The U.S. military handed over security control of Iraq's largest Sunni province, Anbar — a former bastion of both Sunni nationalist and jihadist militants — to Iraqi forces Sept. 1. Only a handful of the nearly 40 leaders of the Sunni tribal militia known as the Awakening Council attended the official ceremony, which was held under tight security in the provincial capital of Ar Ramadi. (The Awakening Council, which is on the U.S. payroll, played a key role in 2007 in getting Sunni nationalist militants fighting U.S. troops to turn their guns against al Qaeda-led jihadists.) Some American troops will remain in the province to train Iraqi army and police personnel and as a standby force in the event of any fresh surge in violence. The western province of Anbar is Iraq's largest province, stretching from Baghdad to the Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi borders. It is the 11th province to be transferred to Iraqi governmental control. Three Kurdish provinces in the north — Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniyah, which together form the autonomous federal Kurdistan region — and seven Shia-majority provinces in the south (Karbala, An Najaf, Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Al Qadisiyah, Maysin and Basra) have already come under Iraqi control. The transfer of Kurdish provinces was quick and smooth given their special status, while Baghdad was able to impose its writ on the Shiite provinces with some difficulty owing to intra-Shiite factional struggles. But Anbar is the first Sunni province to be handed over to Iraqi forces and therefore will be a major litmus test for Baghdad's control over Sunni areas. In a significant hurdle in this regard, the Shia dominate Iraqi national government forces while the fighters of the Sunni Awakening Councils established the calm in Anbar. With the Sunni integration within the Iraqi system still in limbo, a prime example of contested central-provincial authority is looming. The Awakening Council forces, which have a significant presence within the local police, would like to consolidate their hold over the province and use it as a springboard to enhance Sunni influence within the central government. Conversely, the Shiite-dominated al-Maliki administration wants to gain control over the province to limit Sunni power and consolidate Shiite domination of the post-Baathist Iraqi republic. The future status of Anbar is critical for both the Iraqi Sunni and Shia, as well as their respective backers, the United States and Iran. The Sunni share of the Iraqi political pie, which has seen U.S.-Iranian negotiations fall into gridlock, is the core issue. Washington fears a resurgent Russia will encourage Tehran to drive a harder bargain on the future of Iraq. Signs suggest that this may already be happening. Two weeks ago, a key legislator from Iraq's most powerful and pro-Iranian Shiite party — the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq — issued some tough remarks about the U.S.-supported Awakening Council. Jalal al-Din al-Saghir said, "The state cannot accept the men of the Awakening; their days are coming to an end." Elsewhere, Brig. Gen. Nasser al Haiti, the commander of Al Muthanna brigade in the Iraqi army, described the Awakening Council militiamen as a "cancer," adding that they must be "uprooted." The al-Maliki administration wants to see an end to this Sunni militia, and at the same time wants to limit the number of fighters to be integrated into Iraqi security forces. The Shia may have some options for dealing with the Awakening Council related to intra-Sunni politics in Anbar. At the same time that the Awakening Council is struggling with the Shiite-dominated central government, it is also at odds with a fellow Sunni group — the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. Not only do the IIP and its allies have a significant presence in the Presidency Council, Parliament and the Cabinet, they also control 36 of the 41 seats in the provincial council in Anbar. The rivalry between the Awakening Council and the IIP intensified in the wake of the provincial elections supposed to occur by the end of the year or early in 2009. These elections will be an opportunity for the tribes to dominate the province. They failed to accomplish this during the last election, which they boycotted — something the IIP took advantage of. Given its complex dealings with the al-Maliki administration, the IIP had provincial police chief Maj. Gen. Tareq Youssef al-Asal al-Dulaimi replaced with Riad al-Karboole, who is seen as an IIP man. The intra-Sunni rift could create problems for the 28,000-strong provincial police force, which could provide an opening for jihadists and other insurgent forces to rear their head again in Anbar. While it does not want to see Sunni empowerment via the Awakening Council, the al-Maliki government also does not want to see a revival of Sunni militancy in Anbar. Therefore, it cannot afford to take too strong a position against the Awakening Council by exploiting its rivalry with the IIP. If there is to be a settlement of this issue, it is not going to occur at the local, provincial or even the Iraqi national political level. The future role of Sunnis at all these levels will have to be sorted out between the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia.