Since Aug. 9, when Russian tanks began to roll into the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, it has become unequivocally clear that the Russian military has regained significant operational capability. STRATFOR believes that the Kremlin planned this demonstration of might beforehand and had its forces in a heightened state of preparedness and alert. But regardless of the degree of foreknowledge, the fact remains that when the moment came to strike, Russian forces were able to act. The Russian armed forces have widely been summarily dismissed as a third-rate military force since the fall of the Soviet Union. But while the decline of the 1990s was substantial, STRATFOR has long held that the Kremlin continues to enjoy the height of Soviet technology and, after years of reform under former President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, is not to be underestimated. Granted, the events of the past several days are still coming into focus, and the exact size and composition of the Russian force remains unclear. Nonetheless, the Russian military has demonstrated fundamental war-fighting ability in a number of respects: A speedy and decisive reaction to orders from Moscow. Russian forces quickly secured the crucial Roki Tunnel, which connects South Ossetia to the neighboring Russian province of North Ossetia. Less than 12 hours after Georgian troops moved into South Ossetia, a sizable column of Russian tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery had emerged on the South Ossetian side of the tunnel and was making a concerted push toward the capital, Tskhinvali. Appropriate vehicle maintenance and logistical support. While this operation was not a major long-distance offensive, vehicles were in a sufficient state of repair and logistics calculations were precise enough to effect a surge of Russian armor more than 30 miles into Georgia. Units of the 58th Combined Arms Army, likely including elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, were quickly at the outskirts of Tskhinvali and engaged in urban warfare. Sufficient command and control to orchestrate a broad combined-arms campaign. This coordination of combined arms — tanks and infantry, artillery guns and large artillery rockets, perhaps even Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships — suggests a notable degree of coordination and communication. Effective application of airpower. The Russian air force has sustained a bombing campaign across Georgia, including strikes at night. Russian planes took out key Georgian assets from the port of Poti, where the Georgian navy is based, to the airbase at Marneuli, where the Russians quickly took out the runway and removed Georgia's small handful of combat-capable Su-25 Frogfoot fighters from the equation. Indeed, one of the success stories of the Georgian defense industry has been a refurbishment facility for the Su-25 — and that, too, has been heavily bombed. Effective application of naval power. Warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet — including the 11,000-ton flagship Moskva — quickly moved into position off the Georgian coast, blocking any possible reinforcement from the sea and essentially completing the isolation of the small former Soviet republic. In the assault, Russian performance does not appear to have been flawless or wildly exceptional. But on the whole, Moscow has demonstrated that its armed forces have emerged from the darkest years of the 1990s. Russia has now accomplished something it had not done since the collapse of the Soviet Union: imposed its will militarily in its periphery. The idea that the Russian military can be dismissed out of hand has been proven false. Just how far it has come remains to be seen, but the message has already been sent. With this turn of events, countries from the Baltics to Ukraine to Central Asian states will start rethinking just what it means to share a border with Russia.