up a system where spies report back to him from all directions — a system in which everyone is watching others and being watched in turn. North Korea has four centers of power: the Korean People's Army (KPA), the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) and the National Defense Commission (NDC). The KPA is the backbone of the country, the people, the party and the state, and a place for people to achieve upward mobility. It is large, receives lots of attention from the center and commands a fair amount of influence in shaping policies related to South Korea (particularly over the demilitarized zone) and regional relations. This state of affairs is encapsulated in the word "songun," or "military first," a term Kim coined in 1999 to emphasize that military priority was the only political stance by which North Korea could maintain its independence. The WPK is North Korea's ruling party, and it rules with a limited form of internal democracy, similar to the Communist Party of China. It is independent of the formal government — and in many ways it is the real government, given that Kim rose up through its ranks. Meanwhile, the SPA is North Korea's nominal parliament and more often than not rubber-stamps whatever is handed over by the government. The real power, presided over directly by Kim, is the NDC, which dominates the SPA. It has become the true center of power in the country and in some ways is the culmination of the military, party and government — Kim's balancing act institutionalized.

Generational Differences in the Elite

There are other, perhaps more significant modes of assessing North Korea's power structure. For example, consider age, seniority and generational differences, each of which have a major influence on internal politics in the country. The oldest generation of the current regime comprises the revolutionaries of former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's time. The second generation consists of the children of the revolutionaries, like Kim Jong Il. The rising third generation is made up of the revolutionaries' grandchildren. The first generation is nearly gone but remains the backbone of regime legitimacy. Members of the second generation (the current rulers) came of age after the Korean War, have never really fought in a war, and were raised in relative privilege, studying abroad in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or sometimes China. Cadres from this group owe their legitimacy to their parents. Their grip on power is tenuous, given that any shift in the balance or style of government means they will lose their privileges, which are based on the thin foundation of who their parents were. They have no real training for the modern world. The third generation is much more interesting. These are the spoiled but worldly elite, schooled in the United States and Western Europe, frequently at the London School of Economics. Their motivation is not so much power as it is money. They challenge the conventions of the current political and economic system and push for greater international economic cooperation and access. If push came to shove, this generation could well sell out the regime and party for its own personal gain. Just as the first generation was uneasy about handing over power to the second, the second generation is nervous about the transition of power to the third generation — but acutely more so. In general, the second generation feels threatened by its successors, while the third generation sees its elders as forming an irritating roadblock. An unregulated struggle between the elites of the second and third generation could get rather ugly. The second generation fears that shifts in U.S. leadership and growing political and economic pressures in South Korea might undermine the current trend of increased economic contact with North Korea. They also fear that any rapid policy shift could spur internal factional competition, undermining regime stability. With Kim at the helm, the first sign of internal rifts would have sent Pyongyang back to its policy of self-imposed isolation. But with Kim gone, such an outcome cannot be assumed.

The Two Roads Ahead

Ultimately, there is a plenty of room for speculation about North Korea's future without Kim, but nothing is as clear-cut as it was when his predecessor, Kim Il Sung, passed away. When Kim senior died, Kim junior had been in place as the obvious and (generally) accepted successor for well over a decade, spending years accompanying his father on inspection tours and building up multiple support bases throughout the elite. Kim might currently have a plan for succession, but it cannot be a well-established one, as more than one of his children and members of the elite still appear to be jostling for power. In recent years, the potential for a North Korean group leadership has become increasingly tangible. Whether a ruling group or junta would include only Kim's contemporaries, or whether it would be intergenerational, is difficult to tell. But the ability of North Korea's elite to hold on to their power might well depend on realizing just such an option. Otherwise, if North Korea's ruling class cannot maintain its grip on power, Kim's passing could lead down the road to chaos. This outcome would have massive geopolitical ramifications, as it could provoke the intervention of foreign states, such as China, who have their own interests in the Korean Peninsula.