Chinese officials have released additional information on the Aug. 4 attack against a border police detachment in Kashi (Kashgar) city in Xinjiang province. According to the most recent reports, the two attackers, Uighur men aged 28 and 33, drove their dump truck into a group of some 70 border police jogging past the Yiquan hotel, a little more than 300 feet from the border police compound. In addition to driving the vehicle into the group, the attackers threw homemade explosives at the police from the vehicle. The attack killed 16 police officers and injured another 16. The driver then lost control and crashed the truck into a utility pole. The two men then apparently tried to escape, fighting with the police using knives, before being captured. The driver of the truck had blown off part of his arm after one of the explosive devises detonated in his hand. It is unclear whether this happened after or before the crash — if before, it might have been what caused the driver to lose control. Police found an additional 10 explosive devices in the vehicle, as well as four knives and a homemade gun. (click image to enlarge) It is unclear whether the attack was initially designed to target the police in the street, as opposed to the police station itself. However, it is highly likely that the officers follow a regular morning routine, so the attackers would probably have known there would be a large gathering of closely grouped and unarmed police in the area each morning. The most effective element of the attack was not the explosives — which seem to have injured the attackers more than their targets — but rather the simple use of a large vehicle to ram into the police detachment. The attack shows planning, but not a significant level of sophistication — though it does demonstrate that sophistication is not always necessary for success. In addition, the use of homemade devices, including the homemade gun, suggests the attackers either do not have access to commercial or military weapons (and thus minimal links to supply lines from outside Xinjiang) or they chose not to use them. This follows some earlier examples of Islamist Uighur militant groups, who trained and indoctrinated potential militants outside Xinjiang and then sent them back into China, sometimes with weapons and sometimes without, allowing them to choose the time and method of their attack on the establishment. The implication is that this attack comes at the behest of, or at least inspired by, the Turkistan Islamic Party or some related group, following up the July 25 video warning of further attacks. The small scale of the attack (despite the relatively high casualty count for an attack in China) may reflect a small and independent self-made cell operation, part of a movement with minimal connections between cells or back to a central leadership node. The cell is more likely to be inspired by ideology than specifically directed by an external leadership, with the apex leaders issuing videos and other media to inspire and draw attention to (and take credit for) activities, but remaining distant from the actual operators. This would suggest an evolution in Xinjiang militancy. The militants evidently are learning from the broader regional jihadist movement of the benefits of such a loosely affiliated structure — one that requires only a small core of planners, ideologues and operatives, isolated from the broader "inspired" movement that carries out attacks in a near-autonomous fashion. Thus if security forces crack one cell, it is difficult to trace it back to other cells or to the central leadership — making it harder for Chinese security forces to control or contain. If there is further evolution along these lines among the Uighur militants, security forces will be faced with an increasing number of small-scale actions — increasing the tactical threat even if the strategic threat to Beijing remains small. Perhaps the biggest threat is damage to China's image, and possible local repercussions of security operations China carries out in places other than Xinjiang.